Mo. Rev. Stat. § 89.020
(RSMo 1939 § 7412, A.L. 1957 p. 274, A.L. 1959 H.B. 493, A.L. 1985 H.B. 552, A.L. 1989 S.B. 11)
(1957) City ordinance delegating to city council the discretionary power to enforce zoning regulations held valid. State ex rel. Ludlow v. Guffey (Mo.) 306 S.W.2d 552.
(1957) Power of eminent domain vested in school districts for the selection of sites and location of schools, cannot be controlled by city zoning ordinance. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferris (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 896.
1958) Where zoning of area as local business district was part of comprehensive zoning plan, it was not proper to look only to the uses of property in the particular district to determine whether the classification was reasonable as applied to owner's property, and further, where there were 35 residences and but three or four non- conforming uses in the district, the classification preventing use of owner's property as supper club was not unreasonable. Downing v. City of Joplin (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 81.
(1959) Since kinds of structures subject to control listed by this section do not include churches, it does not authorize cities to control their location within a city. Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur (Mo.), 320 S.W.2d 451.
(1961) Under this section the city has no right to impose upon landowners aesthetic standards for buildings they choose to erect. Accordingly ordinance requiring buildings to conform to certain architectural standards held void. State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze (A.), 342 S.W.2d 261.
(1962) Where individual operated a junkyard within an area subsequently zoned as two-family residential, he could not be deprived of his right to operate the junkyard unless he had abandoned the junkyard business. State ex rel. Capps v. Bruns (A.), 353 S.W.2d 829.
(1963) Provision of zoning ordinance that in class A residential districts buildings were to be used only for single-family dwellings, churches, public schools and accessory buildings was unconstitutional as applied to landowners who had operated a private school for profit before incorporation of village and adoption of zoning ordinance and who were denied permit to erect an additional school building on their land. Urnstein v. Village of Town and Country (Mo.), 368 S.W.2d 390.
(1963) Refusal to rezone vacant tract classified as residential to commercial was unreasonable and arbitrary and infringed plaintiff's rights under due process clause where maintenance of residential zoning bore no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare and where property was three times more valuable as commercial property and was not suited to residential development in view of adjacent commercial development and traffic conditions. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights (Mo.), 372 S.W.2d 833.
(1967) The exercise of the zoning powers delegated to cities including the enactment of ordinances amending the comprehensive plan is a legislative function and, as a general rule, courts will not inquire into the interests or motives of the members of a municipal legislative function. Strandburg v. Kansas City (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 737.
(1976) Denial to members of a religious society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an area zoned single-family residential was not a denial of their constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.
(1979) The zoning power of a municipality under §§ 89.010 to 89.140 does not authorize a municipality to restrict or limit use of public property for public purposes. City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills (A.), 589 S.W.2d 31.
(1993) Section is plain and unambiguous and provision of statute that addresses homes where unrelated physically or mentally handicapped persons reside does not require city to allow up to eight nonrelated individuals recovering from alcohol or drug abuse to live in single residence in single-family residential district. City of St. Joseph v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 859 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. App. W.D.).
(1994) Where statute provides that, for zoning purposes, single family residence includes group homes for eight or fewer physically or mentally handicapped persons and up to two caretakers, statute does not provide ceiling or express state policy limiting group homes to eight residents. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F.Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo.).