The Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri, sentenced Michael Worthington to death after he pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of forcible rape. Following unsuccessful state appeals and postconviction proceedings, Worthington filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing seven grounds for relief. The district court granted his petition on one ground, from which Warden Don Roper now appeals. Worthington, in turn, cross-appeals from the district court’s rejection of two other grounds, for which the district court issued a certificate of appealability. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court’s grant of Worthington’s pe *492 tition and affirm the district court’s denial with respect to his two additional claims.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1995, Worthington was charged with burglary, and the rape and murder of his neighbor, Melinda Griffin. The following facts are drawn from the Missouri Supreme Court’s description of the incident in its opinion affirming Worthington’s sentence.
See State v. Worthington,
A neighbor discovered Griffin’s remains on October 1. Her naked body was found at the foot of her bed, with a lace stocking draped across it. DNA testing later identified Worthington’s semen on Griffin’s body. When police officers located Worthington that evening, he was wearing a fanny pack containing Griffin’s jewelry and keys. After he was arrested, Worthington initially told the investigating officers that he had been high and intoxicated from using alcohol and various other drugs for the previous four days. Upon being presented with the evidence against him, he confessed to killing Griffin but said that he could not remember the details of the incident.
The State charged Worthington with one count of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of forcible rape. He initially retained attorney Joel Eisenstein to represent him, but Eisenstein later withdrew. Worthington then retained attorneys N. Scott Rosenblum, Joseph L. Green, and Bradford Kessler, 1 all experienced capital defеnse attorneys. On August 28, 1998, Worthington pled guilty to all three charges without a plea agreement. He waived a jury for sentencing.
The four-day sentencing hearing commenced on September 14, 1998, at which time the State presented victim impact statements, forensic evidence, and evidence of Worthington’s lengthy criminal history. A detective with the Peoria, Illinois Police Department testified that Worthington had been arrested fifteen times— often in connection with burglaries — and had been listed as a “suspect or criminal” in connection with another fifteen cases. At least three of the incidents involved Worthington breaking into his grandmother’s house. In addition, the police records indicated that Worthington twice had assaulted his ailing grandfather, first by grabbing him and threatening his life and the second time by firing a gun at him. The State also presented evidence that Worthington repeatedly had been convicted for burglary as a juvenile and twice had been institutionalized in juvenile correctional facilities. He also was imprisoned twice by the Illinois Department of Corrections. Further, the State presented evidence that Worthington engaged in a pattern of disruptive and assaultive behavior while incarcerated after Griffin’s murder, *493 including fighting with inmates, threatening and attempting to assault correctional officers, and hiding contraband — including a razor blade — in his cell.
The State also called Dr. Max Givon, a psychologist. Dr. Givon had examined Worthington in 1996, pursuant to the defense’s motion for a pretrial mental evaluation. See Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 552.015-.030. In preparation for his report, Dr. Givon interviewed Worthington twice, administered an MMPI-2 psychological test, and reviewed an extensive collection of records chronicling Worthington’s background. He concluded that Worthington did not have a mental disease or defect, but instead that he had antisocial personality disorder, was malingering and cocaine-dependent, and abused alcohol.
In preparation for the penalty phase, attorney Green had two brief conversations with Worthington’s mother and contacted Carol Tegard, Worthington’s maternal aunt, who later would testify at the penalty hearing. Green did not obtain records other than those compiled during Dr. Givon’s 1996 evaluation. Based on Dr. Givon’s unfavorable conclusions regarding Worthington’s mental health, Green did not consider further pursuing an expert psychological mitigation strategy at the penalty phase. Attorney Rosenblum, however, retained Dr. Kevin Miller, a psychiatrist, in early August 1998, initially for the purpose of exploring a diminished capacity defense at the guilt phase. He provided Dr. Miller with Dr. Givon’s report, along with police investigative reports and partial records of Worthington’s 10-day psychiatric hospitalization in 1994. Additionally, Rosenblum invited Dr. Miller to request further materials from Dr. Givon directly, and Dr. Miller met with Worthington twice. Dr. Miller’s conclusions corroborated Dr. Givon’s unfavorable diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder, cocaine dependance, and alcohol abuse. Dr. Miller also concluded that there was evidence that Worthington was suffering from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder (in remission), and that he had a history of cocaine-induced psychosis. However, Dr. Miller indicated that there was insufficient evidence to draw a definite conclusion on bipolar disorder, dissociative disorder, malingering, and complex partial seizures.
