S17A0950. WILSON v. THE STATE.
302 Ga. 106
Supreme Court of Georgia
September 13, 2017
GRANT, Justice.
FINAL COPY
Aрpellant Charles Rodney Wilson was convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the October 2012 shooting death of Jesse Howard. Wilson now appeals, asserting various errors in the adjudication of his motion for new trial, insufficiency of the evidеnce, evidentiary error, and improper refusal to bifurcate the trial of certain counts. Though none of Wilson‘s enumerations have merit, we do note an error in his sentencing, and we therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentenсing.1
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, the evidence at trial showed that Wilson, a convicted felon, shot and killed victim Howard on October 25, 2012. Earlier that month, Howard had broken into Wilson‘s car and stolen several ounces of marijuana. During the days that followed, Wilson sought out Howard, first at Howard‘s girlfriend‘s workplace and then at his grandmother‘s home. Wilson told Howard‘s girlfriend to tell him that Wilson “got something for him, he going to do something to him.” At Howard‘s grandmother‘s home, Howard‘s mother, who answered Wilson‘s knock at the door and told him that Howard was not there, noticed that Wilson “was standing at an angle, as if he had something on his side.”
On the day of the shooting, two of Wilson‘s friends spotted Howard with Scotty Hawk at the mall. Knowing that Wilson was looking for Howard, the friends followed the men as they left the mall in Howard‘s girlfriend‘s black Honda Aсcord and drove to Stonehenge, an Athens
Hawk, who had noticed he was being followed and saw Wilson‘s car pull up, approached Wilson and asked what was going on. Wilson had a handgun in his lap and was “talking in a rage.” After attempting to calm Wilson down, Hawk walked away from Wilson‘s car to talk to his neighbor. Wilson then exited the car with his gun and called to Howard to come in the street, threatening to “whoop his ass.” Hawk told Howard to go inside because Wilson had a gun. Howard yelled back that Wilson “ain‘t going to do nothing.” Wilson chambered a round, ran toward Howard, and hit him in the head with the gun; the gun fired, and Howard fell to the ground. Wilson fled.
Police responders found Howard lying on the ground next to the Honda Accord with a fatal gunshot wound to the head. The officers observed what appeared to be a bullet mark on the side of the Accord; according to Howаrd‘s girlfriend, the mark had not been there before the shooting. As for
At trial, Billups and Hunter both testified that Wilson had struck Howard with the gun and the gun discharged almost immediately. Hawk testified that Wilson had hit Howard with the gun, Howard grabbed Wilson, and then Wilson shot Howard in the head.
The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head; Howard also had abrasions consistent with being struck with a gun on the forehead. The bullet had entered through Howard‘s left ear and exited from behind his right ear. Gunpowder stippling at the entrance wound indicated, based on its diameter and concentric pattern, that the muzzle-to-target distance was three to five inches with no obstruction. Upon questioning about the рossibility that the fatal wound had been inflicted by a ricocheting bullet rather than a direct gunshot, both the medical examiner and a State crime scene reconstruction expert testified that this scenario was unlikely. Specifically, both witnesses opined that bоth the stippling pattern observed on the victim and the bullet‘s apparent trajectory were inconsistent with the possibility of a ricocheting bullet. Theorizing about the bullet mark on the Accord, the crime scene expert suggested that
Wilson testified at trial that he had never intended to shoot Howard and instead intended only to hit him with the gun. He also testified that he had believed Howard was armed at the time, though investigators found no weapons on or around Howard at the scene.
Contrary to Wilson‘s contention, the evidence described аbove was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inсonsistencies in the evidence.‘“) (citation omitted).
II.
Wilson contends that the verdict was contrary to “the principles of justice and equity” and “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence” under
(a) Wilson asserts that there is no evidence that the trial court actually exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.” But “the trial court need not explicitly speak of its discretion with respect to the general grounds, and unless the record shows otherwise, we must presume that the trial court understood the nature of its discretion and exercised it.” Murdock v. State, 299 Ga. 177, 178 (2) (787 SE2d 184) (2016). This Court will thus presume, in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, that the trial court did properly exercise such discretion. Compare Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 771-772 (3) (778 SE2d 205) (2015) (presuming trial court properly exercisеd its discretion where the general grounds were expressly referenced at the new
(b) Regarding Wilson‘s related complaint that the trial court failed to issue express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on the new trial motion, we are aware of no authority — and, indeed, Wilson has directed us to none — requiring such express findings. See Murdock, 299 Ga. at 178 (affirming summаry denial of new trial motion based on general grounds); Butts, 297 Ga. at 772 (same).
(c) Wilson also attacks the denial of his new trial motion on the ground that it was decided by a different judge than the judge who had presided at his trial. But there is no prohibition on a successor judge deciding a new trial motiоn. Quite to the contrary, our Code expressly authorizes it in
(d) Finally, to the extent Wilson asks this Court to review the merits of the trial court‘s exercise of its discretion аs the thirteenth juror, we decline to do so; this Court does not sit as an arbiter of the general grounds, which are “solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 532, 534 (1) (796 SE2d 671) (2017). In sum, we have no basis to disturb the trial court‘s denial of Wilson‘s motion for new trial on the general grounds.
III.
Wilson asserts that the trial court erred when, during his case-in-chief, it refused to admit evidence of victim Howard‘s prior drug convictions, which he contended were admissible to support the narrative that Howard was involved in the “drug lifestyle” and was thus likely to be armed at the time of Wilson‘s encounter with him. Under our Evidence Code, evidence of
IV.
Contrary to Wilson‘s contention, the trial court properly denied Wilson‘s motion to bifurcate the trial of the counts charging him with
V.
In its sentencing order, the trial court purported to sentence Wilson to life in prison on Counts 1, 2, and 3 (the malice murder and both felony murder counts); a fivе-year term consecutive to the life sentence on Count 6 (the first of the four firearm-possession-during-commission-of-a-crime counts); and five-year concurrent terms, respectively, on Counts 7 through 9 (the three other firearm possession counts). The court properly merged the aggravated assault (Count 4) with the malice murder, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 374 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993), and purported to merge the felon-in-possession count (Count 5) with the felony murder count predicated thereon (Count 3). To the extent the sentencing order purports to impose a life sentence for each of the three murder counts, this was error, as a defendant may be sentenced only on a single verdict of murder where there is but one victim. See id. at 371-372. Because the evidence was sufficient to
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded for resentencing. All the Justices concur.
Murder. Clarke Superior Court. Before Judge Stephens.
Jessica I. Benjamin, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, James V. Chafin, Kalki Valamanchili, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney Generаl, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.