ZUMWALDE, APPELLEE, v. MADEIRA AND INDIAN HILL JOINT FIRE DISTRICT ET AL.; ASHBROCK, APPELLANT.
No. 2010-0218
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted February 1, 2011—Decided April 7, 2011.
128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., John T. Sunderland, and John B. Kopf, for appellees and cross-appellants Lorain County and Lorain County Board of County Commissioners.
John R. Varanese, for appellee city of Lorain.
[Cite as Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603.]
CUPP, J.
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellee, Barbara Zumwalde, previously sued defendant Madeira and Indian Hill Joint Fire District for unlawful employment discrimination. As part of the resolution of that matter, the district offered Zumwalde full-time employment contingent upon her passing a physical examination.
{¶ 3} In completing a questionnaire for the examination on July 14, 2005, Zumwalde indicated that she neither had nor had ever had back problems. Further, Zumwalde certified that all her answers in the questionnaire were true and complete and acknowledged that any material and deliberate falsification of fact would be grounds for dismissal. It was later learned, however, that Zumwalde‘s medical records indicated that she had received chiropractic treatment for back pain beginning in May 2005.
{¶ 4} On September 29, 2005, Zumwalde sustained a work-related injury to her low back during a training exercise. As a result, Zumwalde filed a workers’ compensation claim, which the district approved for benefits on or about October 14, 2005.
{¶ 5} While investigating Zumwalde‘s workers’ compensation claim, Chief Stephen Ashbrock of the district learned of Zumwalde‘s chiropractic treatment for back pain. Ashbrock determined that Zumwalde‘s misrepresentations violated the district‘s Personnel Guide and scheduled a predisciplinary conference for July 31, 2006.
{¶ 6} Based on the evidence presented at the July 31, 2006 conference, Ashbrock found that Zumwalde had violated two provisions of the Personnel Guide. Ashbrock suspended Zumwalde for 30 calendar days without pay and provided notice of her right of appeal to the district‘s Personnel Committee of the board of trustees. Zumwalde appealed the suspension. On October 20, 2006, the Personnel Committee sustained Ashbrock‘s conclusions and findings but reduced the period of loss of pay to 20 calendar days.
{¶ 7} Zumwalde then filed suit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas against the district and Ashbrock, asserting retaliation claims for filing (1) her previous discrimination suit and (2) the workers’ compensation claim. The district and Ashbrock filed a motion for summary judgment. Ashbrock argued that, as a district employee, he was immune from Zumwalde‘s claim pursuant to
{¶ 8} Ashbrock appealed the decision to the First District Court of Appeals. In affirming the denial of immunity, the First District analyzed the issue pursuant to
{¶ 9} We accepted Ashbrock‘s appeal under our discretionary jurisdiction for review of a single proposition of law: ”
Relevant Statute
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} “This chapter does not apply to, and shall not be construed to apply to, the following:
{¶ 13} “(A) Civil actions that seek to recover damages from a political subdivision or any of its employees for contractual liability;
{¶ 14} “(B) Civil actions by an employee, or the collective bargaining representative of an employee, against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision;
{¶ 15} “* * *
{¶ 16} “(E) Civil claims based upon alleged violations of the constitution or statutes of the United States, except that the provisions of section 2744.07 of the Revised Code shall apply to such claims or related civil actions.”
Analysis
{¶ 17} Ashbrock argues that the First District erred in its application of
{¶ 19} Further, Ashbrock maintains that
{¶ 20} In response, Zumwalde contends that the plain language of
{¶ 21} Zumwalde further asserts that examining
{¶ 22} This court concisely stated a well-settled rule of statutory interpretation in Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus: “[T]he intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the lawmaking body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. The question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it
{¶ 23} The court further expounded upon this rule in Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106, 65 O.O.2d 296, 304 N.E.2d 378: “It is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretive effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly.” (Citation omitted.)
{¶ 24} The language of
{¶ 25} Additionally, Zumwalde‘s argument that the use of “civil actions” instead of “civil claims” signifies the legislature‘s intent to remove immunity for employees of political subdivisions is without merit.
{¶ 26} Finally, Zumwalde maintains that public-policy considerations weigh in favor of denying immunity to political-subdivision employees named as defendants in a civil action arising out of the employment relationship. However, our conclusion that
Conclusion
{¶ 27} In a civil action brought by an employee of a political subdivision against another employee of the political subdivision arising out of the employment relationship,
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
Law Office of Marc Mezibov, Marc D. Mezibov, and Susan M. Lawrence, for appellee.
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, L.L.P., Wilson G. Weisenfelder Jr., and Laura I. Hillerich, for appellant.
White & Fish, L.P.A., Inc. and Arnold S. White, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.
Fortney & Klingshirn and Neil Klingshirn; and the Gittes Law Group and Frederick M. Gittes, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers’ Association.
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Municipal League, Ohio Township Association, and Ohio Fire Chiefs’ Association.