As a result of this second evaluation, Rosenblum decided against raising a psychological mitigation argument at the penalty phase. Instead, the defense team focused on Worthington’s abusive background. Counsel presented the testimony of Carol Tegard, who recounted Worthington’s abuse and neglect as a child. Counsel also presented numerous documents detailing Worthington’s dysfunctional background, including his mother’s chronic alcoholism, his father’s heroin addiction, and physical abuse and neglect by his family and babysitter. The presentence report (“PSR”), prepared by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole for the sentencing court, confirmed these accounts and described incidents where Worthington was the victim of sexual abuse. In addition, counsel called three inmates and the records custodian from the St. Charles County Jail in an effort to undermine evidence pertaining to Worthington’s misconduct while incarcerated. Finally, Dr. Roswald Evans, a psychiatric pharmacist, testified that Worthington was intoxicated at the time of the crime and that his intoxication “rendered him ... incapable of making a decision about his behavior.”
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the sentencing court announced that it found as non-statutory mitigating circumstances that Worthington was raised in a
*494
dysfunctional family, was abused and neglected as a child, and was a long-term drug abuser. The court also found two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Worthington committed the murder while engaged in the perpetration of forcible rape and first-dеgree burglary, and (2) that Worthington committed the murder for the purpose of receiving money or things of monetary value from the victim. The court then sentenced Worthington to death on the murder count and sentenced him to terms of thirty years and life imprisonment for the burglary and the rape, respectively. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the sentence of death.
Worthington,
Worthington then filed a
pro se
motion for postconviction relief under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035Q). The post-conviction trial court subsequently appointed counsel, who filed an amended motion. Among other claims, Worthington asserted that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate his background adequately and to provide a complete social history to expert witnesses. Had experts further examined his background and his family’s mental-health history, Worthington alleged, they would have been able to present testimony that he did indeed suffer from mental disease or defect. In support of his argument, Worthington presented three expert witnesses — Drs. Jonathan Pincus, Dennis Cowan, and Robert Smith — who testified that Worthington suffered from a number of mental disorders, including Tourette’s Syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, attention-deficitdiyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and bipolar disordеr. Worthington also argued that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and present additional mitigation evidence through his parents’ testimony, and that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and object to one of the State’s penalty phase witnesses, Charlotte Peroti. The trial court denied Worthington’s motion for postconviction relief,
Worthington v. State,
No. 00-12558,
In 2005, Worthington filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition sought review of seven claims, including the three discussed above. The district court held that the state courts had not adjudicated the merits of Worthington’s claim that trial counsel had failed to adequately investigate and pursue psychological mitigation evidence.
Worthington v. Roper,
II. DISCUSSION
A. Warden Roper’s Appeal
Warden Roper appeals the district court’s ruling that Worthington’s at
*495
torneys were ineffective during the penalty phase because they failed to investigate adequately his social history and medical history, including his family’s background, and pursue a psychological mitigation strategy based on expert testimony. We review
de novo
the district court’s legal conclusions,
Armstrong v. Kemna,
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AED-PA”), a decision by a state court “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” is entitled to deference by the federal courts. “[W]hen a state prisoner files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court we are directed to undertake only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions.”
Collier v. Norris,
The language of § 2254(d) plainly limits the applicability of AEDPA’s deferential standard to claims that have been “adjudicated on the merits” in state court.
Brown v. Luebbers,
As to the first inquiry, we conclude that Worthington’s claim was indeed adjudicated on the merits by the postconviction trial court. That court correctly recognized
Strickland v. Washington,
[T]rial counsel did conduct a reasonable investigation and made a reasonable decision that made further investigations unnecessary. The court further finds that [Worthington] has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under substantially similar circumstances and that he was thereby prejudiced.
Id.
at 11. Despite the postconviction trial court’s treatment of his ineffective-assistance claim, Worthington now argues that it did not adjudicate this portion of his claim because it did not adequately scrutinize his allegation that counsel performed ineffectively at the penalty phase by failing to supply experts with comprehensive background information. This argument fails to persuade, however, because a review of the postconviction trial court’s decision leaves no question that it rejected Worthington’s ineffective-assistance claim
in toto.
