Stafford v. StateStafford v. State
Appellant Lil‘Che Stafford was found guilty by a Fulton County jury of felony murder and first-degree burglary in connection with the death of Jose Greer.1 On appeal, Appellant raises four enumerations of error: (1) evidence of an earlier burglary and armed robbery was improperly admitted; (2) a testifying detective
1. The evidence concerning the crimes came largely from co-defendant Frederick Clark, who was offered use immunity for his testimony. Clark testified as follows: On December 8, 2015, Appellant met with Clark and co-defendants Mark Spencer, Maxx Pritchett, and Vas Coleman at a house on Mitchell Street in Atlanta. After discussing that they needed money, the group decided to rob the home of a drug dealer they knew as “Cash.” Clark drove the men to Sky Lofts Condominiums, where they thought Cash lived. Upon their arrival, Spencer checked the front entryway of the condominium complex for cameras and returned to Clark‘s car.
Clark rang the doorbell of a third-floor unit where they believed Cash was residing, while Appellant and Spencer hid out of view. When nobody answered, Clark began using a screwdriver to open the door, and Appellant and Spencer joined him in attempting to break down the door. After seeing someone down the hall, Clark and Appellant began to flee, but Spencer stopped Clark and convinced him to continue trying to get into the unit. Appellant returned to the door to see why Clark and Spencer stopped following him, then stayed. The three men took turns trying to open the door with the screwdriver, and eventually Appellant and Spencer broke the door open together with their forearms. Once inside the unit, the three men stole an iPhone, iPad, laptop computer, and some hats — all of which were placed in a backpack that Spencer was carrying. Appellant also took a jar full of coins. While in the unit, Spencer remarked to Clark that he noticed an ambulance and police in the vicinity, which prompted the three men to leave through a
Unbeknownst to the men, Cash did not live in this unit, but the victim, Greer, did. When Greer heard the commotion at his door, he called 911 to report that his unit was being broken into; he also told 911 that he had fled to his balcony to escape the perpetrators and that he might try to jump off the balcony to get to safety. Ultimately, Greer fell 30 feet to the ground.
A surveillance video recording from the condominium complex showed three men entering the complex through a doorway. Another camera recorded the same three men running down a stairwell and exiting through a different doorway.
William Gadsden, a resident at the condominium complex, saw three men running down the back stairwell of the complex. Gadsden
The police arrived at the scene about two minutes after Greer called 911 and moments after Gadsden saw the three men running down the stairwell. The responding officer found Greer lying on the sidewalk, and Greer was able to tell her that he was trying to escape the burglars by climbing to the balcony below, but he slipped and fell. The police found an abandoned jar of coins containing Greer‘s business card on the sidewalk nearby and found Greer‘s unit ransacked. Greer was transported to the hospital, where he later died. The medical examiner testified that Greer died from blunt force trauma and classified the manner of death as a homicide.
Clark testified that after jumping over the fence, he and Spencer went in one direction and Appellant went in an opposite direction. Spencer and Clark shed their outer clothing, placed the clothes in the backpack, and disposed of the backpack in an
Bryant, who was friends with Appellant and his co-defendants, testified that Spencer called him to give Spencer a ride. He picked up Clark and Spencer from the Mitchell Street house on the day of Greer‘s homicide. As they were leaving the house, they saw Appellant walking towards them. Appellant got into Bryant‘s car, and Bryant took all three men back towards the area of the crime scene. Spencer directed Bryant to park by a building about a block away from the Sky Lofts Condominiums. Appellant, Clark, and Spencer left the car for a few minutes and returned with a backpack.
Cell site tower location information for Clark, Coleman, Pritchett, and Spencer placed their cell phones in the area of the Mitchell Street house before the burglary, in the area of the Sky Lofts Condominiums around the time of the burglary, and back in the area of the Mitchell Street house after the burglary. As Appellant did not have a cell phone, there were no cell phone records available for him.
