Williams v. FordWilliams v. Ford
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Victor A. Bolden
Plaintiff, Leslie Williams, is currently incarcerated at the Hartford Correctional Center in Hartford, Connecticut, and has filed this civil rights action pro se under
In the operative Amended Complaint and addendum, Mr. Williams asserts sixteen federal and state law claims against the Defendants. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8. As will be discussed in further detail below, the Court reviewed and dismissed a number of Mr. Williams‘s claims under
I. Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss filed under
In reviewing a complaint under
II. Factual Allegations
Mr. Williams alleges that, on February 7, 2013, he passed Defendant Beaulieu a folded sheet of paper containing a drawing of her, fully clothed, and the following poem:
Mirror mirror on the wall,
every time I see my girl anew I fall,
lift my spirits with a look,
drown my sorrows with a smile,
just meet me half way and I will go the extra mile,
to make you feel like dancin’ to the beat inside your heart,
but if you forget the steps,
I can show you where to start.
Am. Compl. at ¶¶12-15, 17, ECF 8. Mr. Williams alleges that Defendant Beaulieu showed the paper to Deputy Warden Roche. Id. ¶19. Defendants Beaulieu, Roche, and Green then allegedly placed Mr. Williams in segregation because of the drawing. Id.
Mr. Williams claims that he believes the placement was an attempt to “attenuate” Nurse Beaulieu‘s alleged violation of a Department of Correction policy (when she accepted personal correspondence from an inmate) and to have him transferred to another correctional facility. Id. ¶19. He alleges that when he asked Defendant Green why he was in segregation, she told him that he had not been charged with any crime or disciplinary infraction but was “under investigation.” Id. ¶22. Mr. Williams also claims that Defendant Carrara falsely stated that he assessed Mr. Williams‘s medical condition prior to his placement in restrictive housing. Id. ¶25.
In restrictive housing, Mr. Williams alleges that Defendant Green denied him access to
Mr. Williams alleges that Defendant Green did not tour the restrictive housing unit for twelve days. Id. ¶30. On February 19, 2013, when Defendant Green began touring the unit, Mr. Williams allegedly informed her that holding him in administrative detention was “illegal.” Id. According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant Green responded that she had not violated any prison directives and refused to remove him from restrictive housing or Administrative Detention status. Id. ¶¶30-31. After his conversation with Defendant Green, Mr. Williams allegedly filed a grievance. Id. ¶¶31, 49.
Mr. Williams claims that he was returned to the South Block Housing Unit on February 28, 2013 and that all of his property was returned to him on the same day. Id. ¶32. He alleges that no charges were filed against him as a result of the February 7, 2013 incident. Id. ¶33.
Mr. Williams claims that, after he was removed from restrictive housing, Defendants Ford, Bundy, and Green refused to reinstate his prison job until April 15, 2013. Id. ¶34. He contends that the denial of his prison job for two months deprived him of “basic necessities”
Mr. Williams also alleges that, on January 5, 2014, Defendant Green removed Mr. Williams from his job assignment after he received a poor performance report. Id. ¶45. Defendant Bundy denied Mr. Williams‘s grievance regarding this incident. Id.
III. Discussion
In the Amended Complaint and addendum, Mr. Williams asserts sixteen claims that can be divided into three categories, namely—federal constitutional claims (Claims One through Eight and Fifteen); state constitutional claims (Claims Nine, Ten and Sixteen); and claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act but construed by the Court as state tort law claims (Claims Eleven through Fourteen). Am. Compl. at 7-12, at Addendum 11-12, ECF No. 8.
Mr. Williams‘s federal law claims are as follows: (1) Defendants Roche, Green, and Beaulieu deprived Mr. Williams of a protected liberty interest under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and/or improperly retaliated against him when they confined him in restrictive housing for the drawing and poem; (2) Defendants Carrara, Beaulieu, Roche, Ford, and Green deprived Mr. Williams of his liberty without affording him due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when they failed to follow proper restrictive housing procedures; (3) Defendants Ford, Roche, and Green violated Mr. Williams‘s Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the restrictive housing unit; (4) Defendants Ford, Roche, and Green violated Mr. Williams‘s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to ensure that he was not subjected to punishment without penological justification in the
His state constitutional claims are as follows: (9) Defendants Ford, Roche, Green, and Beaulieu violated Article First, Section Four of the Connecticut Constitution by punishing Mr. Williams for freely speaking, writing, or publishing his sentiments; (10) Defendants Ford, Roche, and Green violated Article First, Section Nine of the Connecticut Constitution because their actions in punishing him were not clearly warranted by law; and (16) Defendants Ford, Roche, Bundy, Green, and Beaulieu denied him equal protection of the laws under Article First, Section Twenty of the Connecticut Constitution.