3
“AEDPA’s requirement that a petitioner’s claim be adjudicated on the
*497
merits by a state court is not an entitlement to a well-articulated or even a correct decision by a state court.”
Weaver,
As to the second inquiry, when a state appellate court affirms a lower court decision without reasoning, we “look through” the silent opinion and apply AEDPA review to the “last reasoned decision” of the state courts.
See Winfield v. Roper,
Applying the deferential AEDPA standard of review to his claim that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to investigate and pursue mitigating psychological evidence, we now consider whether Worthington is entitled to federal habeas relief.
4
Because the postconviction trial court correctly identified
Strickland
as the controlling authority for ineffective-assistance claims, we address whether the state court unreasonably applied that precedent and whether the state court unreasonably
*498
determined the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Bucklew v. Luebbers,
The first prong of
Strickland
requires a showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Id.
at 687-88,
The second prong of
Strickland
— prejudice—requires a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result of the penalty phase would have been more favorable to the defense.
Strickland,
Worthington rehes heavily on three Supreme Court cases decided after
Strickland
that have further defined the contours of counsel’s duty to investigate at the penalty phase:
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith,
and
Rompilla v. Beard.
5
*499
In
Williams,
the Court ordered habeas relief under AEDPA, concluding that counsel’s performance fell well outside the bounds of effective assistance.
The Court in
Wiggins
likewise held that counsel’s decision to limit the scope of investigation — and their resulting failure to introduce
any
of Wiggins’s personal history as mitigation evidence — was constitutionally deficient.
Finally, in
Rompilla,
the petitioner argued that trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to investigate his school records, juvenile records, evidence of alcohol dependence, and — most significantly — the cоurt file of his previous conviction.
Here, Worthington argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate adequately his background and pursue a psychological mitigation strategy based on expert testimony. Specifically, Worthington faults trial counsel’s failure to interview family members and acquaintances, to procure his records from the Illinois Department of Corrections, and to obtain the psyсhiatric and medical records of Worthington’s mother, father, uncle, grandmother, and grandfather. This additional history, he alleges, would have supported mitigating expert testimony regarding his mental health. The state court concluded that trial counsel made a reasonable decision not to pursue the mental-health strategy further and thus acted reasonably in not pursuing further psychological evidence. Worthington, No. 00-12558, slip op. at 10,11.
As we have noted, “counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable determination that an investigation is unnecessary.”
Link,
Worthington’s claim rests heavily on his contention that attorney Joseph Green performed an unreasonably cursory investigation before deciding against pursuing further psycholоgical evidence. In particular, Worthington asserts, Green’s testimony demonstrates that he had no strategic reason not to further investigate Worthington’s background and pursue further psychological evaluations. Green had been “subcontracted” by attorney Scott Rosenblum to handle much of Worthington’s penalty phase. During his post-conviction deposition, Green acknowledged that he had not hired a mitigation specialist even though mitigation specialists usually are employed in death penalty cases. He testified, though, that the records compiled by Dr. Givon during his 1996 examination (discussed further below) “were consistent with the type of records that a mitigation specialist would have obtained.” Green spoke to Worthington’s mother only briefly, but he found that she was preoccupied with portraying herself as a good mother. He also contacted Carol Tegard, Worthington’s aunt, who later testified as a mitigation witness during the penalty phase. Despite having the names of other family members and acquaintances, Green did not contact them or travel to Peoria, Illinois, Worthington’s home town. 6 Green also did not procure records other than those acquired by Dr. Givon.
*501
While the extent of Green’s preparation for the penalty рhase was not ideal, in assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s performance, we cannot disregard the efforts of attorney Rosenblum.
See Bucklew,
This case is not one “where the record is clear that no reasonablе attorney ... would have failed to pursue further evidence.”
