TARSHA WOOD, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 11-154 (AK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
May 22, 2012
ALAN KAY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:11-cv-00154-AK Document 14 Filed 05/22/12
This mаtter is pending before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for [summary judgment on the issue of] Fees and Costs (Fee Motion) and Memorandum in support thereof (Memorandum) [10]; Defendant’s opposition to the Motion (Opposition) [11]; and Plaintiff’s reply to the Opposition (Reply) [12].1 Plaintiff Tarsha Wood (Plaintiff) has requested $2,084.10 in legal fees. Defendant District of Columbia (Defendant or the District) contests Plaintiff’s prevailing party status and asserts that Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of any legal fees or costs. (Opposition, Exh. 1 [Defеndant’s chart of proposed allowable fees and reasons for fee reductions].)
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the parent of a minor child who was the subject of an administrative action brought pursuant to the
1) Pursuant to the Blackman-Jones Consent Decree, members of the class may file a due process complaint when they are dissatisfied with the resolution of a request for compensatory education at an IEP meeting or by Central Administration Personnel.
2) Petitioner met the burden to establish that DCPS failed to satisfy the Petitioner’s request for an IEP meeting but Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the alleged procedural violations impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to rights afforded by the IDEA 2004, or caused a deprivation of educational benefit.
(March 5, 2008 HOD at 2-3.) The Hearing Officer inter alia ordered DCPS to provide written notice to [counsel for Plaintiff], proposing at least three separate dates and times to convene an IEP/сompensatory education meeting within ten days . . . . (March 5, 2008 HOD at 3.) The Hearing Officer further ordered that if DCPS fails to convene an IEP/compensatory education meeting pursuant to this HOD, then DCPS shall fund the Petitioner’s compensatory education plan. (Id.)
Plaintiff originally filed her complaint for legal fees and costs with the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant removed this and other simultaneously filed cases to this Court and the parties subsequently cоnsented to the referral of all such cases to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes. The parties were directed to brief the issues in these cases in the form of motions for legal fees and responses thereto.
A. Prevailing Party
The
The Supreme Court has indicated that the term prevailing party does not include a plaintiff who fail[s] to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. Buckhannon Bd & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep‘t Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 606 (2001). The Supreme Court therefore rejected the catalyst theory whereby a plaintiff would be a prevailing party if the lawsuit brought about the desired result through a voluntary change in the defendant ‘s conduct. 532 U.S. at 605. The Supreme Court instead determined that a prevailing party must obtain a material alternation of the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 604 (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass‘n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)). See also District of Columbia v. Straus, Civil Action No. 09-7051, 2010 WL 45932, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 8, 2010) (the term prevailing party [is] a legal term of art that requires more than achieving the desired outcome; the party seeking fees must also have been awarded some relief by the court.) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.) The
B. Fee Requests
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests. See In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ([A] fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.) An award of attorneys’ fees is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the case. Smith, 954 F. Supp. at 364 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). The result of this calculation is the lodestar amount. Smith, 954 F. Supp. at 364.
A party moving for summary judgment on legal fees accordingly must demonstrate prevailing party status and the reasonableness of the fees requested in terms of hours spent and hourly rate. Under
The court is required to draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and to accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmoving party must establish more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of its position. Id. at 252. Nor may the non-moving party rely on allegations or conclusory statements; instead, the non-moving party is obliged to present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find it its favor. Greene v Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Prevailing Party
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff in the instant case is not a prevailing party because the Hearing Officer did not find a denial of FAPE and allegedly awarded only de minimus relief. (Opposition at 7-9.) Plaintiff’s underlying administrative complaint asserted that DCPS had
Plaintiff argues that the IDEA explicitly allows for relief for а parent in the absence of a finding of denial of FAPE. (Reply at 3); see
[N]either a hearing officer’s conclusion that DCPS was a prevailing party, nor his determination that DCPS did not deny the student a FAPE, requires this court to consider DCPS the prevailing party. Bush ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia, 579 F. Supp.2d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal citations omitted). In A.H. v. D.C., the plaintiff requested that the Hearing Officer conclude that DCPS denied her child a FAPE and order DCPS to convene an IEP
Compare Robinson v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 06-1253, 2007 WL 2257326 at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2007) (If the [hearing officer] does not find a denial of a [FAPE], this does not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs cannot seek attorney’s fees, but recovery is limited.); A.S. v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 10-1670, 2012 WL 291349 *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2012) (finding that with a plaintiff who achieves partial success, the court may identify specific hours to be eliminated or reduce the award to reflect that limited success because it is the the degree of the plaintiff’s success that is the critical factor to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee.) (citing Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 786 (1989)).
The essential test for prevailing party status is whether a party successfully obtains a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties with the imprimatur of an adjudication. Skrine, 2007 WL 915227, at *4 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604). Defendant in this case argues that the showing is not met where the Hearing Officer does not find a denial of FAPE and the Plaintiff only obtains minimal relief. See Abarca v. District of Columbia, 2007 WL 1794101, at *3 (D.D.C. June 19, 2007) (denying prevailing party status under these circumstances). Plaintiff contends that the court in Abarca specifically noted that
This Court finds that Plaintiff did accomplish her primary objective at the administrative hearing, demonstrated by Hearing Officer’s order that DCPS convene an IEP/compensatory education meeting to determine the amount, form and delivery of compensatory education to the student. (HOD at 3.)2 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party and further, that she is entitled to recover fees and costs. While the Hearing Officer did not find a denial of FAPE, the Court notes that such determination would be premature in the instance where a petitioner is moving for an IEP/compensatory education meeting, which necessarily preсedes the determination of compensatory education due to a student.
B. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates3
Plaintiff seeks fees for the services of one lawyer and three paralegals, to be paid at the following rates: $268.00 per hour for Zachary Nahass, an attorney with approximately 1-2 years experience during the relevant time period, and $146.00/$150.00 per hour for Patrick Meehan,
Tyrka further asserts that clients have retained Tyrka & Associates with the understanding and agreement that the client would retain full responsibility for all fees regardless of what was reimbursed by third parties, at rates consistent with the Laffey [M]atrix as adjusted per the finding in Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000), and other cases. (Exh. 2 ¶4.)5 Plaintiff relies upon the rates set forth in the enhanced Laffey Matrix in her request for attorney’s fеes but Tyrka’s Verified Statement does not indicate how frequently Plaintiff’s counsel is paid at these enhanced Laffey rates.6 Nor has counsel
Plaintiff asserts that in order to demonstrate prevailing market rates, she may point to such evidence as an updated [enhanced] version of the Laffey Matrix or the U.S. Attorney’s Office [USAO] Matrix, or [her] own survey of prevailing market rates in the community. (Memorandum in support of Fee Motion (Memorandum) at 8 (citing Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (additional citation omitted))). In the Covington case, which involved allegations of civil rights violations, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit did look to Laffey rates for prevailing market rates but the relevant market therein was complex federal litigation, 57 F.3d at 1110. In contrast, this case involves IDEA litigation, which is not complex federal litigation because most if not all of the attorney’s fees in question are the result of counsel’s preparation for attendance at routine administrative hearings. Accordingly, the Laffey Matrix rates are inapplicable as prevailing market rates.
Plaintiff additionally relies upon Rooths v District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011, and Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs, Civil Action No. 06-1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8. (Fee Motion, Exhs. 5-7).7 According to
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the mere showing that a high hourly rate was approved in another case does not in and of itself establish a new market rate or prove that the new rate is reasonable. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Rooths v District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011 at 10-11 (Fee Motion, Exh. 5), is misplaced because the trial court ultimately rejected the application of enhanced Laffey rates, applied Laffey Mаtrix rates as a starting point, and then reduced those rates by 25%. Rooths v District of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 63 (D.D.C. 2011).
In Rooths, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman noted that [i]n this circuit, the rates contained in the Laffey Matrix are typically treated as the highest rates that will be presumed to be reasonable when a court reviews a petition for statutory attorneys’ fees. 802 F Supp. 2d 61. The trial court declined to approve as reasonable the inflated rates contained in a proposed alternative fee matrix. Id.; see Blackman v. District of Columbia, 677 F. Supp. 2d 169, 176 (D.D.C. 2010) (in determining prevailing market rаtes, the court declined to apply enhanced Laffey rates). The Rooths court further refused to apply enhanced Laffey rates, in part because it found that the [enhanced Laffey] matrix was generated using national statistics rather than measurements particular to the District of Columbia area. 802 F. Supp.2d at 62 (emphasis in original); see also DL v. District of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 239, 243 (D.D.C. 2009) (because the USAO [Laffey] Matrix accounts for price inflation within the local community, it more aptly focuses on the relevant community than the [enhanced] Laffey Matrix based on the legal services
Recognizing the difficulty courts encounter in determining what are reasonable legal fees, this Court agrees with the rationale set forth in Rooths, and finds that the Plaintiff’s reliance on an enhancеd Laffey Matrix is unsupported because such Matrix does not provide an accurate representation of District of Columbia legal fees applicable to IDEA cases. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that IDEA litigation involving administrative hearings is the type of complex federal litigation encompassed by the Laffey rates. See McClam v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 11-381 (RMC), September 6, 2011 Memorandum Opinion at 8 (declining to apply Laffey rates in part on grounds that IDEA cases are generally not comрlex [and in that case,] Plaintiffs . . . pointed to no novel issue or other complexity that turned this, particular IDEA case into a complicated piece of litigation.)8
Defendant’s argument against imposition of Laffey rates primarily focuses on the Rooths and McClam decisions, supra. but the Defendant also asserts that Plaintiffs have made no serious attempt to show that rates under the Laffey Matrix are appropriate in this case or, more specifically, that Laffey rates were necessary to attrаct competent counsel in the underlying,
This Court follows the reasoning of the Rooths case and other cases declining to apply enhanced Laffey rates. Considering that this is a straightforward case seeking IDEA legal fees, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the hourly rates set by her counsel, which are based on enhanced Laffey rates, are reasonable.10 Such enhanced ratеs do not reflect what the local legal market will bear in terms of legal fees for IDEA litigation. Using the [USAO] Laffey Matrix as a starting point for determination of a reasonable hourly rate, this Court determines that the hourly rate for Zachary Nahass [attorney with 2 years experience] would be $215.00 instead of $268.00, while the rate for paralegals Patrick Meehan, Camille McKenzie and Yanet Scott would be $125.00/$130.00 instead of $146.00/$150.00.
C. Costs
Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $67.10 for expenses arising from copying ($.10 per
D. Fees and Costs Awarded
The amount of fees and costs requested by Plaintiff is $2,084.10. The legal fees claimed were based on 3.5 hours billed at $268.00/hour, 1.0 hour billed at $146.00/hour and 1.0 hour billed at $150.00/hour. This Court has determined that hourly rates based on 75% of the Laffey Matrix rate are applicable, which means that 3.5 hours are billed at $161.00/hour, 1.0 hour is billed at $94.00/hour and 1.0 hour is billed at $98.00/hour. Total fees thus equal $755.50 and
DATED: May 22, 2012
____________________/s/_____________________
ALAN KAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE