MURDOCK v. THE STATE.
S16A0082
Supreme Court of Georgia
DECIDED JUNE 6, 2016.
(787 SE2d 184)
BLACKWELL, Justice.
Tamara N. Crawford, Kenneth D. Kondritzer, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Michael V. Snow, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Adrian Murdock was tried by a DeKalb County jury and convicted of murder with malice aforethought, the unlawful possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer, and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, all in connection with the fatal shooting of Breon Sims. Murdock appeals,1 contending that the
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Murdock and Sims for many years had been friends and neighbors. But on November 18, 2010, they became embroiled in a dispute over money that Sims supposedly owed to Murdock. At first, the two men exchanged angry words on social media. Later that afternoon, the dispute turned physical. Sims walked out of his house, and he was approached by Murdock, who was carrying a gun. Sims told Murdock to put the gun down so that they could “scrap this out,” but Murdock instead twice struck Sims about the head with the gun, and Murdock then pointed the gun at Sims. At that point, Sims said, “if you [are] going to kill me, kill me,” and Murdock shot Sims in the chest. Murdock fled the scene when law enforcement officers arrived. Sims was taken to a hospital, but he died later that day. Although Murdock does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence, we have undertaken an independent review of the record, and we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Murdock is guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Murdock moved for a new trial on general and special grounds,3 and the trial court denied his motion without discussion.4 Murdock complains that the record does not show that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to consider a new trial on the general grounds. See generally White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 524-525 (2) (753 SE2d 115) (2013) (“When properly raised in a timely motion [for new trial], [the general grounds] require the trial judge to exercise a broad discretion to sit as a thirteenth juror.” (Citation and punctuation omitted)). But when denying a motion for new trial, the trial court need not explicitly speak of its discretion with respect to the general grounds, and unless the record shows otherwise, we must presume that the trial court understood the nature of its discretion and exercised it. See Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 771-772 (3) (778 SE2d 205) (2015). As we have explained, “where a trial judge ruling on a new trial motion enters an order that, without more, recites that the new trial is refused or denied, this will be taken to mean that the judge has in the exercise of his discretion approved the verdict.” Id. at 772 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted). This claim of error is without merit.
3. At trial, a juror sent a note to the judge, indicating that the juror long ago had been the victim of an armed robbery and worried that he would “have trouble being impartial” as a result of that experience.5 The juror was brought into the courtroom, and the judge explained that this case did not
Murdock contends that the refusal to excuse the juror was error. Even assuming that the request to “consider replacing [the juror]” was sufficient to preserve this claim of error, it is without merit. Trial courts have considerable discretion to determine whether a juror can be impartial, see Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 66 (2) (734 SE2d 345) (2012), and as we previously have noted, “a trial judge is uniquely positioned to evaluate whether a . . . juror can render an impartial verdict, considering that the trial judge . . . can observe a prospective juror in person and take account of her demeanor and countenance, not just the words that she speaks.” Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 379-380 (7) (744 SE2d 738) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). On the record in this case, we see no abuse of the considerable discretion of the trial court with respect to the juror at issue. See id. at 386-387 (7) (discussing rehabilitation of jurors).
4. After Murdock shot Sims, Murdock‘s sister called 911 to report the shooting, and she later gave a statement about the shooting to investigating officers. At trial, she testified, and although she remembered placing the 911 call and giving a statement to investigators, she said that she could not recall the details of the shooting itself or the content of her statement. Later, the trial court allowed—over a hearsay objection—an investigating officer to testify about the content of her statement. Murdock contends that the admission of this testimony was error, but it was properly admitted under
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
