WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE, еt al., Plaintiff, Appellant, Cross-Respondent, v. JOSH KAUL, et al., Defendants, Respondents, Cross-Appellants, Petitioners.
No. 2022AP431
Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Decided July 10, 2026
2026 WI 28
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Polk County Circuit Court (Jeffrey L. Anderson, J.) No. 2021CV152.
¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. The attorney general represents the state in legal matters, including by bringing civil actions to enforce state statutes or otherwise to represent the state‘s interests. See generally
¶2 First, when the attorney general deposits uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund and credits them to one or more program appropriations, is he complying with the directive in
I
A
¶3 We first set the stage by explaining how revenues wind up in the state treasury and by differentiating between two key terms used in the budget statutes, “deposit” and “credit.” When a state agency receives money on behalf of the state, it must place that money into a “fund” within the state treasury. The budget statutes refer to this act as “depositing.” See, e.g.,
¶4 When money is deposited into the general fund, it must be directed to a specific part of the general fund. The budget statutes refer to this act as “crediting.” For example,
¶5 The default crediting rule is that money deposited into the
¶6 The following diagram shows the relationships between the funds described in the paragraphs above. It is not drawn to scale, or meant to illustrate anything else within the treasury, or depict the relative dollar amounts contained in each part of the treasury.
B
¶7 For many years, attorneys general from both political parties have negotiated settlements through which the state recovered significant sums of “uncommitted” funds—in other words, money that was not
¶8 In 2017, the legislature included a provision in the biennial budget, 2017 Wis. Act 59, § 1672g, creating § 165.10 (2017).4 That version of § 165.10 provided in relevant part that “before the attorney general may expend settlement funds under s. 20.455(3)(g) that are not committed under the terms of the settlement,” he had to submit a proposed spending plan to the legislature‘s joint committee on finance for approval. See § 165.10 (2017). If the committee did not schedule a meeting to review the plan within 14 days, the attorney general could spend the money as planned. Id. If the committee scheduled a meeting within that period, however, the attorney general could spend the money “only to implement the plan as approved by the committee.” Id.
¶9 Approximately fifteen months later, in late 2018, the legislature adopted the current version of
¶10 After Attorney General Kaul took office in 2019, the legislature argued that
¶11 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in the attorney general‘s favor, concluding that
¶12 The legislature appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court‘s decision regarding
¶13 The court of appeals’ broad holding that
II
¶14 We review decisions granting or denying summary judgment de novo. See Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Co., 2026 WI 12, ¶14, 419 Wis. 2d 755, 33 N.W.3d 800. In doing so, we also must interpret statutes, another question of law that we review de novo. See Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Healthcare Wis. v. WERC, 2025 WI 29, ¶5, 416 Wis. 2d 688, 22 N.W.3d 876.
III
¶15 The legislature‘s primary contention is that thе attorney general is violating
A
¶16 Section 165.10, entitled “Deposit of settlement funds,” provides in its entirety that “[t]he attorney general shall deposit all settlement funds into the general fund.”
¶17 This simple, declarative sentence identifies a class of state money (“settlement funds“) and imposes a single, narrow restriction on where that money must be deposited (into the state treasury, specifically “the general fund“). See id. It says nothing whatsoever about where that money may or must be credited after it is deposited. Further, the “general fund,” as explained above, consists of “[a]ll moneys in the state treasury not specifically designated in any statute as belonging to any other funds.” See
¶18 The legislature nonetheless argues that the attorney general violates
B
¶20 When we granted review in this case, we added a second issue, namely “does the language of
¶21 After reviewing the record and the briefs of both parties, and after hearing oral arguments, the court is too divided to reach a majority mandate on that issue. Generally, when the court is too divided to reach a majority as to the mandate, we affirm the decision under review. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc. v. Emps. Ins. Co., 2023 WI 42, ¶1, 407 Wis. 2d 384, 990 N.W.2d 267 (per curiam). Under these circumstances, however, there is no decision to affirm with respect to
proper interpretation of these other crediting statutes, or whether the attorney general is violating with them.
