VICTOR A. WOZNIAK ET AL. v. TOWN OF COLCHESTER
AC 41275
Appellate Court of Connecticut
October 29, 2019
Alvord, Elgo and Moll, Js.
Argued April 9—officially released October 29, 2019
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Syllabus
The plaintiffs, V and O, appealed to this court from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant town of Colchester. The plaintiffs owned an undeveloped parcel of real property located in Colchester in an area that is designated as a flood zone on a map prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A survey indicated that the map incorrectly located a portion of a brook on the property, which the plaintiffs claimed caused the property to be improperly designated as being in a flood zone. V submitted to FEMA an application for a Letter of Map Amendment to correct the map, and FEMA requested additional information. The plaintiffs thereafter demanded that the defendant file an application for a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) with FEMA on their behalf, and when the defendant declined, the plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to do so. The plaintiffs contended that the applicable federal regulations (
- The defendant‘s claim that the appeal was moot was unavailing, as FEMA‘s pending study of the brook did not render the appeal moot; correspondence from FEMA to the defendant indicated that the new program was being implemented for the first time, and the record did not indicate when the program would conclude or when any final determination regarding the brook would transpire, and, guided by the fundamental precept that this court must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of jurisdiction in resolving the issue of mootness, this court could not conclude on the limited record before it that the pending review of the brook under the program necessarily deprived this court of the ability to provide the plaintiffs with any meaningful relief.
- The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to file a LOMR application on their behalf:
- Despite the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant owed a duty to initiate a LOMR application pursuant to
§ 65.3 , by its plain language§ 65.3 concerns physical changes to property, it was undisputed that no physical change affecting flooding conditions had occurred with respect to the plaintiffs’ property, as the plaintiffs’ claim was that the brook was improperly depicted on a portion of their property since the map was promulgated, and, therefore, in the absence of any allegation that the plaintiffs’ property underwent any physical change or that it was affected by a physical change to another property, the plaintiffs’ claim was untenable; moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs attempted to inject new factual allegations into the case for the first time on appeal, such allegations were improper, having never been raised before the trial court, and this court declined to consider them. - The plaintiffs could not prevail in their claim that
§ 65.7 imposed a ministerial duty on the defendant to file a LOMR application to correct the inaccurate description of the brook on their behalf: a prerequisite to the extraordinary relief afforded by a writ of mandamus is the existence of a ministerial duty, and a community‘s determination pursuant to§ 65.7 , as to whether any “practicable alternatives exist” to revising the boundaries of a previously adopted floodway is a quintessentially discretionary function, as opposed to a ministerial function, as that determination requires a community to exercise its judgment as to whether alternatives to revising such boundaries are practical; moreover, the applicable federal regulation (44 C.F.R. § 72.1 ) expressly indicates that LOMR applications are predicated on proposed or actual manmade alterations within the floodplain,§ 65.7 plainly and unambiguously concerns changes to floodways, and because the plaintiffs did not allege any manmade alterations or physical changes affecting their property or the designation thereof,§ 65.7 was inapposite to the present case. - The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they had no adequate remedy at law: the plaintiffs neither alleged in their complaint nor provided any evidence that property owners are precluded from filing LOMR applications, and a review of the regulatory scheme indicated that property owners were not precluded from filing LOMR applications, as the National Flood Insurance Program plainly envisions the filing of LOMR applications by parties other than local communities such as the defendant; moreover, the instructions provided by FEMA for completing LOMR applications require the submission of a concurrence form with signatures of the requester, community official and engineer, the purpose of which is to ensure that the community is aware of the impacts of the LOMR application and which was further evidence that the program envisions applicants other than local communities, and the plaintiffs presented no basis on which this court reasonably could conclude that a property owner is prohibited, as a matter of federal administrative law, from filing a LOMR application, and the availability of that legal remedy, which would provide the plaintiffs the relief that they sought, was fatal to their mandamus action.
