JUSTYNA ZUBKO-VALVA, as Mother and Natural Guardian of ANTHONY VALVA and ANDREW VALVA, and as Administratrix of the Estate of THOMAS VALVA, and JUSTYNA ZUBKO-VALVA Individually,
2:20-cv-2663 (ERK)(ARL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
KORMAN, J.:
On January 17, 2020, eight-year-old Thomas Valva (“Tommy“) froze to death in his father‘s garage. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 45, 263. Tommy‘s father Michael Valva and his father‘s girlfriend Angela Pollina had locked him in the garage overnight as a form of punishment. Id. ¶ 259. Indeed, Mr. Valva, who was a police officer, subjected Tommy, along with his brothers Anthony and Andrew, to a slew of sadistic “punishment[s]” in the years leading up to Tommy‘s death, such as forcing the children to eat hot pepper powder, denying them access to
While the barbaric acts of Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina are directly responsible for Tommy‘s death, there is an institutional actor that is almost as culpable. The facts describing that culpability, which I proceed to discuss below, are detailed in the complaint filed by Mrs. Valva against Mr. Valva, Ms. Pollina, CPS officials, and numerous other private and government defendants. Pending is a motion to dismiss this complaint brought by Suffolk County, an attorney for the Suffolk County‘s Department of Social Services, and seven Suffolk County Child Protective Services employees (collectively, but excluding the County, the “CPS Defendants“).1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 30, 2015, Mr. Valva filed for divorce. ECF No. 64-7 at 3. Mrs. Valva initially retained custody of their three children—Tommy, Anthony, and Andrew—while the divorce action was pending. Id. But after Donna McCabe, who had been appointed to represent the children in the divorce action, informed New York Supreme Court Judge Zimmerman that Mrs. Valva had been interfering with her access to the children, Judge Zimmerman decided to award temporary custody of the children to Mr. Valva. ECF No. 64-8 at 9–22. Judge Zimmerman did, however, allow Mrs. Valva unsupervised visitation with the children. ECF No. 1 ¶ 85.
After Mr. Valva was awarded temporary custody of the children, he began to file child abuse allegations against Mrs. Valva with CPS. Id. ¶ 94. Mr. Valva alleged that Mrs. Valva was hitting the children and poisoning them with a toxic “brown medicine.” Id. ¶ 95. He also accused Mrs. Valva of suffering from a deteriorating mental illness that rendered her incapable of caring for children. Id. A day after Mr. Valva filed his child abuse report, defendant Michele Clark, a CPS investigator, visited Tommy and Anthony at their school. Id. ¶ 99. The children denied Mr. Valva‘s allegations. Id. ¶¶ 99–100. They told CPS investigator Clark that they had no concerns about visiting their mother, that their mother did not use physical punishment, and that they were not afraid of her. Id.; see also ECF No. 79 at 6–7.
Mrs. Valva filed her own child abuse reports against Mr. Valva. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 103–04. Mrs. Valva informed CPS that her children were starving and suffering severe weight loss while living at their father‘s house. Id. ¶ 105. Mrs. Valva noted that in one month (i) Anthony, who was eight years old at the time, had lost 13.2 pounds; (ii) Tommy, who was six, had lost 4.4 pounds; and (iii) Andrew, who was four, had lost 3.7 pounds. Id. Mrs. Valva also reported that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina were beating the children on their heads, hands and backs, putting them in extremely long time-outs without food or drink, and making them stay outside in the backyard with no shoes. Id. ¶ 106. Mrs. Valva tried unsuccessfully to follow up on her report by calling the CPS hotline on November 13, 2017 and December 1, 2018. Id. ¶ 107. She later learned that CPS investigator
On December 19, 2017, Mrs. Valva met with CPS investigator Clark and two of her supervisors, defendants Edward Heepe and Robert Leto. Id. ¶ 110. Mrs. Valva told Ms. Clark, Mr. Heepe, and Mr. Leto that the boys were losing weight while living with their father, that their educational needs were not being met, and that their father was leaving them outside in the cold without shoes as a form of discipline. Id. ¶ 111. Mrs. Valva alleges that she provided Ms. Clark, Mr. Heepe, and Mr. Leto with a flash drive containing 320 files of direct evidence that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina were abusing the children. Id. ¶ 112. The flash drive also contained letters from the children‘s pediatrician and a neuropsychologist who specializes in treating children with autism (both Tommy and Anthony were diagnosed as autistic), id. ¶¶ 127, 276, which claimed that Mrs. Valva was a loving parent and that there were no signs that she abused her children. Id. ¶ 115. Moreover, the flash drive contained a letter from Dr. Kimberly Berens (who supervised Anthony‘s intensive behavior treatment), which predicted that Judge Zimmerman‘s order removing the children from Mrs. Valva‘s custody would cause regression in Anthony‘s developmental progress, as well as psychological and emotional distress for all three children. Id. ¶ 116. Mrs. Valva also provided CPS with certified transcripts of audio recordings showing Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina trying to brainwash the children against their mother by forcing them to repeat phrases like “I don‘t love mommy,” “mommy is mean,” and “I don‘t want to stay with mommy.” Id. ¶ 113.
On January 2, 2018, Mrs. Valva filed another child abuse report against Mr. Valva with Suffolk County CPS. ECF No. 1 ¶ 124. The complaint alleges that CPS closed out the report a day later without conducting any investigation. Id. ¶ 125. On January 14, 2018, Mrs. Valva filed a third child abuse report against Mr. Valva after she noticed injuries on Tommy‘s buttocks, which included coagulated blood spots, bruises, and broken blood vessels. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 127–28. Tommy told Mrs. Valva that Mr. Valva hit him 12 times the day before. Id. ¶ 130. After investigating the injuries to Tommy‘s buttocks, CPS filed a neglect petition against Mr. Valva for using excessive corporal punishment. Id. ¶ 148, ECF No. 79 at 9 n.1. Mr. Valva‘s neglect case was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal on March 7, 2018, and an order of protection was issued directing Mr. Valva to refrain from domestic violence and the use of corporal punishment and to take classes at a local library. ECF No. 1 ¶ 151; ECF No. 79 at 9 n.1.
On January 16, 2018, Mrs. Valva threatened to file a complaint against CPS investigator Clark for conducting CPS’ investigation in a biased and unfair manner. Id. ¶ 140. Mrs. Valva also blamed Ms. Clark for Mr. Valva‘s January 13 assault of Tommy. Id. The next day, Ms. Clark filed a neglect pre-petition against Mrs. Valva under
The complaint alleges that CPS investigators Lantz and Estrada repeatedly lied to ensure that the neglect petition against Mrs. Valva would continue. Id. ¶¶ 169–71. Specifically, Mrs. Valva claims that Ms. Lantz and Ms. Estrada fabricated allegations
Unlike Mr. Valva, who had his neglect case adjourned in contemplation of dismissal, CPS decided to prosecute the neglect case against Mrs. Valva. Because CPS chose to proceed with the neglect proceedings, Mr. Valva and Mrs. Valva‘s divorce proceedings were stayed pending resolution of the neglect petition. Id. ¶ 198. The neglect proceedings began with an emergency hearing on January 17, 2018, in which Family Court Judge Cheng issued a temporary order of protection suspending Mrs. Valva‘s rights to unsupervised visitations with her children. ECF No. 79 at 28; ECF No. 79-1 at 36–37. Mrs. Valva then requested a hearing on the temporary order of protection, which culminated in Judge Cheng modifying the order of protection two months later to allow for unsupervised visitation. ECF No. 79-1 at 8–9.