IV
¶22 We conclude that the attorney general complies with
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed in part.
WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL
JUSTICE HAGEDORN, concurring in part and dissenting in part
¶23 I agree with the majority that the court of appeals misconstrued
¶24 It is true that this court asked the parties, as a second issue, to address the meaning of
¶25 The court justifies its decision to dismiss an issue as “improvidently granted” on the grounds that the court cannot reach a resolution. However, we are not divided on the meaning of
WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL
JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, dissenting
Preliminary Statement
¶26 If an attorney makes a false statement of fact or law, she may be sanctioned for violating the rules of professional conduct for attorneys. SCR 20:3.3. Unfortunately, supreme court justices can deceive the People of Wisconsin with impunity. Reaching an opinion favorable to Democratic Attorney General Josh Kaul (who faces a contested election in November), the majority dodges the issue we asked the parties to brief:
If the court determines that
WIS. STAT. § 165.10 and§ 20.906(1) should be interpreted not to prohibit the attorney general from crediting settlement funds into the appropriation underWIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g) , does the language ofWIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g) authorize the crediting of civil action settlement proceeds to that appropriation? In other words, do the services rendеred by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State of Wisconsin or an executive branch agency constitute “proceeds from services” underWIS. STAT. § 20.455(3)(g) ?
Order Granting Petition for Review at 1–2, Wis. State Legislature v. Kaul, No. 2022AP431 (Wis. Dec. 5, 2025) (emphasis added).
¶27 The majority erases
¶29 The majority‘s machinations have left insufficient time to convert my previously-drafted opinion into a dissent, so (consistent with precedent established by other members of the court) I reproduce below what the majority opinion should have been. See State v. McAdory, 2025 WI 30, ¶41, 417 Wis. 2d 194, 22 N.W.2d 844 (Ziegler, J., concurring); Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶72, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). This is not the first time justice has taken a back seat to political interests. The members of the majority extend the Democrats’ almost unbroken winning streak in litigation against the Republican legislature since the progressives took control.2 In
Clarke v. WEC, 2023 WI 79, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 N.W.2d 370 (adopting Governor Evers’ position and invalidating the legislature‘s redistricting maps); - Wis. Mfrs. & Com. v. Evers, 2022 WI 38, 401 Wis. 2d 699, 977 N.W.2d 374 (allowing Governor Evers’ Department of Health Services to release the names of Wisconsin employers whose employees tested positive for COVID-19);
- Johnson v. WEC, 2022 WI 14, 400 Wis. 2d 626, 971 N.W.2d 402, rev‘d sub nom. Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm‘n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) (per curiam) (adopting Governor Evers’ proposed congressional map and state legislative maps and rejecting the legislature‘s);
- Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611 (ruling against the legislature and expanding executive branch power by allowing administrative agencies to impose requirements not explicitly permitted by statute);
- Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (ruling against the legislature and in favor of Governor Evers’ Department of Natural Resources in allowing the DNR to impose requirements not explicitly permitted by statute);
- Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶¶74–148, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) (joined by Dallet and Karofsky, JJ.) (dissenting from decision that Governor Evers’ executive orders proclaiming successive states of emergency based on COVID-19 exceeded the Governor‘s powers);
- Democratic Nat‘l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WI 80, ¶¶15–27, 394 Wis. 2d 33, 949 N.W.2d 423 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley and Karofsky, JJ.) (dissenting from decision recognizing legislature‘s right to participate as a party in litigation defending the validity of state laws);
- Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶¶109–71, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Dallet, J.) (in original action requesting a declaration that Governor Evers exceeded his constitutional authority to partially veto appropriation bills,
Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Dallet were the only justices who would have declared all of Governor Evers’ vetoes constitutional);
- Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶¶163–88, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 (Dallet, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) (dissenting from decision upholding the constitutionality of the legislature‘s involvement in certain litigation prosecuted or defended by the attorney general and joining decision invalidating legislature‘s regulation of guidance documents issued by the executive branch);
- Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶¶122–30, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting) (joined by Dallet, J.) (dissenting from decision declaring Governor Evers’ appointed DHS Secretary failed to follow the emergency rulemaking procedures established by the legislature and exceeded her powers in issuing order confining all people to their homes, forbidding travel and closing businesses); id., ¶¶132–63 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) (same);
- League of Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶¶43–54, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) (dissenting from decision declaring the December 2018 extraordinary session of the legislature constitutional and embracing Governor Evers’ position to the contrary).