- Despite the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant owed a duty to initiate a LOMR application pursuant to
Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London, where the court, Knox, J., granted the motion filed by the defendant for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court; thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which this court denied without prejudice. Affirmed.
Matthew Ranelli, with whom, on the brief, was Amber N. Sarno, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
ELGO, J. This case concerns the obligation of a municipality to file an application on behalf of a property owner to correct flood maps promulgated by federal administrative authorities. The plaintiffs, Victor A. Wozniak and Olga E. Wozniak,1 appeal from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Colchester. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court properly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a writ of mandamus.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
We begin by providing necessary context for the present dispute. “Prior to 1968, there was a growing concern that the private insurance industry was unable to offer reasonably priced flood insurance on a national basis. . . . Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) of 1968 to address this concern.3 The purposes of the NFIA were to provide affordable flood insurance throughout the nation, encourage appropriate land use that would minimize the exposure of property to flood damage and loss, and thereby reduce federal expenditures for flood losses and disaster assistance. . . . To that end, NFIA authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish and carry out the National Flood Insurance Program . . . . There are three basic components of [that program]: (1) the identification and mapping of flood-prone
To carry out its mandate, the NFIA authorizes FEMA to “identify and publish information with respect to all flood plain areas, including coastal areas located in the United States, which have special flood hazards”4 and to “establish or update flood-risk zone data in all such areas, and make estimates with respect to the rates of probable flood caused loss for the various flood risk zones for each of these areas . . . .”
The following facts are gleaned from the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof submitted, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Dubinsky v. Black, 185 Conn. App. 53, 56, 196 A.3d 870 (2018). The defendant is a community, as that term is defined in the code,5 that has participated in the National Flood Insurance Program since 1982, and thus is obligated to adopt adequate flood plain management regulations consistent with federal criteria. See
At all relevant times, the plaintiffs owned real property known as 159 Lebanon Avenue in Colchester (property), an undeveloped parcel of vacant land. The property is located in an area that is designated as a flood zone on Flood Insurance Rate Map number 09011C0154G (map) prepared by FEMA and dated July 18, 2011. In light of that designation, the plaintiffs had a survey of the property performed, which indicated that the map incorrectly located a portion of Judd Brook on the property. As Wozniak averred in his July 14, 2017 affidavit, the survey confirmed that the map “incorrectly depicts the location of Judd Brook, resulting in our [p]roperty being wrongfully determined to be in a flood zone.”
On April 4, 2012, Wozniak brought that alleged inaccuracy to FEMA‘s attention by submitting an application for a Letter of Map Amendment (LOMA).6 That application
The record also contains three letters sent to the plaintiffs from the defendant‘s First Selectman, Gregg Schuster, in the summer and fall of 2012. In his August 1, 2012 letter, Schuster stated: “Based on the [defendant‘s] review of the materials you submitted, specifically FEMA‘s May 25, 2012 letter of [r]eply regarding your LOMA application, it appears you have been asked to supply additional data in order for FEMA to continue processing your request. It does not appear that they are asking you to submit a [Letter of Map Revision (LOMR)] application. In any event, as was done for your LOMA application, if in fact you are required to file a LOMR, the [defendant‘s] Chief Executive Officer . . . would assist you to the extent of reviewing your application and signing a concurrence form contained within your application. The [defendant] has done this for other private property LOMR applications in the past. However, all materials and maps required to complete the submission to FEMA are the private property owner‘s responsibility.” In his September 7, 2012 letter, Schuster similarly stated that “[a]fter speaking with FEMA representatives, including Caitlin Clifford, who you recommended that we speak with, it is our understanding that as the property owner, there is no reason why you cannot continue with your LOMA application. Should you continue with your LOMA application, the [defendant] would be more than happy to assist you by giving you concurrence through the First Selectman‘s Office.” In a third letter dated October 16, 2012, Schuster provided the plaintiffs detailed advice on how to prepare a “successful LOMA application.”8
When the defendant declined to do so, this litigation ensued. The plaintiffs’ operative complaint contains three counts. In the first, they seek a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to file a LOMR application on their behalf to correct the alleged error on the map. The second count sounds in inverse condemnation, alleging that the defendant‘s failure to file a LOMR application “effectively resulted in a confiscation of the [p]roperty without compensation.” In the third count, the plaintiffs alleged negligence on the defendant‘s part “in carrying out its obligations under the National Flood Insurance Program by failing to file a [LOMR] with FEMA.” The defendants filed an answer, as well as a special defense to the third count of the complaint, on August 11, 2015. On August 18, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a certificate of closed pleadings, in which they requested a court trial.