Judge Cheng proceeded to hold a full fact-finding hearing on the neglect petition. See ECF No. 79 at 3–22. Defendant Randall Ratje, an Assistant County Attorney, prosecuted the case on behalf of Suffolk County. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 176–78. On April 12, 2019, Judge Cheng concluded that the County had produced “insufficient credible evidence” to support a finding of child neglect against Mrs. Valva. ECF 79 at 22. Judge Cheng held that many of the County‘s allegations did “not even rise to the level of child neglect behavior.” Id. Moreover, the judge rejected the County‘s claims that Mrs. Valva‘s mental health was impaired. Id. at 21. Indeed, he observed that Mrs. Valva, who worked as a corrections officer, had submitted a pre-employment psychological evaluation report from the Department of Corrections that concluded that there was “no evidence of psychopathology.” Id.
Judge Cheng also stated that he had the opportunity to observe Mrs. Valva during the pendency of the case and during her testimony. Id. He found that, although Mrs. Valva expressed her belief that CPS, the County Attorney, and the attorney for the children were all working against her, she “was focused, goal-directed and clear” and did not appear to suffer from mental illness. Id. Thus, Judge Cheng dismissed the County‘s neglect petition against Mrs. Valva. Id. at 22.
Based on the multiple complaints from the children‘s school about Mr. Valva‘s abuse, Judge Cheng ordered CPS to investigate. ECF No. 1 ¶ 230; ECF No. 79 at 24–27. As a result, CPS generated investigative reports on October 2, 2018, October 15, 2018, and March 5, 2019, which contained statements from the children‘s teachers and doctors about Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s abuse. ECF No. 1 ¶ 230. For example, CPS’ October 15, 2018 report contained the following troubling claims from the boys’ teachers: (i) “Ms. Emin
very thin, has little to no affect, [and] has been observed snatching food off the desks and off the floor.” Id. ¶ 231 (emphases omitted). In the same report, the children‘s doctor expressed concern that Anthony and Tommy were undernourished and explained that “both children [were] underweight with their BMI being in the 1st percentile.” Id. ¶ 232.
Meanwhile, the children remained in Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s custody. On January 8, 2020, CPS investigator Lydia Sabosto and her supervisor, Jean Montague, closed out the last report that had been filed on the CPS hotline. Id. ¶ 254. Mrs. Valva spoke to CPS supervisor Montague on the phone twice and begged her not to close the investigation. Id. ¶ 255. Less than 10 days after CPS closed out its final investigation into Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s abuse, Tommy died. Id. ¶ 256.
DISCUSSION
This opinion resolves the motion to dismiss brought by Suffolk County and the CPS Defendants. In deciding a motion to dismiss under
incorporated by reference. Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2020).
I. Federal Claims
Mrs. Valva brings numerous causes of action claiming that the CPS Defendants violated her constitutional rights under
A. “Deliberate Indifference” in Violation of Due Process
Mrs. Valva claims that the CPS Defendants violated the Constitution by displaying
contemporary conscience.‘” Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep‘t, 577 F.3d 415, 431 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)).
Of course, nobody could dispute that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s actions, as outlined in the complaint, “shock the contemporary conscience.” Id. But “[a]s a general matter . . . a State‘s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause” even if state actors “may have been aware of the dangers that [the individual] faced” from specific private actors. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 201 (1989). Rather, private violence can only form the basis of a substantive due process claim in two scenarios: (1) where “the state had a special relationship with the victim” that gave rise to an obligation to protect him from the private violence and (2) where the state actor “in some way had assisted in creating or increasing the danger to the victim.” Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[e]ven if [a] claim falls within one of these two exceptions,” the defendants’ actions themselves must “shock the contemporary conscience“; it is not enough that the private individuals’ actions would meet that standard. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss her “deliberate indifference” claim, Mrs. Valva‘s complaint must plausibly allege that (1) the defendant is a state actor; (2) the defendants either (a) had a “special relationship” with her children that required them to protect the children from Mr.
Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s abuse or (b) helped to “creat[e] or increas[e] the danger” Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina posed to the children; and (3) the defendant‘s actions “shock[ed] the contemporary conscience.” Id.
No party disputes that the CPS Defendants are state actors. Rather the CPS Defendants argue that Mrs. Valva‘s substantive due process claim fails because she merely alleges that CPS Defendants “fail[ed] to protect” the Valva children from Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s “private violence,” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, and that, in any event, none of the CPS Defendants’ alleged actions “shock the contemporary conscience.” Matican, 524 F.3d at 155. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
Mrs. Valva claims that the CPS Defendants did not merely fail to protect her children from Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina, but rather, the CPS Defendants “enhanced the danger” that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina posed. Okin, 577 F.3d at 428. At first blush, DeShaney appears to foreclose Mrs. Valva‘s argument. In DeShaney, the police received a report that Joshua DeShaney‘s father was physically abusing him. 489 U.S. at 192. In response, the “Winnebago County Department of Social Services (DSS) interviewed the father, but he denied the accusations, and DSS did not pursue them further.” Id. When “Joshua was [later] admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions,” DSS obtained a court order placing Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital. Id. Yet three days later, DSS (working as part of a team with other individuals) determined that it lacked sufficient evidence to ask the court to retain custody over Joshua and had Joshua “returned . . . to the custody of
Id. DSS also agreed with the father that he would enroll Joshua in a preschool program, obtain counselling services, and encourage his girlfriend to move out of his home. Id.
“A month later, emergency room personnel called the DSS caseworker handling Joshua‘s case to report that he had once again been treated for suspicious injuries.” Id. But the caseworker took no action. Id. That same caseworker then made six monthly visits to Joshua‘s home “during which she observed a number of suspicious injuries on Joshua‘s head” and that Joshua‘s father was not complying with the terms of his agreement. Id. at 192–93. Still, the caseworker made no effort to remove Joshua from his father‘s custody. Id. at 193. Additionally, “neighbors informed the police that they had seen or heard Joshua‘s father or his [girlfriend] beating or otherwise abusing Joshua.” Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting). After “the emergency room notified DSS that Joshua had been treated once again for injuries that they believed to be caused by child abuse,” the caseworker made two attempts to see Joshua, but his father told her “that Joshua was too ill to see her.” Id. at 193 (majority opinion). Soon afterward Joshua‘s father “beat 4-year-old Joshua so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma . . . [and] suffered brain damage so severe that he [was] expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution” for individuals with severe disabilities. Id.
Joshua and his mother subsequently sued Winnebago County, DSS, and several DSS employees under
Although it recognized that the facts of the case were “undeniably tragic,” id. at 191, the Supreme Court held that the defendants’ actions did not violate due process, id. at 194. The Court explained that the Due Process Clause “forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law,‘” but does not “impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.” id. at 195. Thus, the Court concluded “that a State‘s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” id. at 197. It did not matter, the Court said, that the state actors in that case “may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced” from his father. id. at 201. What did matter was that the State “played no part in . . . creati[ng]” that danger “nor did it do anything to render [Joshua] any more vulnerable to [it].” Id. The defendants’ actions in that case, the Court observed, “placed [Joshua] in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all.” Id. And, therefore, no due process violation occurred in that case. See id. at 203.