The new majority has continued its political favoritism since Evers v. Marklein:
- Priorities USA v. WEC, 2024 WI 32, 412 Wis. 2d 594, 8 N.W.3d 429 (ruling in favor of Governor Evers’ Wisconsin Elections Commission and against the legislature in overruling this court‘s precedent from just two years prior establishing that
WIS. STAT. § 6.87 precludes the use of secure drop boxes for the return of absentee ballots to municipal clerks); - LeMieux v. Evers, 2025 WI 12, 415 Wis. 2d 422, 19 N.W.3d 76 (granting Governor Evers unrestricted authority to exercise his “partial veto” to rewrite appropriation bills without the legislature‘s approval, including the creation of an infamous 400-year tax increase);
* * *
¶30 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. Wisconsin‘s money belongs to the People of Wisconsin. The People control the allocation and expenditure of Wisconsin‘s revenues through their constitutional representatives in the Wisconsin Legislature.
- Evers v. Marklein, 2025 WI 36, 417 Wis. 2d 453, 22 N.W.3d 789 (granting Governor Evers’ agencies unchecked authority to promulgate administrative rules with the force and effect of law).
The members of the progressive majority are the only justices who demonstrate nearly unwavering fealty to one party. But see, e.g., Wis. State Legis. v. Wis. Dep‘t of Pub. Instruction, 2025 WI 27, 416 Wis. 2d 611, 22 N.W.3d 932. The rest of us render decisions in accordance with the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, which not surprisingly produces opinions that favor neither political party. See, e.g., Wisconsin Elections Comm‘n v. LeMahieu, 2025 WI 4, ¶¶38–45, 414 Wis. 2d 571, 16 N.W.3d 469 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (applying this court‘s precedent in Prehn and affirming that the Wisconsin Statutes permit holdover directors and board members at executive agencies after their terms expire, retaining executive power); Kaul v. Wis. State Legislature, 2025 WI 23, 416 Wis. 2d 322, 21 N.W.3d 513 (holding that civil enforcement actions are a core executive power and the legislature may not veto Department of Justice settlements with the tаrgets of enforcement).
I. BACKGROUND
¶32 The attorney general represents the People of Wisconsin in court.
¶33 As a general rule, unless the Wisconsin Legislature directs particular enforcement revenues to a particular appropriation, the revenues are to be deposited into the “general fund” of the treasury and credited to the “general
WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE v. KAUL
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, dissenting
A. HISTORY
¶34 The dispute between the legislature and the attorney general arose over revenues generated from antitrust and consumer protection enforcement, which, unlike environmental enforcement, fall under the default rule for crediting moneys to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. As early as 2005, attorneys general began to join other states and the federal government in large multistate antitrust and consumer protection enforcement actions. (R. 108:16.) These actions are prosecuted under a variety of state and federal statutes, and in a variety of forums within and outside of Wisconsin. (R. 91.) Given the cost and complexity of taking multistate litigation to trial, such suits often resolve via voluntary settlements or consent judgments. (R. 108:16.) Sometimes called a “consent decree” or a “stipulated judgment,” a consent judgment is a negotiated settlement in which parties agree out of court to remedies including restitution for victims, costs of investigation, forfeitures, surcharges, fees, and injunctive relief. (R. 107:3.) Once reduced to an agreement, the attorney general files a complaint in court and simultaneously submits a stipulated judgment. (R. 107:3–4.) The court then memorializes the consent judgment as a court order, enabling parties to initiate contempt proceedings to enforce the judgment.6 (R. 107:4.)
