1. 1. The department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the person's blood, breath, or urine was eight-hundredths of one percent or more by weight, based on the definition of alcohol concentration in section 302.500, or where such person was less than twenty-one years of age when stopped and was stopped upon probable cause to believe such person was driving while intoxicated in violation of section 577.010, or driving with excessive blood alcohol content in violation of section 577.012, or upon probable cause to believe such person violated a state, county or municipal traffic offense and such person was driving with a blood alcohol content of two-hundredths of one percent or more by weight.
2. 2. The department shall make a determination of these facts on the basis of the report of a law enforcement officer required in section 302.510, and this determination shall be final unless a hearing is requested and held. If a hearing is held, the department shall review the matter and make a final determination on the basis of evidence received at the hearing.
3. 3. The determination of these facts by the department is independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect any suspension or revocation under this section.

(L. 1983 S.B. 318 & 135 § 3, A.L. 1984 S.B. 608 & 681, A.L. 1991 S.B. 125 & 341, A.L. 1996 H.B. 1169 & 1271 merged with S.B. 722, A.L. 2001 H.B. 302 & 38)

Effective 9-29-01

(1985) Held that the provisions of this section are not impermissibly vague or violative of the equal protection clause. Vetter v. King (Mo. banc), 691 S.W.2d 255.

(1986) Probable cause that a person has been "driving" under this section was found even though the machine stands motionless, where such person is found unconscious behind the wheel with the motor running and the transmission in "drive". Dalton v. McNeill, 713 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. App.).

(1997) Where a driver was behind the wheel and had turned on the ignition of a vehicle parked in a driveway at the time of his arrest for driving while intoxicated, the driver was sufficiently in control of the vehicle to support an administrative suspension of his license. Lasley v. Director of Revenue, 954 S.W.2d 327 (Mo.banc).

(2001) Motorist who was under age 21 and had a blood alcohol content of .133% when stopped was subject to license suspension; special safeguard provision requiring probable cause for the initial stop was not applicable. Baldwin v. Director of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 401 (Mo.banc).

(2001) License suspension and revocation proceeding is a civil proceeding and thus the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not apply. Krieg v. Director of Revenue, 39 S.W.3d 574 (Mo.App.E.D.).

(2003) Person sitting in driver's seat of vehicle, either asleep or unconscious and with key in ignition and engine running, is operating the vehicle within meaning of section. Cox v. Director of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo.banc).