Wilson v. StateWilson v. State
Antonio Wilson was convicted of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Tre Griffin.1 On appeal, he contends that
Each of these claims fails. The evidence was sufficient to support Wilson‘s drug-conspiracy conviction. The indictment satisfied due process because the predicate felony for the felony
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence at trial showed the following.
(a) On the morning of the shooting, Wilson was at Braindon Cayo‘s house smoking marijuana with Cayo, Adonis Lewis, Cayo‘s girlfriend, Britney Coleman, and Wilson‘s girlfriend, Auviance West. At around 2:00 p.m. they were joined by Jalene Wright.
The group discussed going to buy more marijuana from Lewis‘s regular dealer, Griffin. Wilson was involved in the planning: West testified that she gave Wilson money because “[h]e said he was going to go buy weed,” and Wright testified that Cayo asked her, on behalf of himself, Wilson, and Lewis, if they could borrow her car to go make the purchase.
Wilson, Cayo, Lewis, Coleman, and Wright left in Wright‘s car to drive to Griffin‘s house; West stayed behind. According to
The group arrived at Griffin‘s house. Lewis got out of the car and stood by the driver‘s side door. Griffin came down the driveway carrying a bookbag and wearing a gun on his hip. Lewis and Griffin greeted each other, and Lewis got out the money while Griffin pulled marijuana and a scale from his bookbag. Griffin put the scale on the ground by the driver‘s side door to weigh the marijuana. Lewis stood nearby.
Wilson got out of the passenger side of the car and walked around to the driver‘s side where Griffin was. A few seconds later, Griffin was shot. No one admitted to seeing the actual shooting. But Coleman, Wright, Cayo, and Lewis all testified that they saw Wilson holding a gun afterwards, either just after the shooting or in the car
Lewis picked up Griffin‘s bоokbag and got back in the car. On the way back to Cayo‘s house, Wilson took the SIM card from Griffin‘s phone and Cayo threw the phone out the window. When they arrived at Cayo‘s house, Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis divided up the marijuana from the bookbag. Then they burned the bookbag and talked about selling the murder weapon. Wilson reported to West, “we robbed him.”
(b) Right after Griffin was shot, his mother called 911. Investigators at the scene got Griffin‘s phone number from his family and obtained a description of the car that was seen driving away from the shooting. In the following weeks, police got a tip that led them to Wright. They then found Wright on social media and were able to connect her to the car. When Wright was interviewed by police, she told them that on the day of the shooting she went to Cayo‘s house and that “all three of the guys at the house“—Cayo, Lewis, and Wilson—went to buy marijuana. She admitted later that she and Coleman went with them.
Police also obtained significant information from cell-phone data. Griffin‘s phone records showed that five minutes before his mother called 911, he received a call from a phone that was later connected to Lewis‘s mother. Police obtained the records and data from Lewis‘s mother‘s phone and found that the phone call to Griffin pinged a cell tower that was a half mile from Griffin‘s house. Lewis‘s mother‘s phone also contained photos of Cayo and Lewis holding a handgun. A firearms expert from the Georgia Burеau of Investigation testified that the handgun in the photos appeared to be a Smith & Wesson SD9, and that the bullet recovered from Griffin‘s body could have been fired from that type of gun. And Lewis‘s mother‘s phone also contained a text message conversation that included a YouTube link to a rap video entitled “Dope,” in which Cayo, Lewis, and Wilson appeared and Cayo and Lewis “flashed around” a handgun. Cayo and West testified that the gun in the “Dope” video was the one used to kill Griffin.
2. Wilson first contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for
A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime “when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”
The evidence here was sufficient to support Wilson‘s conviction for conspiracy to purchase marijuana. First, there was testimony that Wilson was an active participant in the plan to buy mаrijuana from Griffin: Wright testified that when Cayo asked to borrow her car to go make the purchase, he was asking on behalf of Wilson and Lewis as well as himself. West testified that she gave Wilson money because “[h]e said he was going to go buy weed.” And multiple witnesses testified that Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis divided the marijuana among them after they had obtained it. See McLeod v. State, 297 Ga. 99, 103 (2) (772 SE2d 641) (2015) (“appellant‘s shared criminal intent with her co-conspirators may be inferred by her conduct before, during, and after the crimes“). That was enough to show a mutual understanding among Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis to purchase marijuana. Also, the evidence showed that all three did overt acts in furtherance of their plan: among other things, Wilson collected money from West, Lewis cоntacted Griffin to arrange the purchase, and Cayo obtained Wright‘s car. This evidence of those overt acts, together with that of the participants’ mutual understanding, was sufficient to support Wilson‘s conviction for conspiracy to purchase marijuana.