¶35 Settlement agreements often include well-defined line items for payments like restitution to victims and attorney fees. Historically, the attorney general has also negotiated antitrust and consumer protection settlement agreements assigning large portions of settlements to his own “discretion.” (R. 108:17; 16:30.) Wisconsin attorneys general accordingly developed a practice of crediting certain line items to DOJ program appropriations for restitution and attorney fees, but rather than remit “discretionary” settlement funds to the treasury’s general purpose revenues for the legislature to appropriate, attorneys
B. THE WISCONSIN BUDGET STATUTES
¶36 A full understanding of the longstanding dispute between the Wisconsin Legislature and Wisconsin attorneys general requires familiarity with Wisconsin budget statutes. At the most general level, ch. 25 of the Wisconsin Statutes organizes the state treasury into “funds.”
¶37 Money deposited into the treasury’s “general fund” is “credited” based upon the money’s origin. Money leaving the treasury is routed in accordance with its “appropriation.” Relevant to this case, ch. 20 routes incoming revenues into either the “general purpose revenues” of the general fund or the “program revenues” of the general fund.
¶38 For example,
¶39 This interbranch dispute centers on the difference between “general purpose revenues” and “program revenues.” “General purpose revenues” are not earmarked for a particular purpose. “General purpose revenues” come from sources
¶40 “Program revenues,” on the other hand, are moneys “paid into the general fund,” which the legislature has already assigned “by law to an appropriation to finance a specified program or state agency.”
¶41 Central to this litigation, a default rule of
C. HISTORY OF ENACTMENTS
¶42 Prior to 2010, the legislature became aware of the attorney general “crediting” putatively “discretionary” settlement funds to the DOJ’s program appropriation,
¶43 In 2017, the legislature passed Wis. Act 59, § 1672g, a provision of the 2017 budget act, to regulate this practice. Act 59 created
¶45 Second, Act 369 clawed back moneys the attorney general had already credited to
¶46 The sums of money at stake are substantial. As of January 10, 2022, the DOJ had credited nearly $33 million in that account. (R. 108:11; 89:5.) Additionally, the DOJ holds three quarters of a million dollars of settlement funds in its
D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶47 After Attorney General Kaul took office in 2019, the legislature’s Joint Committee on Finance asked why Kaul had not complied with Act 369. (Supp.App’x.60) Kaul responded that certain portions of settlements fall under specific program appropriations, such as line items for victim restitution and attorney fees. Because, according to Kaul, those appropriations would conflict with the
¶48 The legislature responded by noting that
¶49 With no change in Kaul’s position forthcoming, the legislature filed this lawsuit on June 3, 2021, seeking a declaration that 2017 Wis. Act 369 § 27, codified at
¶50 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court granted summary judgment in Kaul’s favor. The court agreed with the legislature and ruled that
¶51 In a published opinion, the court of appeals reversed. The court held that
¶52 We affirm the court of appeals. We hold that
¶53 With respect to program revenues, we hold that
¶54 With respect to
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶56 “The interpretation and application of statutes present questions of law that we review independently.” Wis. Prop. Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan, 2023 WI 58, ¶9, 408 Wis. 2d 287, 992 N.W.2d 100.
III. ANALYSIS
¶57 The text of the Wisconsin Statutes resolves this appeal. “We assume that the legislature‘s intent is expressed in the statutory language.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. “[W]e have repeatedly held that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.” Id., ¶45 (internal quotation omitted). “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. (citations omitted). The Wisconsin budget statutes are comprised almost entirely of “technical” and “specially-defined words.” See id.
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 165.10
¶58
¶60 Read otherwise,
¶61
¶62 Finally,
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 20.906(1)
¶63 Once the attorney general has deposited all settlement funds into the general fund, the question remains where to credit them. The “general fund” contains both “general purpose revenues” and “program revenues.”