Javon Farquharson, who regularly bought and resold electronics, testified that on the day after the burglary, Appellant and Coleman tried to sell him an iPad and iPhone. They also showed Farquharson a wallet containing an ID card and a red debit or credit card. Farquharson heard Appellant mention that the group “hit a little lick last night” and “I stepped over this dude when I was leaving.” Farquharson opted not to purchase the electronics from Appellant and Coleman because he was a convicted felon and he did not “want to get caught up with no dealing in stolen property.” Appellant later mentioned that he used the stolen card at a
Alani Bellinger, Farquharson‘s girlfriend, was present when Appellant and Coleman brought the wallet and electronics to Farquharson. Bellinger testified that she could see the face on the ID card in the wallet, and she saw the same face in a news report about Greer‘s death later that night. She subsequently called a police tip line to report this information.
In addition to the information from the tip line, the police determined from an interview with Farquharson that Appellant and Coleman later sold the stolen electronics at a particular computer store, and Greer‘s laptop and iPhone were later recovered from that store.3 Based on this information, arrest warrants were issued for
At some point during the investigation, Clark sought to provide the police with information about the crimes. Clark admitted that he purchased a plane ticket for Appellant to Denver and a bus and plane ticket for Spencer. Based on other information he provided, an arrest warrant was also issued for Coleman. Coleman was arrested in Alabama in February 2016 and was transported to Atlanta, where he was interviewed by the police.
2. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of prior crimes under
Rule 404 (b) provides, in relevant part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Prior to trial, the State filed a timely notice of intent to introduce, under Rule 404 (b), other-acts evidence of a burglary and armed robbery in which Appellant allegedly participated in October 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the October 2015 incident“). Following a hearing, the trial court ruled, over Appellant‘s objection, that evidence of the October 2015 incident was admissible under Rule 404 (b) to show intent, plan, and identity.
(a) The Evidence Admitted Under Rule 404 (b)
During trial, the State presented evidence of the October 2015 incident through the testimony of Clark; two Georgia State University students, James Shimkus and Preston Baldwin; and Detective Vincent Velasquez. The trial court instructed the jury that the evidence about the October 2015 incident was being offered for the limited purposes of proving intent, plan, and identity. The court also instructed the jury that it was not authorized to “infer
The evidence presented by the State under Rule 404 (b) included the following. Shimkus, who is white, testified that in the “middle of October in 2015,” he was a student at Georgia State and was rooming with Baldwin, who is black and played football at Georgia State, at the City Walk Apartments. Shimkus also testified that he was dealing drugs during this time. According to Shimkus, in October 2015, Shimkus heard a knock at the door, looked through the peephole, and saw a man standing outside his apartment. Shimkus opened the door and six men, including the man outside the door, rushed into the apartment holding guns and wearing masks. Shimkus and Baldwin testified that the men robbed them of money, drugs,5 and video game consoles, struck them, and left the
Clark testified that in the fall of 2015, he visited the Mitchell Street house, where Appellant, Spencer, Pritchett, and Coleman were hanging out. Inside the room where they were gathered, Clark saw mushrooms, marijuana, LSD, and money. The group, including Appellant, stated that they had stolen the drugs and money from two Georgia State students. Clark was told that the students lived at the City Walk Apartments, which was housing for students of Georgia State University; one of the students was black, and one was white; the black student was a Georgia State football player that Clark identified as “Princeton”6; and the white student was a drug dealer. The group also told Clark that they “beat one of the guys up” before leaving with the drugs and money.
The State also presented the testimony of Detective Velasquez, who testified about statements Clark made to him in January 2016
(b) Harmless Error Analysis
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the October 2015 incident, we conclude that any such error was harmless and thus does not merit reversal.
For a nonconstitutional ruling . . . , the test for determining harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict. In conducting that analysis, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable
jurors to have done.
Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 415 (2) (851 SE2d 541) (2020).