3. Wilson contends the trial court erred by denying his special demurrer to quash Count 4 of the indictment. Count 4 charged Wilson (along with Cayo and Lewis) with felony murder for causing Griffin‘s death “while in the commission of the offense of Conspiracy to Violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, a felony.” Wilson argued in the special demurrer, as he does on appeal, that the count was not sufficient as a matter of due process because it did not
As described in footnote 1, Wilson was convicted of Counts 4 and 7 of the indictment. Count 4 charged Wilson, Cayo, and Lewis with felony murder predicated on conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Count 7, in turn, charged that all three “unlawfully conspired with each other to commit the offense of Purchase of Marijuana, in violation of code section 16-13-30 of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, did do the following overt acts to effect the object of the conspirаcy: contacted Tre Griffin to arrange the purchase of marijuana, secured a method of transportation to the residence of Tre Griffin, traveled to the residence of Tre Griffin, and met in person with Tre Griffin.” No other count charged any defendant with any violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.
The purpose of an indictment “is to allow the defendant to
Wilson‘s indictment was constitutionally sufficient. Count 4 charged him with felony murder for causing Griffin‘s death while committing conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act; Count 7, in turn, charged him with conspiracy to purchase
4. Wilson next contends the State did not prove that the conspiracy to purchase marijuana proximately caused Griffin‘s death. He argues that a conspiracy to purchase marijuana is not
A person commits felony murder when, “in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.”
Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the conspiracy to purchase marijuana proximately caused Griffin‘s death. We have recognized time and again that transactions in illegal drugs are inherently dangerous. See State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 595-596 (2) (b) (826 SE2d 36) (2019) (“this Court and others have recognized that violence is inherent in the business of dealing illegal drugs“) (punctuation omitted); Davis, 290 Ga. at 760-761 (4) (explaining that it is “not unusual” for parties to an illegal drug transaction to be armed, and citing cases noting that it was not unreasonable to expect firearms to be present at a drug transaction or to believe that one‘s safety was in danger when going to a known drug area). This is because it is among the “incidental, probable consequences” of an illegal drug transaction that something may go wrong and someone may be killed. See Davis, 290 Ga. at 760 (4) (defendant proximately caused victim‘s death when he arranged to purchase marijuana from the victim, “something went wrong,” and the defendant‘s brother shot the victim). Indeed, at Wilson‘s trial, a homicide detective testified that “at least 75 to 80 percent” of his
Wilson urges that it was not the conspiracy to purchase marijuana but the later plan to rob Griffin—of which he was acquitted—that foreseeably caused Griffin‘s death. But “[r]egardless of whether an [armed] robbery took place, the [parties] met for a drug transaction and something went wrong“—which was reasonably foreseeable. Davis, 290 Ga. at 760 (4). The proximate-cause requirement is satisfied here, so this claim of error fails.
5. Wilson contends that the trial court erred by failing to give his requested jury instruction on proximate cause. We review de novo a properly preserved claim that a trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an applicable principle of law. See Reese v. State, 314 Ga. 871, 879-880 (2) (880 SE2d 117) (2022).
Wilson asked for an instruction to the effect that the jury could not convict him of felony murder unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a felony that both proximately caused the victim‘s death and was dangerous enough that it created a foreseeable risk that it would result in the victim‘s death. The trial
A person commits armed robbery, aggravated assault, and conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substance Act as previously defined. In order for homicide to have been done in the commission of these particular felonies, there must be some connection between the felony and the homicide. The homicide must have been done in carrying out the unlawful act and not сollateral to it. It is not enough that the homicide occurred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or committed. There must be a legal relationship between the homicide and the felony so as to cause you to find that the homicide occurred before the felony was at an end, or before any attempt to avoid conviction or arrest for the felony. The felony must have a legal relationship to the homicide, be at least concurrent with it in part, and be part of it in the actual and material sense. A homicide is committed in the carrying out of a felony when it is committed by the accused when engaged in the performance of any act required for the full exеcution of a felony.2
The trial court also properly defined felony murder for the jury, explaining that “[a] person commits the crime of murder, when in commission of a felony, that person causes the death of another
Those instructions, taken together, adequately informed the jury about the principles of proximate cause that applied to this case. See Ware v. State, 305 Ga. 457, 459-460 (2) (826 SE2d 56) (2019) (concluding that the same set of instructions fully informed the jury that it could not convict the defendant of felony murder unless it found that he committed a predicate felony that proximately caused the victim‘s death). See also Campbell-Williams, 309 Ga. at 588 (2) (a) (jury instructions are “read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is error“) (citation omitted). The jury was instructed that it could not convict Wilson of felony murder unless it found that he was guilty of one of the charged predicate felonies; that the murder was “done in the commission of,” and “at least concurrent with” and “not collateral to,” the predicate felony; and that the predicate felony was related to the murder “in an actual and material sense.” Following those instructions—as
Wilson‘s requested instruction also would have told the jury that a predicate felony for a felony murder must itself be inherently dangerous. But our “clear precedent” is that such an instruction is not required, even when requested. Davis, 290 Ga. at 762 (5) (b). See also State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 34 (2) (b) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (“our case law runs contrary to” the notion that a trial court must “instruct the jury explicitly that it must find as an element of the felony murder that the underlying felony...was committed in a manner that created a foreseeable risk of death“). So the trial court‘s failure to give that part of the instruction was not error.