Link,
In light of Supremе Court precedent, then, we cannot say that the state court’s determination that counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into psychological mitigating evidence constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Counsel based the decision not to pursue a psychological mitigation strategy on the opinions of two mental-health professionals — Drs. Givon and Miller' — each of whom had interviewed Worthington twice. Dr. Givon had reviewed a substantial collection of records pertaining to Worthington’s social and medical history. Likewise, Dr. Miller demonstrated significant familiarity with many of the records documenting Worthington’s background. See State App. 494 (noting Dr. Kessler’s report); id. (noting Dr. Legan’s report); id. (noting reports from the Illinois Department of Correction, Youth Division); id. 494-95 (noting records of Dr. Ryall’s sessions). Further, Dr. Miller was aware of the physical and sexual abuse that Worthington suffered as a child. See id. 493. He also knew that Worthington’s grandmother was chronically hospitalized for schizophrenia and that both of Worthington’s parents had been in psychiatric hospitals and rehabilitation programs. See id. 496. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the opinions of Drs. Givon and Miller were so lacking in factual basis that the state court unreasonably concluded that cоunsel had conducted an adequate investigation. 8
Having determined that counsel reasonably investigated the potential for a psychological mitigation strategy, we now examine the state court’s decision that counsel reasonably decided against further investigating and presenting expert psychological evidence at the penalty phase. Because Worthington has failed to show that his attorneys’ investigation was deficient, there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Strickland,
B. Worthington’s Cross-Appeal
Worthington first cross-appeals the district court’s rejection of his argument that trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to conduct an adequate investigation and present further mitigating evidence through additional witnesses. In particular, Worthington asserts that his parents- — Patricia Washburn (“Patricia”) and Richard Worthington (“Richard”)— would have testified about his troubled upbringing. The Missouri Supreme Court held that counsel reasonably decided not to present Patricia’s testimony because, when contacted, she had downplayed Worthington’s traumatic childhood and endeavored “to portray herself as a good mother.”
Worthington,
Applying AEDPA review,
10
the district court upheld the state court conclusion that counsel’s decision not to call Patricia was reasonable under
Strickland. Worthington,
With regard to his mother’s testimony, Worthington challenges the Missouri Supreme Court’s determination that counsel reasonably decided against calling Patricia as a witness. Worthington contends that the postconviction trial court did not make “an explicit factual finding” that “counsel had a tactical basis for not calling [Patricia] because her testimony might harm the defense.” Thus, asserts Worthington, the Missouri Supreme Court’s conclusion that counsel made a reasonable strategic decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts because it was “based upon a non-existent factual finding.”
See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). As an initial mattеr, we note that the postconviction trial court did, in fact, find that counsel’s decision not to call Patricia was a reasonable decision based on her cocaine habit and her statements downplaying Worthington’s abusive childhood.
See Worthington,
No. 00-12558, slip op. at 11. Even had the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on findings of fact independent from those of the postconviction trial court, however, we could not grant Worthington’s habeas petition absent a showing that those findings were unreasonable. Section 2254(e)(l)’s “presumption of correctness applies to factual determinations made by state courts, whether the court be a trial court or an appellate court.”
Perry v. Kemna,
With regard to the testimony of his father, Worthington argues that the district court erred in upholding as reasonable the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision that Worthington was not prejudiced by the absence of Richard’s testimony. Had Richard testified, Worthington contends, the sentencing court would have gained a better understanding of Worthington’s abusive background. We agree with the distriсt court, however, that the Missouri Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Worthington suffered no prejudice, because Richard’s testimony would have been cumulative of evidence already before the sentencing court.
Worthington,
At the penalty phase, the sentencing court heard the testimony of Carol Tegard, who described Worthington’s tormented childhood and youth. She testified about the widespread drug and alcohol abuse *505 that surrounded Worthington during his early years, as well as his mother’s prostitution. Worthington and Patricia were “constantly moving,” at one point living out of a car until Patricia sold it for drug money. Tegard also testified that Patricia attempted suicide numerous times in Worthington’s presence. Richard was a drug user and dealer who had minimal contact with the family until Worthington’s adolescent years. When he did reenter Worthington’s life, Tegard testified, Richard taught his son how to burglarize. According to Tegard, Worthington underwent psychiatric treatment and checked into a drug rehabilitation program, but his family members refused to be supportive.