His state law tort claims, which he frames under the Federal Tort Claims Act, are as
Mr. Williams seeks a declaration that the requirements that indigent inmates must meet to receive state assistance are unconstitutional and an injunction ordering that his drawing and poem be returned. Am. Compl. ¶¶71-72, ECF No. 8. He also seeks punitive and compensatory damages, including compensation for his drawing and poem if the Defendants have damaged it or cannot return it. Id. ¶¶73-74. He also asks for a declaration that the Defendants actions alleged in the Amended Complaint violated his constitutional rights. Id. at Addendum ¶7.
In the Initial Review Order, filed October 6, 2014, the Court dismissed all claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act but indicated it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the underlying state law torts. Initial Review Order 12-13, ECF No. 7. The Court also dismissed some of the federal claims, namely those for denial of due process for failing to follow institutional rules, deprivation of property, denial of equal protection, denial of a prison job, and claims for making false or defamatory statements. Id. at 15. It also dismissed the state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the state constitutional claim for denial of equal protection of the laws. Id. Thus, Claims Two, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Eleven, Fifteen, and Sixteen were dismissed in their entirety.
The Defendants’ motion asks the Court to dismiss Claims One, Thirteen, and Fourteen in their entirety because they fail to state a plausible entitlement to relief under
A. Claim One
In his first claim, Mr. Williams contends that Defendants Roche, Green, and Beaulieu deprived him of a liberty interest protected by the Federal Constitution when they confined him in restrictive housing for the drawing and poem. In their motion, the Defendants construe this claim to be one of retaliation. Defs.’ Br. 6, ECF No. 27-1. In his opposition, Mr. Williams contends that Claim One is not a claim of retaliation but rather a procedural due process claim. Opp. Br. 3-7, ECF No. 29. In its Initial Review Order, the Court dismissed Mr. Williams‘s due process claims premised on the failure to comply with institutional directives in Claims Two and Five but did not dismiss any portion of Claim One. See Initial Review Order 11-12, ECF No. 7.2
Construing Claim One liberally, it appears to include two separate legal theories. The first is that Mr. Williams‘s First Amendment rights were violated when the Defendants placed him in segregated housing for the drawing and poem—essentially a retaliation claim. Second, one might read the allegations as claiming that Mr. Williams‘s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was deprived of a liberty interest, namely his freedom of speech, without sufficient procedural due process.
For the former retaliation aspect of this claim to survive a motion to dismiss, Mr. Williams must allege facts that raise a plausible inference that (1) he engaged in protected speech or conduct, (2) that the Defendants took adverse action against him, and (3) that there was a
A prisoner only “retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrective system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Courts have found that inmates have some degree of First Amendment protection in their writings and correspondence. See e.g., Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “a prisoner‘s right to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail is protected by the First Amendment“). But if the reaction to Mr. Williams‘s poem was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, there was no deprivation of his First Amendment rights. See Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendants did not violate plaintiff‘s First Amendment rights when they denied him free, unlimited postage for non-legal mail because such a limitation was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
In addition, as a general matter, the First Amendment does not protect threatening or harassing speech. See e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-360 (2003) (noting that “[t]he protections afforded by the First Amendment [ ] are not absolute” and that “true threats” and “fighting words” do not constitute speech protected under the First Amendment); Chevalier v. Schmidt, No. 11-CV-788(JTC), 2012 WL 6690313, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (holding that a plaintiff‘s threatening letter to the judge who sentenced him was not protected speech under the First Amendment); Jermosen v. Coughlin, 878 F. Supp. 444, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
At this time, the Court cannot definitively conclude that Mr. Williams‘s poem and drawing were not constitutionally protected speech. Discovery is required to understand the precise circumstances in which the speech occurred to determine whether it is protected by the First Amendment. The Court notes, however, that if the facts reveal that the speech was harassing or the Defendants’ reaction to his speech was reasonably related to a penological goal, Mr. Williams did not engage in speech protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the retaliation aspect of Claim One is DENIED.
As noted above, Claim One also might be construed as a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Williams alleges that he was deprived of a liberty interest, his First Amendment right to free speech, without sufficient process. “To establish a claim for denial of procedural due process, a prisoner must show that he had a protected liberty interest and was deprived of that interest without being afforded the requisite process.” Alston v. Cahill, No. 3:07-CV-473 (RNC), 2012 WL 3288923, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000)). Mr. Williams plausibly alleges that he received no process when the Defendants took his poem away from him. Thus, the viability of
A liberty interest arises either from “[1] the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty‘; or... [2] an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted). The range of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to free speech. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974) (“The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.“), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411-14 (1989); Vaher v. Town of Orangetown, N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 404, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that “the right to free speech” is a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment but noting that free speech also “remains subject to reasonable government regulation“) (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707-08 (1931)).
The extent to which that liberty interest was deprived depends on whether Mr. Williams engaged in protected speech and, if so, whether the Defendants were justified in limiting that speech to further penological objectives. Thus, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to the retaliation claim, the Court will permit this claim to go forward.