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 20.455(1)(gh)
¶65 The court of appeals held, and the legislature maintains before this court, that no provision of the Wisconsin Statutes triggers the exception to the crediting rule under
D. Wisconsin Stat. § 165.10 DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION.
¶66 As a threshold matter,
¶68 To illustrate,
¶69 Twelve other agency provisions listed in
E. Wisconsin Stat. § 20.455(1)(gh) PROVIDES ONLY ONE EXCEPTION.
¶71 The list in
F. Wisconsin Stat. § 20.455(3)(g) DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL CREDITING RULE.
¶72 For decades, attorneys general have credited putatively “discretionary” “settlement funds” to the DOJ program appropriation for “Gifts, grants and proceeds,”
The amounts in the schedule to carry out the purposes for which gifts and grants are made and collected. All moneys received from gifts and grants and all proceeds from services, conferences, and sales of publications and promotional materials, except as provided in sub. (2) (gm) and (gp) and to transfer to s. 20.505 (1) (kg), at the discretion of the attorney general, an amount not to exceed $98,300 annually, shall be credited to this appropriation account.24
The phrase “settlement funds” does not appear in that provision, nor does that provision incorporate by reference
¶74 The legislature requires “specific[]” language tо trigger the exception to the
¶76 The Wisconsin Statutes establish that “settlement proceeds” and “legal services” mean something different than “settlement funds.” See
¶77 Reading “proceeds from services” to encompass all “settlement funds” disregards the specificity with which the legislature writes its ch. 20 program appropriations.25
Moneys received under ss. 23.22 (9) (c), 49.49 (6), 100.263, 133.16, 281.98 (2), 283.91 (5), 289.96 (3) (b), 291.97 (3), 292.99 (2), 293.87
(4) (b), 295.19 (3) (b) 2., 295.79 (4) (b), and 299.97 (2), for the expenses of investigation and prosecution of violations, including attorney fees.
¶78
¶79 Kaul’s argument that “proceeds from sеrvices” contemplates “settlement funds” runs afoul of two other principles of statutory interpretation. “Proceeds from services” appears in a list. Section 20.455(3)(g) appropriates “moneys received from gifts and grants and all proceeds from services, conferences, and sales of publications and promotional materials” (emphasis added). Kaul’s construction of the statute would strip “proceeds from services” of the context that list furnishes. We “interpret[] [language] in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.
¶80 Reading “proceeds from services” in light of the list in which it appears in
¶82 The whole-text canon also forecloses a textual path for Kaul’s arguments. In 2017, the legislature amended
¶83 Kaul argues Act 369 nevertheless allows him to credit “settlement funds” to
¶84
¶85 Once “settlement funds” have been deposited into the general fund,
¶86 Because
¶87 Finally,
Notes
(1) FREQUENCY OF DEPOSITS. Unless otherwise provided by law, all moneys collected or received by any state agency for or in behalf of the state or which are required by law to be turned into the state treasury shall be deposited in or transmitted to the state treasury at least once a week and also at other times as required by the governor or the secretary of administration and shall be accompanied by a statement in such form as the secretary of administration may prescribe showing the amount of such collection and from whom and for what purpose or on what account the same was received. All moneys paid into the treasury shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law.
(3) ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.
. . . .
(g) Gifts, grants and proceeds. The amounts in the schedule to carry out the purposes for which gifts and grants are made and collected. All moneys received from gifts and grants аnd all proceeds from services, conferences, and sales of publications and promotional materials, except as provided in sub. (2) (gm) and (gp) and to transfer to s. 20.505 (1) (kg), at the discretion of the attorney general, an amount not to exceed $98,300 annually, shall be credited to this appropriation account.
(a) General purpose revenues. “General purpose revenues” consist of general taxes, miscellaneous receipts and revenues collected by state agencies which are paid into a specific fund, lose their identity, and are then available for appropriation by the legislature. In this chapter, “general purpose revenues” refers to general purpose revenues in the general fund. General purpose revenues are identified by the abbreviation “GPR” in s. 20.005. They shall be deposited pursuant to s. 20.906.
