MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action brought pro se is before the Court on review of Plaintiff‘s complaint and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court grants the application and dismisses the complaint.

Plaintiff is a physician and professor who sues the National Institutes of Health (NIH) “for defamation and fraud.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6; see id. at 16 (listing “Count I: Defamation” and “Count II: Fraud“). Allegedly on April 16, 2024, employees of NIH “made false and defamatory statements about Plaintiff” that were “published to third parties” on May 29, 2024, id. at 8, causing “personal, psychological, emotional, and financial injury, and loss[,]” id. at 9 (cleaned up). The “statements . . . were untrue and damaging to Plaintiff‘s reputation.” Id. at 15. Plaintiff seeks an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 14.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). It is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a party seeking relief in the district court to plead facts that bring the suit within the court‘s jurisdiction). As a United States agency component, NIH is immune from suit save “clear congressional consent[.]” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 82-83 (1991) (describing NIH as a federal agency subject to sovereign immunity). A waiver of immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and [it cannot] be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (cleaned up).

Although the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), waives the United States’ immunity for certain claims demanding money damages, see id. §§2674, 2679-80, it “exempts from its waiver . . . any claim ‘arising out of libel or slander,” which encompasses “claims for ‘false light’ invasion of privacy[.]” Edmonds v. U.S., 436 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2006), citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (other citations omitted); see Compl. at 16 (referencing “Privacy Laws“). The FTCA also exempts from its waiver “any claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Regardless, an FTCA claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit by presenting the claim to the appropriate federal agency and obtaining a final written denial of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). If an agency fails to render a decision within six months after the claim is submitted, the claimant may proceed to court “any time thereafter” on what is “deemed” to be “a final denial.” Id. Nothing suggests that Plaintiff has pursued, much less exhausted, administrative remedies under the FTCA, and in this circuit, the FTCA‘s presentment requirement is “jurisdictional.” Simpkins v. D.C. Gov‘t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)); Norton v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2021) (collecting cases). Plaintiff establishes no other jurisdictional basis for the claims asserted. Therefore, this case will be dismissed by separate order.

Date: February 6, 2025

/s/

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

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