Many of the CPS Defendants’ alleged actions that form the basis of Mrs. Valva‘s substantive due process claims bear an eerie resemblance to DeShaney. Mrs. Valva made multiple reports detailing abuse her children were suffering at Mr. Valva‘s home. She also provided CPS defendants Clark, Heepe, and Leto with photographic evidence of this abuse. Nonetheless, the CPS Defendants did very little to intervene. In response to many of the reports, the CPS Defendants took no action,
marking the reports as closed without conducting any investigations. On one occasion a CPS employee attempted to visit the children at Mr. Valva‘s home but declined to pursue the matter any further once Mr. Valva denied him entry. CPS eventually filed a neglect petition against Mr. Valva, but that petition focused on only one incident
CPS, it seems, adopted the same strategy as DSS in DeShaney; it waited for “the phone [to] ring some day” when one of the Valva children “would be dead.” 489 U.S. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted). Sickening as it is, DeShaney establishes that such a course of action does not violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at 203 (majority opinion). While Mrs. Valva appeals to some general language in the Second Circuit‘s decision in Okin that, in a vacuum, might be understood to establish that a state‘s repeated failure to act can alone form the basis of a substantive due process claim, that language, in context, does not stand for such a broad proposition. Okin states that “repeated, sustained inaction by government officials, in the face of potential acts of violence, might constitute prior assurances rising to the level of an affirmative condoning of private violence, even if there is no explicit approval or encouragement.” 577 F.3d at 428 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). While this language appears to be in tension with DeShaney, a careful reading of Okin suggests only that “repeated, sustained inaction . . . might constitute prior assurances rising to the level of an affirmative condoning of private violence” but only in cases where there is some additional act by the government officials that would lead the perpetrator of the violence to believe that the inaction signaled condonation. 577 F.3d at 428 (emphasis added). Indeed, in explaining the actual holding in the case, Okin and subsequent Second Circuit decisions distinguishing Okin focus on the fact that, in addition to the government officials’ inaction in Okin, those officials “openly expressed camaraderie with [the perpetrator] and contempt for [the victim].” Id. at 430; see also Brown v. City of New York, 786 F. App‘x 289, 292 (2d Cir. 2019) (“This case is unlike Okin, where officers repeatedly and ‘openly expressed camaraderie’ with a physical abuser and contempt for the victim.” (quoting Okin, 577 F.3d at 430)); Coleman v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 685 F. App‘x 69, 71 (2d Cir. 2017) (nearly identical). Thus, Mrs. Valva cannot defeat the CPS Defendants’ motion to dismiss by pointing only to allegations of CPS’ failure to take actions to protect her children from Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina even if those defendants were “aware of the dangers that [the children] faced.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
But Mrs. Valva‘s complaint alleges more than the CPS Defendants’ failure to act. It alleges that certain CPS Defendants pursued a neglect petition against Mrs. Valva in which they advanced false and misleading accounts of Mrs. Valva‘s
treatment of the children. Specifically, CPS investigator Clark, “with the full knowledge, consent and encouragement of Heepe and Leto” falsely accused Mrs. Valva of suffering from mental illness, using excessive corporal punishment, and other serious abuse. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 142–43, 156, 160. Ms. Clark made these claims even though, on five previous occasions, including two days before the neglect pre-petition was filed, Ms. Clark reported that “there were no safety concerns that placed the children in immediate danger of serious harm, in regards to her investigation against [Mrs. Valva].” Id. ¶ 147 (capitalization omitted). The complaint also alleges that, after CPS investigator Clark filed the petition, CPS defendant Lantz and her supervisor CPS
The CPS Defendants argue that the fact that CPS filed a neglect petition against Mr. Valva effectively cancels out any inference Mrs. Valva asks the court to draw in her favor from the neglect petition CPS pursued against her. The CPS Defendants are wrong. The relief CPS requested vis-à-vis Mr. Valva confirmed that, despite Mrs. Valva‘s allegations, they favored Mr. Valva over Mrs. Valva. CPS requested a stay-away order for Mrs. Valva that only allowed her supervised visits with her children, but for Mr. Valva, CPS merely asked the family court to order him to refrain from violence and corporal punishment towards his children. ECF No. 79-1 at 38. And CPS’ preferential treatment of Mr. Valva continued when, less than two months later, it agreed to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal of the
petition. ECF No. 1 ¶ 151. In contrast, CPS pursued its petition against Mrs. Valva until the family court dismissed it on the merits sixteen months after it was filed. ECF No. 79 at 22.