The defendants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, which was accompanied by several exhibits, including application forms and instructions for both LOMR and LOMA applications. In response, the plaintiffs filed an opposition, to which they attached copies of various correspondence and Wozniak‘s affidavit. The court heard argument from the parties on November 13, 2017. In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to any of the three counts alleged in the complaint and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment in its favor.
I
As a preliminary matter, we address a question of mootness. Approximately ten months after the commencement of the present appeal, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, in which it alleged that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the court‘s ruling on their mandamus claim had been rendered moot by recent developments. Appended to that motion were copies of correspondence from FEMA officials who, in October, 2016, informed the defendant of a “new FEMA program” known as “Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning,” or “Risk MAP,” that was intended to help “communities identify, assess, and reduce their flood risk” by “combining quality engineering with updated flood hazard data . . . .” In implementing that new program, FEMA solicited “any data . . . [that the defendant] would like to have taken into consideration when reviewing [the defendant‘s] flood risk . . . .” The defendant‘s town engineer responded to that request by asking FEMA to review, inter alia, “the Flood Zone mapping on [the map] in the area of Judd Brook, North of Lebanon Avenue/State Route 16 for potential conflict between the flood limits/extents shown on the map and the actual flood limit elevations based on topography.”9 By letter dated October 17, 2018, a FEMA official notified the defendant it had completed the “discovery” portion of the Risk MAP program and had “selected” Judd Brook for a detailed study as part of its upcoming “engineering and mapping” activities.
The plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on December 3, 2018. Weeks later, they filed a supplement to the facts recited therein, in which the plaintiffs stipulated in relevant part that Judd Brook “will be reviewed [and] surveyed as part of the proposed field study” to be conducted by FEMA as part of the Risk MAP program. They nevertheless maintained that the pendency of that study did not render the present appeal moot. By order dated March 13, 2019, this court denied the defendant‘s motion to dismiss “without prejudice to the panel that hears the merits of the appeal considering the issues raised in the motion to dismiss.” At oral argument before this court, the parties renewed their respective claims, as set forth in the pleadings on the motion to dismiss.
The question of mootness implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court and thus “may be raised at any time . . . .” State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 308 Conn. 140, 143, 60 A.3d 946 (2013). “Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [this] court‘s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . A case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mendez, 320 Conn. 1, 6, 127 A.3d 994 (2015). “In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council, 326 Conn. 40, 54, 161 A.3d 537 (2017). Our review of the question of mootness is plenary. State v. Rodriguez, 320 Conn. 694, 699, 132 A.3d 731 (2016).
Because the question of mootness implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, we are obligated to indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of jurisdiction in resolving that issue. See Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, 329 Conn. 515, 523, 187 A.3d 1154 (2018); Simes v. Simes, 95 Conn. App. 39, 42, 895 A.2d 852 (2006). Guided by that fundamental precept, we cannot conclude, on the limited record before us, that the pending review of Judd Brook under the Risk MAP program necessarily deprives this court of the ability to provide the plaintiffs with any meaningful relief. Should they prevail in this appeal, the plaintiffs would secure an order of mandamus directing the defendant to submit a LOMR application on their behalf. That relief could well provide a more expeditious resolution of the mapping issue regarding their property than the ongoing Risk MAP program, whose terminal date remains unknown. For that reason, we conclude that the present appeal is not moot and turn our attention to the merits of the plaintiff‘s claim.
