Williе J. Wright, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14AP-153
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 30, 2014
[Cite as Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-4359.]
KLATT, J.
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2012-06301) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on September 30, 2014
Swope and Swope, and Richard F. Swope, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Lindsey M. Grant and Christopher L. Bagi, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
KLATT, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Willie J. Wright, appeals a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio that granted summary judgment to defendant-appellee, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“). For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
{¶ 2} Wright is an inmate in ODRC‘s care and custody. ODRC has assigned Wright to the North Central Correctional Complex (“NCCC“), which is a prison managed by Management Training Corporation (“MTC“).
{¶ 3} On August 12, 2012, Wright filed a negligence action against ODRC. According to Wright‘s complaint, on or abоut March 9, 2012, NCCC correctional officers
{¶ 4} ODRC moved for summary judgment on the basis that Wright had sued the wrong party in the wrong court. ODRC рresented evidence that MTC, a private corporation, manages the day-to-day operation of NCCC pursuant to a contract between ODRC and MTC. According to ODRC, MTC is an independent contractor and, consequently, ODRC cannot be liable for MTC‘s negligence or the negligence of its employees. In response, Wright argued that MTC is not an independent contractor, but instead, an agent of ODRC. Wright therefore contended that ODRC was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of MTC and its employees.
{¶ 5} In a judgment entered January 22, 2014, the trial court concluded that Wright pleaded no claim for which ODRC was either vicariously or directly liable. The trial court determined that the evidence demonstrated MTC‘s status as an independent contractor, and no exception to the gеneral rule exempting an employer from liability for its independent contractor‘s negligence applied. Accordingly, the trial court granted ODRC summary judgment.
{¶ 6} Wright now appeals the January 22, 2014 judgment, and he assigns the following error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE‘S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
{¶ 7} A trial court will grant summary judgment under
{¶ 8} ” ‘One who causes work to be done is not liable, ordinarily, for injuries that result from carelessness in its performance by the employees of an independent contractor, to whom he has let the work, without reserving to himself any contrоl over the execution of it.’ ” Richman Bros. Co. v. Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 430-31 (1936), quoting Ohio S. RR. Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207 (1890), paragraph three of the syllabus. More simply, an employer is generally not liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor that it has hired. Pusey v. Bator, 94 Ohio St.3d 275, 278 (2002). However, an employer cannot likewise evade liability if the negligent party is the employer‘s employee or agent. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employеr is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees or agents. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594, 2009-Ohio-3601, ¶ 20; Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, ¶ 18.
{¶ 9} The doctrine of respondeat superior depends on the existence of control by a principal ovеr an agent. Wuerth at ¶ 20; Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292, 296 (1955). If an employer retains control or the right to control the mode and manner of doing the work contracted for, then the relationship is one of principal and agent. Councell at paragraph one of the syllabus. On the other hand, if the employer merely dictates the ultimate result to be accomplished, then the relationship is one of employer and independent contractor. Id.
{¶ 10} In determining whether an employer has the degree of control necessary to establish agency, courts examine a variety of factors, including: whether the employer or individual controls the details of the work; whether the individual is performing in the course of the employer‘s business rather than in an ancillary capacity; whether the individual receives compensation from the employer, and the mеthod of that compensation; whether the employer or individual controls the hours worked; whether the employer or individual supplies the tools and place of work; whether the individual offеrs his services to the public at large or to one employer at a time; the length of employment; whether the employer has the right to terminate the individual at will; and
{¶ 11} Given the amount of factors involved, determining whether a relationship is that of principal and agent or employer and independent contractor requires an intensive factual inquiry. If the opposing parties present evidence on both sides of the issue, then summary judgment is inappropriate, and a finder of fact must decide the issue. Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146-47 (1988).
{¶ 12} Here, to show ODRC‘s control over MTC, Wright relies on the terms of ODRC and MTC‘s contract. In the contract, MTC agreed to implеment and comply with Ohio laws and administrative rules, as well as ODRC policies and standard operating procedures. More specifically, MTC agreed to: hire personnel with the minimum qualifications established by ODRC; require its employees to obtain training through ODRC; meet ODRC‘s mandatory minimum staffing requirements; adopt policies, procedures, and practices for the security and control of the institution thаt comply with the requirements of
{¶ 13} With regard to inmate transportation, the task that MTC‘s employees were performing when the alleged nеgligence occurred, the contract specifies the qualifications the driver of the vehicle must have, the type of restraints that must be used on the inmates during transportation, and pre-boаrding procedures that correctional officers must
{¶ 14} To counter this evidence, ODRC points to the affidavit testimony of Chris Shortland, the human resources manager for NCCC, and Kelly Sanders, the chief of ODRC‘s division of business administration. Both Shortland and Sanders state that, “[w]hile MTC maintains, manages, аnd operates NCCC in accordance with contractual and statutory criteria, it does so independently of [O]DRC and the State of Ohio.” (Shortland affidavit at ¶ 10; Sanders affidavit at ¶ 9.) Sanders additionally avers that “[O]DRC is not involved in MTC‘s daily decision-making with regard to NCCC.” (Sanders affidavit at ¶ 10.)
{¶ 15} The evidence presented by both parties has relevance to only one factor of the applicable tеst: who controls the details of the work that ODRC hired MTC to perform. Considering this sole factor, the trial court found that MTC was an independent contractor because the evidence did not show that ODRC controlled the specific mode and manner in which NCCC correctional officers were to remove inmates from prison vehicles. This finding is problematic for three reasons. First, the factor at issue requires a broader inquiry into who controls the details of the hireling‘s work, and not just who controls how to perform the specific task that was allegedly negligently performed. Second, the terms оf ODRC and MTC‘s contract detail how MTC must perform a multitude of tasks that constitute the work contracted for, i.e., the operation of NCCC. That evidence contravenes ODRC‘s evidence, creating a material issue of genuine fact on which reasonable minds could disagree. Third, the trial court did not consider the numerous other factors that determine whether an individual is an agent or independеnt contractor.
{¶ 16} The outcome of this case depends in large part on the answer to the agency question. If MTC is ODRC‘s agent, then, by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior, Wright may sue ODRC for the alleged negligence of MTC‘s employees. If MTC is instead an independent contractor, then the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. As MTC‘s status presents a faсtual question on which reasonable minds could differ, the trial court erred in granting ODRC summary judgment. Accordingly, we sustain Wright‘s sole assignment of error.
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Wright‘s assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio, and we remand this cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with law and this decision.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded.
BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.