Crucially, Mr. Valva was aware of the disparate treatment he and Mrs. Valva were receiving from CPS. During Mrs. Valva‘s neglect proceedings, Mr. Valva testified for CPS in support of the petition. ECF No. 1 ¶ 203; ECF No. 79 at 16–17. And it is not unreasonable to infer that through that invited support of the neglect petition against Mrs. Valva, Mr. Valva also learned of the CPS Defendants’ glowing reports of his care for the children and their cavalier attitude towards Mrs. Valva‘s allegations and evidence against him. Thus, based on Mrs. Valva‘s allegations, one can plausibly infer that the CPS Defendants “affirmative conduct” in pursuing the neglect petition against Mrs. Valva “enhanced the danger to [her children] because they conveyed to” to Mr. Valva that, no matter what they would learn about Mr. Valva, only Mrs. Valva would remain in their crosshairs. Okin, 577 F.3d at 430. With this additional knowledge of CPS’ blinding fixation on Mrs. Valva, Mr. Valva could safely assume that he and Ms. Pollina could continue and escalate their abuse “with impunity.” Id. at 431.
To be clear, what distinguishes this case from DeShaney is not Mr. Valva‘s knowledge that CPS was not moving against him despite the evidence of his abuse they possessed. Joshua‘s father must have also possessed such knowledge in DeShaney. See 489 U.S. at 192–93. Rather, what is different here is that Mrs. Valva‘s
allegations plausibly demonstrate that CPS took affirmative actions that demonstrated to Mr. Valva, not only that they had information implicating him that they were not acting on, but also that, even with the evidence they possessed, they had effectively concluded that Mrs. Valva, not him, was the guilty party in this ordeal. Knowing this, Mr. Valva could logically conclude that he did not risk serious repercussions from his and Ms. Pollina‘s continued and intensifying abuse of his children. Thus, Mrs. Valva plausibly alleges that “state officials communicate[d] to a private person that he or she [would] not be arrested, punished, or otherwise interfered with while engaging in misconduct that is likely to endanger the life, liberty or property of others.” Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2005); see also id. at 110–12 (holding that plaintiffs stated a
Having concluded that Mrs. Valva plausibly alleges that the CPS Defendants “enhanced the danger” that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina posed to her children, Okin, 577 F.3d at 428, the next question is whether CPS Defendants’ danger-enhancing
activity was “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience,” id. at 431. According to the complaint, the CPS Defendants repeatedly ignored a desperate mother‘s plea for help, despite having significant evidence of Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina‘s abuse, and then pursued a neglect petition against Mrs. Valva to cover up for, and distract from, their failures. As Mrs. Valva observes, “[i]f the conduct described in the Complaint does not ‘shock the conscience,’ it is hard to fathom what conduct would meet that bar.” ECF No. 78-6 at 23; see also Okin, 577 F.3d at 432 (holding that state officials “conduct shocks the conscience” if their “actions demonstrate a willful disregard of the obvious risks of a domestic violence situation, the serious implications of [a victim‘s] complaints over a fifteen-month period, and the likelihood that their misconduct would enhance the danger to [the victim]“).The deliberate indifference claim may proceed against CPS defendants Clark, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, and Estrada, as Mrs. Valva has adequately alleged that these defendants’ actions enhanced the danger Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina posed to her children.2 The motion to dismiss this claim is granted as to CPS defendants Sabosto and Montague because Mrs. Valva has not alleged that these defendants were involved in the neglect proceedings or otherwise enhanced the danger to Mrs. Valva‘s children.