II
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on their mandamus claim. We disagree.
The standard that governs our review of the trial court‘s decision to grant summary judgment is well established. “Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . [T]he moving party . . . has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts . . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
In the present case, the plaintiffs seek a writ of man-damus to compel the defendant to file a LOMR application on their behalf. Mandamus is an ancient common law writ “with deep roots in the American legal tradition . . . .” Hennessey v. Bridgeport, 213 Conn. 656, 658, 569 A.2d 1122 (1990); see also Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 811–12 (3d Cir. 1965). It is an order directed at public officials that is injunctive in nature. 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies (2d Ed. 1993) § 2.9 (1), p.226; see also Hamblen v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health & Family Services, 322 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Ky. App. 2010) (mandamus “is quintessentially injunctive in nature“); 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) § 224 (a), p.565 (mandamus a prerogative writ designed to give state superintendence of activities of public officers). As our Supreme Court has emphasized, “[t]he writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be applied only under exceptional conditions, and is not to be extended beyond its well-established limits.” Lahiff v. St. Joseph‘s Total Abstinence Society, 76 Conn. 648, 651, 57 A. 692 (1904); see also Cook-Littman v. Board of Selectmen, 328 Conn. 758, 767 n.9, 184 A.3d 253 (2018); AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Commission, 270 Conn. 409, 416–17, 853 A.2d 497 (2004).
“[M]andamus neither gives nor defines rights which one does not already have. It enforces, it commands, performance of a duty. It acts at the instance of one having a complete and immediate legal right; it cannot and it does not act upon a doubtful or a contested right . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hennessey v. Bridgeport, supra, 213 Conn. 659. Accordingly, “[a] party seeking a writ of mandamus must establish: (1) that the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the performance of a duty by the defendant; (2) that the defendant has no discretion with respect to the performance of that duty; and (3) that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Watertown, 303 Conn. 699, 711–12, 38 A.3d 72 (2012).
The plaintiffs claim that the defendant possesses a ministerial duty to file a LOMR application with FEMA on their behalf to rectify the allegedly improper designation of their property, as alleged in the operative complaint. In rendering summary judgment, the court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed to support such a duty on the part of the defendant. We agree.
A
Undisputed Facts
Critical to our analysis are certain facts that are not disputed by the parties. As the trial court noted in its memorandum of decision, a portion of the property has been designated in a flood area “since inception of the [map] and continues to be so designated. . . . [T]here is no dispute
The plaintiffs’ claim, as set forth in their operative complaint and Wozniak‘s affidavit, is not that a physical change to Judd Brook transpired that affected their property. Rather, they claim that Judd Brook has been improperly depicted on a portion of their property since the map first was promulgated, which resulted in incorrect flood plain elevations on the property.11 That “incorrect depiction,” the plaintiffs allege, “places a significant portion of [the] property in the flood plain when it is not.”
B
Relevant Federal Authority
It is well established that, in construing individual regulations, we do not read them in isolation, but rather in light of the entire act. See, e.g., Historic District Commission v. Hall, 282 Conn. 672, 684, 923 A.2d 726 (2007) (“Legislative intent is not to be found in an isolated sentence; the whole statute must be considered. . . . In construing [an] act . . . this court makes every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible . . . .” [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Notably, the NFIA requires FEMA to review flood maps once every five years to assess the need to update all flood plain areas and flood risk zones. See
The National Flood Insurance Program, which is codified at
In considering those provisions, we note that “[a]dministrative regulations have the full force and effect of statutory law and
The National Flood Insurance Program provides distinct administrative mechanisms, known as LOMAs and LOMRs, to correct alleged inaccuracies on flood insurance rate maps. A LOMA is an administrative procedure intended to provide recourse to the “owner or lessee of property who believes his property has been inadvertently included” in a special flood hazard area or regulatory floodway when there has not been “any alteration of topography . . . .”