The evidence tying Appellant to the October 2015 incident was not especially prejudicial. Shimkus and Baldwin could not identify their assailants. The only evidence actually connecting Appellant to the October 2015 incident was Clark‘s testimony, which was merely a retelling of what he heard from the group at the Mitchell Street house, and Detective Velasquez‘s testimony, which was a retelling of Clark‘s story. If the jury found Clark credible, he gave a detailed account of Appellant‘s involvement in the charged crimes, so his second-hand account of the October 2015 incident would be unlikely to affect the jury‘s guilty verdicts. And if the jury discredited Clark, it would have discredited his claim that Appellant was involved in the October 2015 incident. Further, the State did not mention the October 2015 incident in either its opening statement or closing argument. See Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. 277, 283 (2) (830 SE2d 90) (2019) (any error in admission of other-acts evidence was harmless in part because there was no contention that the State mentioned or
And, the other evidence against Appellant was strong. Clark testified that he, Appellant, and others planned the charged burglary; that he, Appellant, and Spencer physically broke down the door to enter Greer‘s unit and stole an iPhone, laptop, and other items while inside, which they put inside a backpack that Spencer was wearing; and that they passed Greer lying on the ground as they fled. Bryant testified that he drove Appellant, along with Clark and Spencer, to retrieve the backpack. Farquharson and Bellinger saw Appellant the next day with Greer‘s driver‘s license and his debit or credit card. Appellant told Farquharson that his group “hit a little lick last night,” and “I stepped over this dude when I was leaving.” Appellant also attempted to sell Farquharson an iPad and iPhone. Appellant later told Farquharson that the electronics were sold at a particular computer store, and Greer‘s electronics were later recovered from the same computer store. Appellant also admitted to Farquharson that he used Greer‘s card at a McDonald‘s restaurant; Greer‘s bank statement confirms the card was used at a
Given the limited prejudicial effect of the admission of the October 2015 incident and the strength of the other evidence of Appellant‘s guilt, we conclude that it is highly probable that any error in admitting evidence of the October 2015 incident did not contribute to the verdicts. See Allen, 310 Ga. at 415 (2) (error in admitting a prior robbery was harmless due to strong evidence against the defendant). Accordingly, this enumeration fails.
3. In a related enumeration, Appellant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to part of Detective Velasquez‘s testimony regarding an armed robbery “separate from the violent crimes that the trial court already admitted into evidence pursuant to [Rule 404 (b)].” Alternatively, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Detective Velasquez‘s testimony regarding this separate incident.
After a review of the relevant testimony, we conclude this
Detective Velasquez entered this information into the police data system to find matching incidents, and found a robbery that occurred on April 28, 2015, at the City Walk Apartments involving a victim by the name of James Shimkus (“the April 2015 incident“). The police report from the April 2015 incident led Detective Velasquez to find and interview Shimkus, who said that he had been robbed another time in a separate incident in the fall of 2015.8
Shimkus‘s description of the October 2015 incident matched the details of the robbery that Clark described to Detective
(a) To prevail on a claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show that his trial counsel‘s performance was deficient, and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense so seriously as to deprive him of a fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. This requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel‘s performance was adequate. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel‘s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Mitchell v. State, 307 Ga. 855, 858 (2) (838 SE2d 847) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If the defendant fails to satisfy either the ‘deficient performance’ or the ‘prejudice’ prong . . . this Court is not required to examine the other.” Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 61-62 (2) (779 SE2d 322) (2015).
Based on the above testimony, it is clear that Detective Velasquez‘s “reasonably sure” comment referred to the October 2015 incident involving Shimkus and Baldwin, and not the April 2015 incident. Further, Detective Velasquez‘s reference to the April 2015 incident was merely to explain how he located Shimkus; he never testified and no other evidence was presented that Appellant had any involvement in that incident. Any objection by trial counsel to Detective Velasquez‘s comment on the ground that it improperly implicated Appellant in the April 2015 incident would have been meritless because the testimony did not support such an objection. We therefore conclude that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to this testimony on this basis. See Lynn v. State, 310 Ga. 608, 617 (4) (c) (ii) (B) (852 SE2d 843) (2020) (citation omitted) (“[T]he failure to make a meritless objection is not deficient performance.“).
(b) Appellant‘s argument that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony fails for the same reason. Appellant did not
must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The third component of this test requires [Appellant] to make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.
Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 243 (4) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).
For the reasons outlined above in Division 3 (a) explaining why Appellant has not shown deficiency in his claim of ineffective assistance, Appellant has shown no error, much less plain error, in the admission of this testimony by the trial court. Accordingly, this enumeration fails.
