WILLIS v. THE STATE.
S18A1363
Supreme Court of Georgia
December 10, 2018
304 Ga. 781
BLACKWELL, Justice.
FINAL COPY
Willis was apprehended by police shortly after the shooting. The arresting officer testified that he observed Willis taking off his shirt and attempting to hide in a residential area. When the officer approached, Willis tried to run away but was thwarted by thick vegetation. The officer saw no visible injuries on Willis. The police recovered two spent bullets at the scene—one was lodged in the wall of the office and the other lay outside the building. The police also found a gun inside a storm drain not far from the shop; this gun was later determined to be the one that fired the bullets recovered from the crime scene.3
Willis argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because, he says, the evidence was almost entirely circumstantial, especially as to the killing of Murry, and did not exclude the reasonable possibility that Murry was shot accidentally while Willis was trying to defend himself. See
Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence does not demand the recognition of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Eyewitness testimony shows that Willis shot at the father without provocation, fled the scene immediately, and attempted to evade law enforcement by running into a residential area and taking off his shirt. See McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 9 (1) (810 SE2d 77) (2018) (the jury could have considered defendant‘s flight from the scene immediately after the shooting to be “an act reflecting consciousness of guilt“). Other evidence shows that Murry—who was the aggressor according to Willis—in fact could not use one of his hands due to a prior injury. Although Willis testified that Murry was shot accidentally while Willis was trying to defend himself, and that he did not intentionally shoot at the father, the jury was free to disbelieve Willis‘s account. See Graham v. State, 301 Ga. 675, 677 (1) (804 SE2d 113) (2017) (“[I]t is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted)). In sum, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Willis was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Willis concedes that this claim can be reviewed only for plain error, as he did not object to any of the testimony about which he now complains. See Benton v. State, 301 Ga. 100, 103 (4) (799 SE2d 743) (2017). To prevail on plain error review, a defendant must make a threshold showing that (1) an error or defect occurred that has not been affirmatively waived; (2) the error was “clear or obvious“; and (3) the error affected the defendant‘s “substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Id. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) If the above three prongs are met, we have the discretion to remedy the error, but “only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Here, Willis fails to show that the admission of the investigator‘s testimony, even if erroneous, had any effect on the outcome of his trial court proceedings. Willis never disputed that Murry was killed by a bullet in the office; his defense was that the gun discharged accidentally during a struggle. He does not explain, nor is it clear, how the investigator‘s statements at issue were inconsistent with Willis‘s testimony or otherwise prejudicial to his defense. For this reason, Willis has not shown plain error.5
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided December 10, 2018.
Murder. Spalding Superior Court. Before Judge Sams.
Bentley C. Adams III, William A. Adams, Jr.; Veronica M. O‘Grady, for appellant.
Benjamin D. Coker, District Attorney, B. Ashton Fallin, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Katherine D. Emerson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