When FEMA determines that a particular property has been inadvertently included in a special flood hazard area or regulatory floodway, it issues a LOMA that specifies (1) the name of the municipality in which the property lies, (2) the number of the erroneous flood insurance rate map, and (3) the identification of the property to be excluded from the previous designation.
By contrast, a request for a LOMR is “based on proposed or actual manmade alterations within the floodplain, such as the placement of fill; modification of a channel; construction or modification of a
1
In their principal appellate brief, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant owed them a duty to “to initiate the LOMR process, as is mandated under
In the present case, it is undisputed that no physical change affecting flooding conditions has occurred with respect to the plaintiffs’ property. Their claim, as memorialized in the operative complaint and Wozniak‘s July 14, 2017 affidavit, is that Judd Brook has been improperly depicted on a portion of their property since the map first was promulgated. See part II A of this opinion. The plaintiffs have made no factual allegation that their property has undergone any physical change or that it has been affected by a physical change to another property. Absent such allegations, the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant had a duty under
Perhaps cognizant of that shortcoming, the plaintiffs have attempted to inject new factual allegations into the case for the first time on appeal. They allege in their principal appellate brief that the trial court‘s analysis ”ignores entirely the fact that the relocation and underground piping of Judd Brook on the [adjacent] parcel changed the character of the floodway, which precipitated a change to the flow rate of the floodway, and has altered the floodplain, in which the plaintiffs’ property is located.” (Emphasis omitted.) The plaintiffs further allege that “the flooding on the [adjacent] parcel was caused by the removal of the dam for the Hayward Pond
2
The plaintiffs also allege that
Titled “Floodway revisions,”
A prerequisite to the extraordinary relief afforded by a writ of mandamus is the existence of a duty that is ministerial in nature. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[i]t is axiomatic that [t]he duty [that a writ of mandamus] compels must be a ministerial one; the writ will not lie to compel the performance of a duty which is discretionary. . . . Consequently, a writ of mandamus will lie only to direct performance of a ministerial act which requires no exercise of a public officer‘s judgment or discretion. . . . Discretion is determined from the nature of the act or thing to be done . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Commission, supra, 270 Conn. 422.
Here, the act or thing to be done is the determination by a community that “no practicable alternatives exist” to revising the boundaries of a previously adopted floodway. The act of determining whether any “practicable alternatives exist” is a quintessentially discretionary function, as it requires a community to exercise its judgment as to whether alternatives to revising such boundaries are practical in nature. As but one example, a community such as the defendant might reasonably
We also are mindful that individual regulations are not to be construed in isolation, but rather in light of the entire act. See Historic District Commission v. Hall, supra, 282 Conn. 684. The code expressly indicates that requests for LOMRs are predicated on “proposed or actual manmade alterations within the floodplain“;
III
The plaintiffs’ claim suffers a further infirmity. To obtain a writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs also must demonstrate that they have no adequate remedy at law. Stewart v. Watertown, supra, 303 Conn. 711–12. The plaintiffs have neither alleged in their operative complaint nor provided any evidence that property owners are precluded from filing LOMR applications with FEMA.
A review of the regulatory scheme governing the LOMR application process indicates otherwise. Part 72 of the National Flood Insurance Program sets forth the procedures that govern LOMR applications. See
The instructions provided by FEMA for completing LOMR applications, which the defendant submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment, further demonstrate that property owners are permitted to file LOMR applications. FEMA‘s “Instructions for Completing the Application Forms for Conditional Letters of Map Revision and Letters of Map Revision” state in relevant part that “[s]ubmissions to [FEMA] for revisions to . . . [f]lood [i]nsurance [r]ate [m]aps . . . by individual and community requesters will require the signing of application forms.” (Emphasis added.) Those instructions explain that LOMR applications must include the submission of a “concurrence form” that “requires the signatures of the requester, community official, and engineer.” As the instructions expressly indicate, the manifest purpose of the concurrence form is to “ensure that the community is aware of the impacts of the [LOMR] request . . . .” For that reason, the instructions require the concurrence form to be signed by both the “[r]evision [r]equester”14 and “the [chief executive officer] for the community involved in [the requested] revision . . . .” The requirement that an applicant seeking a LOMR obtain the concurrence of the community in which the property in question resides is further evidence that the National Flood Insurance Program envisions applicants other than local communities.