In addition to Tegard’s testimony, numerous records before the sentencing court described the severe neglect and abuse that Worthington suffered as a child. For example, a 1989 psychological evaluation rеport described Worthington as having grown up “in a dysfunctional chaotic family made up of his chronic alcoholic mother and a heroin addicted father.” The report also noted “chronic neglect and emotional, physical, and sexual abuse over the years.” Records from the Methodist Medical Center of Illinois and the White Oaks Rehabilitation Center further described Worthington’s chaotic upbringing, including his parents’ drug addiction and physical abuse inflicted by a babysitter. Finally, the PSR provided numerous examples of Worthington’s dysfunctional childhood, as well as detailing instances of physical and sexual abuse.
Worthington discounts the value of the evidence before the sentencing court for two reasons, neither of which is persuasive. First, he argues that Richard’s testimony is not cumulative because the evidence before the sentencing court was “generic” and “skeletal.” As described above, though, the state court’s decision to the contrary is supported by the record. Tegard’s testimony, the documentary evidence, and the PSR supplied a graphic and comprehensive account of Worthington’s background. This stands in stark contrast to the evidence in the cases on which Worthington relies.
See Outten v. Kearney,
Second, Worthington dismisses the records before the sentencing court because “there is no evidence that the ... court thoroughly reviewed any of these records before issuing its sentencing verdict.” The penalty phase record belies Worthington’s assertion, however. The sentence issued by the court was expressly “[biased on the evidence presented to this Court.”
Cf. Strickland,
In light of Tegard’s testimony, the extensive documentary evidence, and the PSR, we agree with the district court that the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision that Worthington suffered no prejudice in the absence of his father’s testimony did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. The additional testimony “did not cover any new subject matter and was not substantially more persuasive” than that actually presented,
Eley v. Bagley,
Worthington also cross-appeals the district court’s denial of his claim that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to investigate the background of State witness Charlotte Peroti and object to her testimony on the grounds that the State hаd failed to disclose her correct name and the substance of her testimony. Peroti testified at the penalty phase that Worthington had broken into her house shortly before he murdered Griffin and that he had attempted to sexually assault her. In addition, Peroti testified that Worthington stole her car.
Although the State had endorsed Peroti as a witness more than two years before
*507
the commencement of the penalty phase hearing, the State had not given the defense notice of the subject matter of her testimony. As a result, on direct appeal the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the State’s failure to notify the defense violated
State v. Debler,
The Missouri Supreme Court likewise denied relief at the post-conviction stage, holding that Worthington had not been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object
to
Peroti’s testimony and seek a continuance to investigate her allegations.
Worthington,
Reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court decision under AEDPA, the district court found the state court’s conclusion that counsel “knew all about” Peroti’s allegations to be an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Worthington,
Worthington urges us to reverse the district court for two reasons.
*508
First, he сontends that the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts, which led to its conclusion that he suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to the lack of adequate notice of Peroti’s testimony and to seek a continuance to investigate her background. Specifically, Worthington challenges the state court’s factual finding that defense counsel had effectively cross-examined Peroti.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “[A] state court decision involves ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings’ only if it is shown that the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.”
Jones v. Luebbers,
Worthington argues that had counsel sufficiently prepared to examine Peroti, they would have been able to impeach her with evidence regarding her bad check conviction and the fact that she allegedly had exaggerated hеr work as an undercover drug informant. However, the state court found that counsel effectively cross-examined Peroti without pursuing those avenues for impeachment, and we cannot say that its finding is unreasonable under AEDPA. Even without prior knowledge of the substance of Peroti’s testimony, counsel succeeded in establishing her bias against Worthington. On cross-examination, Peroti acknowledged that she had volunteered to work with the police “to try to get Michael Worthington arrested for drugs.” Moreover, counsel elicited that Peroti wanted to “make sure [Worthington] got out of [her] area” because he had supplied her son and other children with drugs and alcohol. Peroti also admitted that she had never reported the alleged sexual assault to the police and that she had continued to interact with Worthington after the assault. Likewise, the PSR before the sentencing court detailed a police report that documented the incident only as “Burglary 1st and Stealing Over $150,” further calling into question Peroti’s testimony regarding the alleged sexual assault. Accordingly, we hold that there is sufficient record evidence to support the state court finding that counsel effectively cross-examined Peroti and that the court’s determination of fаct is thus not unreasonable in light of the evidence before it. We may not, therefore, upset the state court’s determination that Worthington suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to investigate Peroti’s background.
