Kyle WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KELLOGG CO., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-2237
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Jan. 13, 2016
628 Fed. Appx. 59
Jeffrey W. Lang, Assistant Solicitor General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York, Albany, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees Russi, Tortora, Miraglia, and Hogan.
PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant John D. Justice (“Justice“), proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Geraci, C.J.), entered March 27, 2015, denying his motion for class certification as untimely filed, and also dismissing under
“We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although factual allegations are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed Justice‘s claims. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its March 27, 2015 decision. See Justice v. King, No. 08-CV-6417-FPG, 2015 WL 1433303 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015).
We have considered all of Justice‘s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
James M. Wicks (Kathryn C. Cole, on the brief), Farrell Fritz, P.C., Uniondale, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellee.
Present: CHESTER J. STRAUB, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Kyle Wilson (“Wilson“) appeals a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.), dismissing his second amended complaint (the “Complaint“). In the Complaint, Wilson alleged that Defendant-Appellee Kellogg Co. (“Kellogg“) breached an implied contract and was unjustly enriched when it failed to compensate him for its use of an idea he submitted in late 2008 through Kellogg‘s online portal through which consumers could submit ideas for new products. A 5 ¶ 15. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
“We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir.2011). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a reviewing court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the] Plaintiff[‘s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining the adequacy of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), consideration is limited to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.1991). “A complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002)) (citations omitted).
In its motion to dismiss, Kellogg attached what it claimed were the Terms and Conditions to which Wilson agreed upon submission of his purported innovation in 2008. Kellogg‘s proffered Terms and Conditions explicitly state that “Kellogg is not obligated in any way to pay for a submitted innovation. If Kellogg Company does decide to use your innovation and it is not protected by a patent or copyright, Kellogg may, in its sole discretion, grant you an award, not to exceed $5,000.” A 66. In opposition to Kellogg‘s motion, Wilson acknowledged that “[t]he Terms and Conditions were considered a legally binding agreement for the submission of ideas,” A 83, but questioned the authenticity of the version proffered by Kellogg. The District Court dismissed the Complaint, determining that the Terms and Conditions were integral to the Complaint and thus properly before the court on a motion to dismiss, Wilson v. Kellogg Co., 111 F.Supp.3d 306, 311-12, No. CV 14-2817 (LDW), 2015 WL 3937511, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.2015); that the “Declaration of Kellogg‘s in-house counsel, [James K. Lewis]” in support of the Terms and Conditions was sufficient to override the Plaintiff‘s objections as to authenticity, id.; and, finally, that the existence of a binding, express contract governing the terms of the parties’ compensation rendered both of Wilson‘s claims unsustainable, see id. at
On appeal, Wilson challenges only that portion of the District Court opinion that found that the proffered Terms and Conditions were properly before it on a motion to dismiss. He cites to our decision in Faulkner v. Beer, which held that “even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document . . . [and] that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.” 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.2006). We do not reach this argument and affirm, instead, on alternate grounds. Even assuming, arguendo, that Faulkner precluded the District Court from taking the Terms and Conditions proffered by Kellogg as the specific version to which Wilson assented—the District Court‘s apt reasoning still necessitates dismissal of Wilson‘s Complaint. See Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, 779 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.2015) (explaining that we “may affirm on any ground with support in the record“).
Wilson concedes that the Terms and Conditions he signed constitute a “legally binding agreement for the submission of ideas.” A 83. Indeed, on appeal he notes that the Terms and Conditions could “reasonably be considered the governing agreement” in this litigation. Pl. Reply Br. at 1. Further, Wilson does not challenge the District Court‘s determination that the Terms and Conditions were not unconscionable—a determination that in no way hinged on whether the specific version of the Terms and Conditions submitted by Kellogg in this litigation is the correct one, but merely assessed the procedural context in which Wilson signed the agreement. These two concessions are fatal to Wilson‘s claims. They confirm that an express contract—the Terms and Conditions (regardless of which precise version Wilson signed)—governed Wilson‘s relationship with Kellogg, and thus that, as the District Court held, Wilson‘s only two claims—for breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment—are unsustainable.1 See Hudson v. Mathers, 283 Mich.App. 91, 770 N.W.2d 883, 887 (2009) (holding that where “an express contract [was] in place between plaintiff and [defendant] that governed” the compensation sought by plaintiff, plaintiff may not recover “under a theory of unjust enrichment“); Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich.App. 463, 666 N.W.2d 271, 280 (2003) (“[A] contract will be implied only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter.“).
Accordingly, and on the basis of this alternate ground, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.