B. Denial of Fair Trial Claim
Mrs. Valva claims that the CPS Defendants violated Mrs. Valva‘s
A
Mrs. Valva‘s allegations are sufficient to state a fair trial claim. She states that the CPS Defendants, acting as investigating officials, fabricated evidence that was used to prosecute her in a neglect proceeding and temporarily resulted in a loss of her parental rights. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 313–18. The CPS Defendants argue that Mrs. Valva has failed to establish a causal connection between the fabricated evidence and a deprivation of liberty because her children were removed from her custody in the matrimonial proceeding before Judge Zimmerman—not the neglect proceeding before Judge Cheng. But the neglect proceedings did result in a deprivation of liberty for Mrs. Valva. At the beginning of the proceedings, CPS requested, and Judge Cheng granted, a temporary order of protection suspending Mrs. Valva‘s right to unsupervised visitations with her children. ECF No. 79 at 28; see ECF No. 79-1 at 36-37. This restriction on Mrs. Valva‘s rights lasted almost two months. ECF No. 79-1 at 8-9. The Supreme Court has recognized “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” as a liberty interest protected by the
The denial of the right to a fair trial claim may proceed against CPS defendants Clark, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, and Estrada, as Mrs. Valva has adequately alleged that these defendants fabricated evidence that was used against her in the neglect proceedings. The motion to dismiss this claim is granted as to CPS defendants Sabosto and Montague because Mrs. Valva has failed to allege that these defendants falsified evidence that was used in the neglect proceedings.
C. Stigma Plus
Mrs. Valva brings a stigma plus claim against the CPS Defendants based on the false statements they made about her treatment of her children that culminated in the neglect proceedings. To prevail on a stigma plus claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the utterance of a statement sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved false, and that he or she claims is false, and (2) a material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration of the plaintiff‘s status or rights.” Mudge v. Zugalla, 939 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Mrs. Valva alleges that the CPS Defendants falsely stated that she abused and neglected her children, injuring her reputation and resulting in the temporary loss of unsupervised visitation with her children through the neglect proceedings. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 325-31. These allegations are sufficient to state a stigma plus claim. The CPS Defendants argue that Mrs. Valva has not shown that the allegedly defamatory statements resulted in “a material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration of [her] status or rights.” Sadallah, 383 F.3d at 38. But as the stigma plus claim, like the denial of a fair trial claim, arises under the
The stigma plus claim may proceed against CPS defendants Clark, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, and Estrada, as Mrs. Valva has adequately alleged that these defendants were involved in making false statements about Mrs. Valva that were used against her in the neglect proceedings. The motion to dismiss this claim is granted as to CPS defendants Sabosto and Montague because Mrs. Valva has failed to allege that these defendants were involved in the neglect proceedings.
D. Malicious Prosecution
Mrs. Valva brings a malicious prosecution claim against the CPS Defendants, alleging that their instigation of baseless neglect proceedings against her violated her
Mrs. Valva‘s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for malicious prosecution under New York law. While the neglect proceedings were not criminal, they did cause Mrs. Valva to lose unsupervised visitation with her children for almost two months. This was an interference with Mrs. Valva‘s personal rights that should rise to the level of a special injury sufficient to serve as the basis of a malicious prosecution claim under New York law. See Yuan v. Rivera, 48 F. Supp. 2d 335, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that depriving the plaintiff “of the custody of her children for several months” satisfied the special injury requirement). By alleging
But Mrs. Valva has not brought a New York law malicious prosecution claim.3 Instead, Mrs. Valva only alleges malicious prosecution under
Because Mrs. Valva has not sufficiently alleged a violation of her
E. Abuse of Process
Mrs. Valva claims that the baseless neglect proceedings constituted a malicious abuse of process under
F. Conspiracy
Mrs. Valva generally alleges that the CPS Defendants were involved in a
G. Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity applies to all actions taken by Assistant County Attorney Randall Ratje in prosecuting Mrs. Valva in the neglect proceeding. See Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1984). As Mrs. Valva has not alleged that Ratje infringed on Mrs. Valva‘s rights outside the context of this proceeding, the motion to dismiss is granted as to all claims against CPS defendant Ratje.
As to the other CPS Defendants, Mrs. Valva has adequately alleged that these defendants were acting in their investigative capacity and were thus not entitled to absolute immunity. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[O]nly qualified immunity [is accorded] to prosecutors who act in an investigating capacity.“); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1986) (complaining witnesses not entitled to absolute immunity).