Because the trial court fully and correctly instructed the jury on the relevant points of law, it was not error to fail to give the additional explanatory instruction that Wilson requested. See, e.g., Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811, 821 (4) (865 SE2d 116) (2021) (where
6. Wilson asked for a jury instruction on conspiracy to possess marijuana as a lesser included felony or misdemeanor offense of conspiracy to purchase marijuana. The trial court declined to give that instruction, and Wilson contends this was error.
A written request to charge a lesser included offense “must always be given if there is any evidence that the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense.” Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 520 (2)
Here, even assuming that conspiracy to possess is a lesser included offense of conspiracy to purchase,3 the evidence could not support a finding that Wilson was guilty only of conspiracy to possess marijuana and not conspiracy to purchase. It is undisputed that Wilson at least knew about the plan to buy more marijuana
7. Wilson contends that the trial court erred by declining to give his requested instruction on the proof needed to show his participation in the conspiracy. The requested instruction would have told the jury that Wilson could not be guilty of conspiracy unless the State proved “that a cоnspiracy existed, that the defendant knew the essential objectives of that conspiracy, and that armed with that knowledge he participated” in the conspiracy.
We see no error because the points of law in Wilson‘s requested instruction were covered in the court‘s other instructions. The trial court gave jury instructions that track the current pattern instructions on the defendant‘s criminal intent, mere presence, and mere association. See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed. 2007, updated Aug. 2022), §§ 1.43.10, 1.43.30, 1.43.31. Those instructions informed the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson “knowingly and
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequenсe to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
With these principles in mind, we turn to the two pieces of
(a) Rap Video
As described above, Cayo, Lewis, and Wilson appeared in a homemade rap video entitled “Dope.” In the video, Cayo and Lewis “flashed” a handgun and identified it as a Smith & Wesson SD-9, which was capable of having fired the bullet recovered from Griffin‘s body, and which Cayo and West testified was the murder weapon. Also in the video, Cayo said that he “hit [his] first lick,” and in Cayo‘s proffer (a transcript of which was introduced at trial) he explained how “hitting a lick” is slang for committing a robbery. The video was shot on November 30, 2017—eleven days after the murder—and uploaded to YouTube a few weeks later. In the period between the murder and the shooting of the video, Cayo exchanged messages on Instagram with another person about wanting to sell the gun, but wanting to wait until after he had used it in a video.
The “Dope” video was certainly relevant. Most importantly, it connеcted the defendants to the murder weapon, and it also implicated Cayo in a robbery, very close in time to the crimes here,
The video‘s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. A defendant‘s appearance in a rap video—even one like this one replete with obscenities and racial slurs—is not per se prejudicial. And Wilson does not endeavor to explain what specifically about this video might cause unfair prejudice. The video shows the defendants boasting about making
Nine months after the murder, after both Wilson and Cayo had been charged, Wilson sent a series of messages to Cayo on Instagram. Wilson wrоte, “Congrats,” then “Keep grinding,” followed by “I miss you too no cap bruh it‘s jus my lawyer Nd 12 watchin my page,” and finally, “It‘s a lot, but ima chop it up witchu.”
Those messages were also relevant. They showed that Wilson and Cayo were still on good terms while they were both being prosecuted for the murder, which tended to make it less likely that Wilson was an unwitting bystander to a murder carried out solely by Cayo or Lewis. The probative value may have been slight, but that is enough to satisfy the relevance standard. See Jordan, 313 Ga. at 844 (2). And we see no danger of unfair prejudice from the
9. Finally, Wilson contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to life without parole. He argues that the sentence is unlawful because the jury did not find any aggravating factors in the crime and because the trial court relied on improper considerations. As to the second point, Wilson points to the trial court‘s remarks, in an order denying his motion to reduce his sentence, that “the evidence points to Wilson being the actual shooter” and that Wilson “fail[ed] to accept and recognize his responsibility.”
Neither contention has merit. A defendant convicted of murder is eligible for a sentence of life without parole, regardless of whether any aggravating factors are found. See
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.