29 C.F.R. § 776.17
(a) Coverage in general. Employees who are not actually “producing * * * or in any other manner working on” goods for commerce are, nevertheless, engaged in the “production” of such goods within the meaning of the Act and therefore within its general coverage if they are employed “in any closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production thereof, in any State.” 77 Prior to the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, this was true of employees engaged “in any process or occupation necessary to the production” of goods for commerce. The amendments deleted the word “necessary” and substituted the words “closely related” and “directly essential” contained in the present law. The words “directly essential” were adopted by the Conference Committee in lieu of the word “indispensable” contained in the amendments as first passed by the House of Representatives. Under the amended language, an employee is covered if the process or occupation in which he is employed is both “closely related” and “directly essential” to the production of goods for interstate or foreign commerce.
The legislative history shows that the new language in the final clause of section 3(j) of the Act is intended to narrow, and to provide a more precise guide to, the scope of its coverage with respect to employees (engaged neither “in commerce” nor in actually “producing or in any other manner working on” goods for commerce) whose coverage under the Act formerly depended on whether their work was “necessary” to the production of goods for commerce. Some employees whose work might meet the “necessary” test are now outside the coverage of the Act because their work is not “closely related” and “directly essential” to such production; others, however, who would have been excluded if the indispensability of their work to production had been made the test, remain within the coverage under the new language. 78
The scope of coverage under the “closely related” and “directly essential” language is discussed in the paragraphs following. In the light of explanations provided by managers of the legislation in Congress 78 including expressions of their intention to leave undisturbed the areas of coverage established under court decisions containing similar language, 79 this new language should provide a more definite guide to the intended coverage under the final clause of section 3(j) than did the earlier “necessary” test. However, while the coverage or noncoverage of many employees may be determined with reasonable certainty, no precise line for inclusion or exclusion may be drawn; there are bound to be borderline problems of coverage under the new language which cannot be finally determined except by authoritative decisions of the courts.
(b) Meaning of “closely related” and “directly essential”. The terms “closely related” and “directly essential” are not susceptible of precise definition; as used in the Act they together describe a situation in which, under all the facts and circumstances, the process or occupation in which the employee is employed bears a relationship to the production of goods for interstate or foreign commerce: (1) Which may reasonably be considered close, as distinguished from remote or tenuous, and (2) in which the work of the employee directly aids production in a practical sense by providing something essential to the carrying on in an effective, efficient, and satisfactory manner of an employer's operations in producing such goods. 80
Not all activities that are “closely related” to production will be “directly essential” to it, nor will all activities “directly essential” to production meet the “closely related” test. For example, employees employed by an employer in an enterprise, or portion thereof, which is devoted to the production of goods for interstate or foreign commerce will, as a general rule, be considered engaged in work “closely related” to such production, but some such employees may be outside the coverage of the Act because their work is not “directly essential” to production of the goods. (For a discussion of this point and specific illustration, see § 776.18(b).) Similarly, there are some situations in which an employee performing work “directly essential” to production by an employer other than his own may not be covered because the kind of work and the circumstances under which it is performed show the employee's activities to be so much a part of an essentially local business operated by his employer that it would be unrealistic to consider them “closely related” to the productive activities of another. (For a more detailed discussion and specific illustrations see § 776.19.)
(c) Determining whether activities are “closely related” and “directly essential”.
77 If coverage of an employee is determined to exist on either basis, it is, of course, not necessary to determine whether the employee would also be covered on the other ground. See Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 124 F. 2d 42 (C.A. 5), affirmed in 317 U.S. 88.
78 H. Mgrs. St., 1949, p. 14; Sen. St., 1949 Cong. Rec. p. 15372; Statement of the Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor explaining the conference agreement to the House of Representatives, 1949 Cong. Rec., p. 15135; colloquy between Representatives McConnell and Javits, 1949 Cong. Rec., p. 15129; of statements of Representative Barden (1949 Cong. Rec. p. 15131), Representative Brehm (1949 Cong. Rec. p. 15132), and Senator Taft (1950 Cong. Rec., p. A-1162).
79 See Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517.
80 See H. Mgrs. St. 1949, pp. 14, 15; Sen. St., 1949 Cong. Rec., p. 15372; cf. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517.
81 Of course, if the need of function of the activity in production is such that the tie between them is both close and immediate (cf. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517), as for example, where an employee is employed to repair electric motors which are used in factories in the production of goods for commerce, this fact may be sufficient to show both the direct essentiality and the close relationship of the employee's work to production. See Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657. See also § 776.19 and H. Mgrs. St., 1949, pp. 14, 15.
82 Cf. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517; 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578; Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108; Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126.
83 See Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517.
84 Cf. 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578; Sen. St. 95 Cong. Rec., October 19, 1949, at 15372.
85 See Walling v. Hamner, 64 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Va.).