The case law from various jurisdictions is replete with examples in which individual property owners have applied for, and obtained, LOMRs from FEMA. See, e.g., McCrory v. Administrator of Federal Emergency Management Agency, 22 F. Supp. 3d 279, 284–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that LOMRs exist to permit “individuals, organizations and municipalities to request a localized update” to flood insurance rate maps and stating that individual property owners in that case “applied for the LOMR” and “FEMA approved the application“), aff‘d, 600 Fed. Appx. 807 (2d Cir. 2015); National Wildlife Federation v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, supra, 2014 WL 5449859 *16 (explaining that “property owners” may “apply for a LOMR from FEMA“); Somers Mill Associates, Inc. v. Fuss & O‘Neill, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. X03-CV-00-0503944 (March 7, 2002) (noting that FEMA issued LOMR to resolve discrepancy in flood insurance rate map in response to “a request initiated” by plaintiff property owners), aff‘d sub nom. Ahearn v. Fuss & O‘Neill, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 202, 826 A.2d 1224, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d 64 (2003); Samuel‘s Furniture, Inc. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 147 Wn.2d 440, 446, 54 P.3d 1194 (2002) (“Although the [local municipality] believed that the project was not within the shoreline jurisdiction, it suggested that [the plaintiff property owner] obtain a [LOMR] from FEMA to remove the portion of [the plaintiff‘s] property at issue from the FEMA floodway designation. [The individual property owner] sought and obtained the LOMR, thus removing the property from the FEMA floodway.“). In addition, the record before us contains copies of correspondence between the defendant‘s First Selectman and Wozniak, in which the First Selectman expressly indicated
The plaintiffs have presented no basis on which this court reasonably could conclude that an individual property owner is prohibited, as a matter of federal administrative law, from filing a LOMR application with FEMA. The relevant federal regulations and the materials submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment all contemplate such filings by property owners, and the case law reflects that property owners routinely apply for and secure LOMRs from FEMA. The availability of that legal remedy, which would provide the plaintiffs the very relief they seek, is fatal to their mandamus action. See Sterner v. Saugatuck Harbor Yacht Club, Inc., 188 Conn. 531, 534, 450 A.2d 369 (1982) (“for mandamus to lie, the plaintiff must have no other adequate remedy“); 55 C.J.S., Mandamus § 7 (2009) (“mandamus is used sparingly . . . and only when it is the sole available remedy“). We therefore conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant in the present case.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
ELGO, J.
Notes
“1. The depicted limits of the flood zone should be a curvature-linear line that shows the elevation of the floodway as the actual topography of the site as it exists in comparison to the established floodway elevations as determined by the FEMA mapping. This area must not encroach upon the actual (field determined) location of Judd Brook or any back water areas below the established flood plain elevation. It also [is] recommended that both sides of the existing Judd Brook be more clearly defined on the submitted mapping, with topographic information shown for the complete affected area. The information must be submitted with a Licensed Land Surveyor‘s certification.
“2. Once the mapping is revised, the submission to Ms. Clifford should indicate that the information submitted involves field verified and determined topographic information and should be referred to her supervisor that is an engineer for evaluation. This was noted in the telephone conversation with Ms. Clifford that her ‘authority’ and limits of evaluation are simply map overlay and that sites that require determination of topographic information are conducted at the supervisory level above her.
“This should provide the most expedient process for the successful determination of your LOMA [a]pplication. Should you continue with your LOMA application, the [defendant] would be more than happy to assist you by giving you concurrence through the First Selectman‘s Office.”