“As is the case generally, to authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 863 (1) (834 SE2d 96) (2019) (punctuation omitted). “Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to authorize the giving of a charge is a question of law.” Garner v. State, 303 Ga. 788, 790 (2) (815 SE2d 36) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). In determining whether a trial court erred in giving jury instructions, we read and consider the instructions as a whole. See Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 105 (7) (805 SE2d 80) (2017).
Here, we conclude that the trial court gave sufficient instructions to the jury regarding proximate cause, and an additional instruction was unnecessary. In the final jury charge, the trial court gave the pattern charge on causation for felony murder,
In order for a homicide to have been done in the commission of this particular felony, there must be some connection between the felony and a homicide. The homicide must have been done in carrying out the unlawful act and not collateral to it. It is not enough that the homicide occurred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or committed. There must be such a legal relationship between the homicide and felony so as to cause you to find that the homicide occurred before the felony was at end or before any attempt to avoid conviction or arrest for the felony. . . . The felony must have a legal relationship to the homicide, be at least concurrent with it in part, and be a part of it in an actual and material sense. A homicide is committed in the carrying out of a felony when it is committed by the accused while engaged in the performance of any act required for the full execution of the felony.
The jury was thus properly and adequately instructed on proximate cause, and that jury charge was supported by the evidence. An additional jury charge on unforeseen or intervening cause was unnecessary because, considered as a whole, the charge given by the trial court was a correct statement of the law with regard to proximate cause in a felony murder case. See Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882, 889-890 (3) (843 SE2d 784) (2020) (“Considering the charges as a whole, we conclude that the trial
5. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
During Coleman‘s interview, which was relayed at trial through Detective Velasquez‘s testimony, Coleman said that he was with Clark, Pritchett, Spencer, and Appellant on the day of the crimes. The men were at the Mitchell Street house when they agreed to drive to the Sky Lofts Condominiums. Coleman stated that he and Pritchett remained in the car while the others entered the condominium complex and that Pritchett drove him to a Wendy‘s restaurant before returning to Mitchell Street. Coleman also admitted that he visited a restaurant called Mr. Everything on the day after the crimes, but denied having or using Greer‘s credit card
During Detective Velasquez‘s testimony relaying what Coleman told him, Appellant raised a hearsay objection, but the trial court overruled the objection, stating that Coleman‘s statements fell within the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Appellant‘s trial counsel did not raise a Confrontation Clause objection.
(a) Hearsay
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted these statements, over objection, under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the hearsay statements, but conclude that the error was harmless.
Admissions shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule. An admission is a statement offered against a party which is . . . [a] statement by a [co-conspirator] of a party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, including a statement made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy. A conspiracy need not be charged in order to make a statement admissible.
Before admitting the statements of a co-conspirator,
the State is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, [and that] the conspiracy included the declarant and the defendant against whom the statement is offered, and the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Mosley v. State, 307 Ga. 711, 716 (3) (838 SE2d 289) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted). Once the conspiracy is established, a statement made by any co-conspirator is admissible hearsay when such statement is made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, including a statement made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy.”
However, as discussed in Division 2 (b) above, there was other strong evidence of Appellant‘s guilt. Additionally, Coleman‘s
(b) Confrontation Clause
Appellant also contends that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to raise a Confrontation Clause objection to this testimony. The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”
Assuming that counsel was deficient for failing to raise a Confrontation Clause objection, the admission of this evidence was harmless for the same reasons that it was harmless to admit the same evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, Appellant cannot show “a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel‘s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different.” Mitchell, 307 Ga. at 858 (2). Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails. See Smith v. State, 298 Ga. 406, 415 (3) (782 SE2d 269) (2016).
6. Appellant finally contends that his convictions should be
We assumed without deciding in Division 2 that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the October 2015 incident. And we determined in Division 5 that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Detective Velasquez‘s testimony about his interview with Coleman under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay; we also assumed trial counsel‘s deficiency with respect to this testimony as a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
However, as explained in those divisions, Appellant has failed to identify sufficient prejudice when these errors by the trial court or trial counsel, either actual or assumed, are considered individually. When considered cumulatively, these errors still do not warrant reversal. See Allen, 310 Ga. at 418 (4); Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 192 (850 SE2d 110) (2020).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.