Second, Worthington proffers an alternative ground for overturning the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision that he was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to Peroti’s testimony under
Debler.
Had counsel objected, Worthington contends, Peroti’s testimony likely would have been excluded in its entirety, thus giving rise to a reasonable probability that the sentencing court would not have imposed the death penalty. As an initial matter, the Missouri Supreme Court has consistently maintained that
Debler’s
notice requirement only “slightly circumseribe[s]” the “wide latitude” that both the State and the defense enjoy at the penalty phase “to introduce any evidence regarding the defendant’s character that assists the jury in determining the appropriate punishment.”
State v. Smith,
Nevertheless, even considering the unlikely possibility that the trial court would have ordered the wholesale exclusion of Peroti’s testimony, we agree with the district court that there was no reasonable probability that the sentencing court would have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
See Wiggins,
*510 III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of Worthington’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, and we affirm its judgment denying habeas relief on the two grounds for which Worthington was granted a certificate of appealability. On remand, we instruct the district court to enter an order denying Worthington’s petition.
Notes
. Kessler withdrew from representation upon the dissolution of his partnership with Rosenblum.
. Because the issue was not contested, we will assume, without deciding, that the Missouri Supreme Court did not adjudicate the merits of the claim for purposes of AEDPA review. We observe, however, that the Missouri Supreme Court mentioned the claim at
*496
issue early in its opinion but never discussed it thereafter,
. In his primary ineffective-assistance claim presented to the postconviction trial court, Worthington intertwined allegations that counsel failed to investigate and present sufficient mitigation testimony through additional witnesses at the penalty phase with allegations that counsel failed to investigate and present sufficient background information to psychological experts in the context of both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. See infra n. 12. We address Worthington’s argument that counsel failed to call additional mitigation witnesses in Section II.B, infra.
. Because the parties have briefed Worthington’s ineffective-assistance claim under the AEDPA standard, we need not remand the claim to the district court.
See Scarberry v. Iowa,
. The Supreme Court also has addressed counsel's duty to investigate in two more recent cases,
Porter v.
McCollum, - U.S. -,
. At his post-conviction deposition, Green testified that "a boatload of reasons” informed his decision not to travel to Peoria, including the fact that "time and expense was not a luxury I had, keeping up my own private practice and what I was getting paid ... for on this case.”
. Green testified that he was unaware that Rosenblum had retained Dr. Miller until well after the sentencing hearing. Green also indicated, though, that he was not responsible for the "logistics of hiring experts.” Rosenblum testified, however, that "I know in my mind I discussed with Joe [Green] not only the fact I was talking to Dr. Miller but that I talked to him about his findings.” The district court adopted Green's recollection without acknowledging Rosenblum’s competing testimony.
See Worthington,
. We observe that the present case is plainly distinguishable from
Antwine v. Delo,
. Because we hold that the state court’s conclusion that Worthington failed to satisfy the first prong of Strickland was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we do not reach the second prong of the analysis — whether the psychological evidence propounded by Worthington post-conviction had a reasonable probability of altering the outcome.
. Unlike Warden Roper’s appeal, the parties agree that the AEDPA standard of review governs the claims regarding Worthington's parents and Charlotte Peroti’s testimony.
. On appeal, Worthington also refers to unspecified "additiоnal evidence of [his] childhood and social history." Although it is unclear whether Worthington is referring to evidence beyond that of his parents, the district court interpreted the claim to include "other family members and possibly former babysitters."
Worthington,
. Worthington also argues that the district court erred by "artificially truncating" his ineffective-assistance claim into two separate issues: whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue expert psychological testimony, and whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present additional lay witness mitigation testimony. According to Worthington, in assessing prejudice the district court should have balanced the aggravating evidence against the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing phase as well as the entire mitigating evidence adduced post-conviction. To be sure, "it is necessary to consider
all
the relevant evidence that the [factfinder] would have had before it if [counsel] had pursued the different path.”
Wong v.
Belmontes, - U.S. -,
. Worthington also raises a perfunctory argument that, had the sentencing court improperly admitted Peroti's testimony over a timely
Debler
objection, there is a reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have been overturned on direct appeal. Because this theory was not raised before the district court. — or even the state courts — we decline to address it.
Whitmore v. Avery,