B. Supervisory Liability in Claims Three and Four
In Claims Three and Four, Mr. Williams alleges that Defendants Green, Roche, and Ford subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement when they confined him in the restrictive housing unit without penological justification. He claims
Because the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to claims brought under
In Claim Three, Mr. Wilson alleges that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the restrictive housing unit. He does not allege that Defendants Ford and Roche were responsible for, or even aware of, these conditions. Mr. Williams specifically alleges that Defendant Ford did not tour the restrictive housing unit while he was confined there. Am. Compl. ¶ 29, ECF No. 8. He also attributes his conditions of confinement exclusively to Defendant Green. Id. ¶ 26 (“due to orders made by Lt. Green ...“).
In opposition, Mr. Williams argues that the fact that he complained about his conditions of confinement to Defendant Green was sufficient to infer that Defendants Ford and Roche also were aware of his complaints. Opp. Br. 9, ECF No. 29. These claims are speculative and cannot support a plausible claim of personal involvement. See Kent v. New York, No. 1:11-CV-1533(MAD/CFH), 2015 WL 1284824, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2015) (finding that a “speculative assertion” that the defendants were involved in an alleged constitutional deprivation under
Mr. Williams also argues that Administrative Directive 9.5, Section Twenty, directly imposed a duty on Warden Ford to tour the restrictive housing unit every 72 hours and his failure to do so is sufficient to impose liability. Opp. Br. 2, 9-10, ECF No. 29. Mr. Williams has misconstrued the directive. Section Twenty provides: “[i]f an inmate is removed from population, the Unit Administrator shall review the case within 72 hours of placement in Administrative Detention to determine whether continued confinement in the status is necessary.” Administrative Directive 9.5, § 20 available at www.ct.gov/doc. This section requires the Unit Administrator to review the case, presumably the facts underlying the placement on Administrative Detention status; it does not require the warden to tour the restrictive housing unit every 72 hours. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the allegations against Defendants Ford and Roche in Claim Three.
In Claim Four, Mr. Williams contends that Defendants Ford, Roche, and Green had a duty to ensure that he was not confined in restrictive housing without penological justification. As indicated above, the Unit Administrator is charged under the directive with determining whether continued confinement in restrictive housing under Administrative Detention status is warranted. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Williams argues that Defendant Roche ordered him confined in restrictive housing and
C. Claim Thirteen - Negligence
In Claim Thirteen, Mr. Williams alleges that Warden Ford was negligent when he failed to conduct required periodic checks and reviews while Mr. Williams was housed in the restrictive housing unit. The Defendants move to dismiss this claim as barred by
Section 4-165 shields state officers or employees from personal liability for negligent actions taken within the scope of their employment.
As noted above, Warden Ford was not required to tour the restrictive housing unit every 72 hours. Even if he were, however, the claim for negligence against him is dismissed because he cannot be held personally liable under
D. Claim Fourteen - False Imprisonment
In Claim Fourteen, Mr. Williams alleges that Defendant Green falsely imprisoned him when she confined him in restrictive housing. The Defendants move to dismiss this claim because Mr. Williams was imprisoned at the time the alleged acts occurred and, therefore, cannot have a claim for false imprisonment in their view. Defs.’ Br. 13, ECF No. 27-1.
In the Amended Complaint, Mr. Williams is not complaining about the fact of his confinement. Instead, he challenges the conditions of his confinement, i.e., the transfer to restrictive housing and harsher conditions. Under common law, there is no claim for false imprisonment where the claim relates only to the conditions of confinement. See
E. Claims Nine, Ten and Twelve - State Law Claims
Defendants argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Williams‘s claims that the Defendants violated Article First, Sections Four and Nine of the Connecticut Constitution. Defs.’ Br. 10-11, ECF No. 27-1. They contend that there is no clearly established cause of action for money damages under these sections of the Connecticut Constitution. Id.
At their discretion, district courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim... if [ ] the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.”
Connecticut courts have recognized a private right of action under
Given the lack of state court precedent, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any possible claims for damages under Article First,
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized a private right of action for money damages for violations of
To support his search and seizure claim, Mr. Williams alleges that he was placed in restrictive housing for giving Defendant Beaulieu the drawing and poem and that he was denied his property for twenty-two days while he was confined there. Under current law, these allegations do not seem to constitute extreme or egregious conduct that would support a claim for damages under
Defendants also ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Claims Nine, Ten and Twelve, because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, which may be pursued in state court.
IV. Conclusion
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 27] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted as to Claims Nine, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen as well as on the supervisory liability allegations in Claim Three. The motion is denied with regard to Count One and the supervisory liability allegations in Claim Four.
The case will proceed on the following claims: Claim One – procedural due process and retaliation against Defendants Roche, Green and Beaulieu; Claim Three – unconstitutional conditions of confinement against Defendant Green; and Claim Four – excessive punishment against Defendants Ford, Roche and Green. As Defendants Carrara, Bundy and Faneuff are not referenced in any of the remaining claims for relief, the Clerk is directed to terminate them as Defendants.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
Victor A. Bolden
United States District Judge