(b) Program revenues. “Program revenues” consist of revenues which are paid into the general fund and are credited by law to an appropriation to finance a specified program or state agency. In this chapter, “program revenues” refers to program revenues in the general fund. Program revenues are identified by the abbreviation “PR” in s. 20.005. For any program revenue appropriation which is limited to the amounts in the schedule, no expenditures may be made exceeding the amounts in the schedule, except as provided in ss. 13.101 and 16.515, regardless of the amounts credited to that appropriation account. They shall be deposited pursuant to s. 20.906. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, program revenues shall be used to reimburse the general fund for payments transferred under the appropriations made in s. 20.865 for the purposes of program revenue appropriations.
(1) LEGAL SERVICES.
. . . .
(hm) Restitution. All moneys received by the department to provide restitution to victims when ordered by the court as the result of prosecutions under s. 49.49 and chs. 100, 133, 281 to 285 and 289 to 299 and under a federal antitrust law for the purpose of providing restitution to victims of the violation when ordered by the court.
2017 Wis. Act 59, § 1672g provides: “165.10 of the statutes is created to read:
165.10 Limits on expenditure of discretionary settlement funds. Notwithstanding s. 20.455 (3), before the attorney general may expend settlement funds under s. 20.455 (3) (g) that are not committed under the terms of the settlement, the attorney general shall submit to the joint committee on finance a proposed plan for the expenditure of the funds. If the cochairpersons of the committee do not notify the attorney general within 14 working days after the submittal that the committee has scheduled a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the proposed plan, the attorney general may expend the funds to implement the proposed plan. If within 14 working days after the submittal, thе cochairpersons of the committee notify the attorney general that the committee has scheduled a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the proposed plan, the attorney general may expend the funds only to implement the plan as approved by the committee.
2017 Wis. Act 369, § 27 provides: “165.10 of the statutes, as created by 2017 Wisconsin Act 59, is amended to read:
165.10 Limits on expenditure Deposit of discretionary settlement funds. Notwithstanding s. 20.455 (3), before the The attorney general may expend shall deposit all settlement funds into the general fund. under s. 20.455 (3) (g) that are not committed under the terms of the settlement, the attorney general shall submit to the joint committee on finance a proposed plan for the expenditure of the funds. If the cochairpersons of the committee do not notify the attorney general within 14 working days after the submittal that the committee has scheduled a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the proposed plan, the attorney general may expend the funds to implement the proposed plan. If, within 14 working days after the submittal, the cochairpersons of the committee notify the attorney general that the committee has scheduled a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the proposed plan, the attorney general may expend the funds only to implement the plan as approved by the committee”
2017 Wisconsin Act 369, § 21 provides: “20.455 (3) (g) of the statutes is amended to read:
20.455 (3) (g) Gifts, grants and proceeds. The amounts in the schedule to carry out the purposes for which gifts and grants are made and collected. All moneys received from gifts and grants and all proceeds from services, conferences, and sales of publications and promotional materials to carry out the purposes for which made or collected, except as provided in sub. (2) (gm) and (gp) and to transfer to s. 20.505 (1) (kg), at the discretion of the аttorney general, an amount not to exceed $98,300 annually, shall be credited to this appropriation account.”
2017 Wisconsin Act 369, § 103(1) provides: “Fiscal changes.
(1) SETTLEMENT FUNDS. Notwithstanding s. 20.001 (3) (c), from the appropriation account under s. 20.455 (3) (g), on the effective date of this subsection, there is lapsed to the general fund the unencumbered balance of any settlement funds in that appropriation account, as determined by the attorney general.
(1) LEGAL SERVICES.
. . . .
(gh) Investigation and prosecution. Moneys received under ss. 23.22 (9) (c), 49.49 (6), 100.263, 133.16, 281.98 (2), 283.91 (5), 289.96 (3) (b), 291.97 (3), 292.99 (2), 293.87 (4) (b), 295.19 (3) (b) 2., 295.79 (4) (b), and 299.97 (2), for the expenses of investigation and prosecution of violations, including attorney fees.