Yeater v. LaBrae School Dist. Bd. of Edn.Yeater v. LaBrae School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Daniel G. Keating, Keating, Keating & Kuzman, 170 Monroe Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44483 (For Appellees- Amy & Gary L. Yeater).
William L. Hawley and Matthew G. Vansuch, Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., 108 Main Avenue, S.W., #500 P.O. Box 1510, Warren, OH 44482 (For Appellee-Anthony Monty).
John D. Latchney, Tomino & Latchney, L.L.C., L.P.A., 803 East Washington Street, #200, Medina, OH 44256 (For Appellant-LaBrae School District, Board of Education).
O P I N I O N
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Board of Education, LaBrae School District, appeals the Judgment Entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, in which the trial court denied its Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶3} Yeater subsequently filed suit against the LaBrae School District, Huscroft, and Monty, claiming that the negligent supervision of the School District employees and physical defects within the gymnasium caused her injury. There was also a claim for spoliation of evidence after the School District disposed of the volleyball stanchion. The School District and Huscroft moved for summary judgment, alleging they were entitled to immunity as to the claims for negligence and spoliation of evidence. Monty moved for summary judgment on the basis that the accident was not foreseeable as a matter of law.
{¶4} The trial court denied Monty‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that there were issues of fact concerning the foreseeability of the accident. The court also denied the School District‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained. The court awarded summary judgment to all defendants on the issue of spoliation of evidence, and to Huscroft for negligence, finding the defendants were entitled to immunity for those claims.
{¶5} The School District timely appealed and raises the following assignment of error: “The trial court erred when it denied Appellant LaBrae School District Board of
{¶6} Pursuant to
{¶7} A trial court‘s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed by an appellate court under a de novo standard of review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 1996-Ohio-336. An appellate court must independently review the record to determine if summary judgment was appropriate. Therefore, an appellate court affords no deference to the trial court‘s decision while making its own judgment. Schwartz v. Bank One, Portsmouth, N.A. (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 806, 809; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-412.
{¶8} The School District first argues that it is immune from liability under
{¶10} The LaBrae School District is a political subdivision. See
{¶11} The second tier involves exceptions to immunity located in
{¶13}
{¶14} To trigger the immunity exception, Yeater had to demonstrate that her injury was caused by the negligence of a School District Employee and that the injury was due to a physical defect. See Dunfee v. Oberlin School Dist., 9th Dist. No. 08CA009497, 2009-Ohio-3406, at ¶13 (“to trigger the immunity exception set forth in
{¶15} The School District claims that there is no genuine issue of fact regarding the negligence of its employees. Further, “to the extent that the trial court‘s decision denying the School District‘s Motion for Summary Judgment was predicated upon Appellee‘s ‘negligent supervision’ argument, the trial court erred.” Moreover, the School District claims that “the physical defects exception is inapplicable because Plaintiff-Appellee was unable to establish negligence in maintenance.”
{¶17} In the context of summary judgment, a party raising an immunity defense must present evidence tending to prove the underlying facts upon which the defense is based. Evans v. S. Ohio Med. Ctr. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 250, 255.
{¶18} “To establish actionable negligence, one must show in addition to the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty and injury resulting proximately therefrom.” Mussivand v. David (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318. “The existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law for the court to determine.” Id.
{¶19} School officials are under no duty to watch over each child at all times. Nottingham v. Akron Bd. of Edn. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 319, 322, citing Allison v. Field Local School Dist. (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 13, 14. “Unless a more specific obligation is assumed, such personnel are bound only under the common law to exercise that care necessary to avoid reasonably foreseeable injuries.” Id., citing Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. v. Toledo (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 96, 98; Huston v. Konieczny (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 214, 217.
{¶20} Yeater contends that Huscroft was negligent in “abandoning her duties to monitor the *** students in the gym, thereby allowing *** the stanchions to be moved in her absence,” and the employees of the school were also negligent in “failing to inspect
{¶21} The School District contends that the third tier of the immunity analysis is applicable. The School District argues that the discretionary immunity contained in
{¶22} “Since the immunity statutes generally provide that ‘“you‘re not liable,” then say “you are liable” and finally say “you‘re not,“’ it is clear that the exceptions to liability in
{¶23} We agree that “[p]ursuant to
{¶25} “Sovereign immunity *** protects only those charged with weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning characterized by a high degree of discretion and judgment. It does not protect a board of education from the negligent conduct of its employees in the details of carrying out the activity even though there is discretion in making choices. This is not the type of discretion for which there is immunity as it does not involve public policy endangering the creative exercise of political judgment.” Du Bose v. Akron Pub. Schools, 9th Dist. No. 18707, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1805, at *10.
{¶26} “[A] school district must inspect for dangerous conditions and take precautions for known or reasonably foreseeable dangers associated with the use of school property.” Id. (citation omitted). “The test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the performance or nonperformance of an act.” Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (citation omitted). The foreseeability of harm generally depends on a defendant‘s knowledge. Thompson v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co. (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 116, 119-120.
{¶27} In Hallett v. Stow Bd. of Edn. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 309, the court held that “[t]here was evidence before the trial court from which it could be concluded that
{¶28} There is evidence from which it could be concluded that there was a defect in the stanchion and that the accident was foreseeable due to the physical defect, i.e. loose bolts.
{¶29} Furthermore, in Du Bose, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1805, a student suffered severe rope burns on her hands when she and other students engaged in a game of tug-of-war on the playground. At the time, the teachers were on the playground but were conversing rather than watching the students and the school had a rule against playing tug-of-war on the playground. The Du Bose court found that the “negligent supervision of children on a playground -- does not involve the type of decision making with respect to public policy and planning that is characterized by a high degree of discretion and judgment. Therefore, the defendants are not immune pursuant to
{¶30} Testimony presented revealed that the students were not allowed to move the stanchions. When a teacher was asked why students were not allowed to move them, he stated that “we thought it was probably unsafe for them to do that.” The stanchions were kept outside of the gymnasium; however, the area was accessible to
{¶31} Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of fact whether Yeater‘s injury occurred due to the negligence of a School District Employee and that the injury was due to a physical defect. See
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment Entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, denying the School District‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
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{¶33} I respectfully dissent.
{¶34} The majority affirms the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly denied the School District‘s motion for summary judgment. I disagree.
{¶35} The Supreme Court of Ohio stated in Elston v. Howland Local Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, syllabus:
{¶36} “Pursuant to
{¶37} The Supreme Court further indicated the following in Elston at ¶19-20:
{¶38} “We have held and it is well recognized that a political subdivision acts through its employees. In Spires v. Lancaster (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 76, ***, we stated, ‘“It is undeniable that the state can only act through its employees and officers.“’ Id. at 79, ***, quoting Drain v. Kosydar (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 49, 56, ***.
{¶39} “Furthermore, teachers and coaches, as employees of a political subdivision, have ‘wide discretion under
{¶40} In the instant matter, although appellees complain that the students were left unattended or not properly supervised, this writer believes the School District has
{¶41} Based upon the discretionary immunity afforded by
{¶42} For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.