H. Qualified Immunity
The CPS Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they had a reasonable basis for initiating neglect proceedings. As Mrs. Valva has adequately alleged that the CPS Defendants had no basis for initiating neglect proceedings, this fact-intensive issue should not be resolved at the pleading stage. See Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[Q]ualified immunity may only be granted on a motion to dismiss if the available record adequately supports the defendants’ claim that” their actions were “objectively reasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
I. Municipal Liability
To state a claim for municipal liability under
“A municipality may be found to have a custom that causes a constitutional violation when, ‘faced with a pattern of misconduct[, it] does nothing, compelling the conclusion that [it] has acquiesced
At this preliminary stage, Mrs. Valva has adequately alleged that Suffolk County‘s failure to train CPS employees violated her constitutional rights. Mrs. Valva alleges that CPS employees Clarke, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, Estrada, Sabosto, and Montague repeatedly ignored reports by Mrs. Valva and school employees that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina were abusing the children. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 93–174, 228, 230–34, 254-55. She also alleges that CPS employees Clarke, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, and Estrada were involved in fabricating evidence against Mrs. Valva to bring neglect proceedings against her even though it was clear that Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina were the ones abusing her children. Id. ¶¶ 141–90. As discussed above, these allegations underly cognizable constitutional violations: deliberate indifference, denial of a fair trial, and stigma plus. Mrs. Valva plausibly alleges that Suffolk County‘s failure to train CPS employees in “verify[ing] the claims of autistic children who may be the victim of abuse” and “assess[ing] the veracity of autistic children who deny that they have been abused” was responsible for several CPS employees privileging the claims against Mrs. Valva over those against Mr. Valva and Ms. Pollina despite significant evidence to the contrary, resulting in violations of Mrs. Valva‘s constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 350.
While a single incident is typically insufficient to establish that a municipal actor was deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations, see Connick, 563 U.S. at 62, Mrs. Valva has plausibly alleged multiple constitutional violations by several CPS employees over the course of more than two years, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 93–190, 228-55. At this stage, this is sufficient for Mrs. Valva to state a claim that Suffolk County “ha[s] deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. The motion to dismiss the municipal liability claim against Suffolk County is denied.
As the suits against the individual CPS Defendants in their official capacities are in essence suits against Suffolk County, they are redundant. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.“). Thus, the motion to dismiss the official-capacity suits against the individual CPS Defendants is granted.
Mrs. Valva also brings her municipal liability claim against “the CPS Supervisory
II. State Law Claims
As some of the federal law claims against the CPS Defendants and Suffolk County remain in this case, I have supplemental jurisdiction over Mrs. Valva‘s state law claims against the CPS Defendants and Suffolk County because they arise out of the “same case or controversy” as the federal claims.
The CPS Defendants argue that all of Mrs. Valva‘s state law claims against them must be dismissed because she failed to comply with
Here, Mrs. Valva sent her notice of claim to the “Suffolk County District Attorney” via priority mail. ECF No. 78-5. While the “Suffolk County District Attorney” is not technically the same as the “Suffolk County Attorney“—the office that should have received the notice—the address listed on the mailing was correct and it did eventually end up at the correct office. Id. This error was thus not fatal to Mrs. Valva providing adequate service under
Nevertheless, Mrs. Valva‘s decision to send the notice via priority mail does render her service inadequate.
“Failure to comply with [Section 50(e)‘s] requirements ordinarily requires a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.” Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1999). I thus grant the CPS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all of Mrs. Valva‘s state claims against the CPS Defendants and Suffolk County. Nevertheless, because Mrs. Valva‘s failure to comply with
CONCLUSION
The
SO ORDERED.
Brooklyn, New York
June 15, 2022
Edward R. Korman
Edward R. Korman
United States District Judge