Williams v. City of New YorkWilliams v. City of New York
Miller & Miller, Brooklyn, NY (Andrew R. Miller of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Scott Shorr and Kathy Chang Park of counsel), for respondents.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), entered May 7, 2015, as granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the state common-law cause of action alleging malicious prosecution and the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to
On April 23, 2008, the plaintiff was arrested by the New York City Police Department and detained at Rikers Island after a single eyewitness identified him as a shooter involved in a gunfight in South Jamaica, Queens. The eyewitness identified the plaintiff in both a statement to a detective and in testimony before a grand jury. The plaintiff was indicted on charges of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts) and related crimes.
On December 11, 2009, after almost 20 months in jail, the plaintiff was released on his own recognizance. On June 30, 2010, the People moved to dismiss the charges against him because they were unable to locate the eyewitness after the eyewitness testified at the grand jury. On July 28, 2010, the charges were dismissed.
The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Among other things, the defendants argued that the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to
In opposition, the plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit from the eyewitness, dated September 9, 2011. The eyewitness averred that his statement and grand jury testimony had been fabricated and that this fabrication resulted from coercion by the police and an unnamed assistant district attorney (hereinafter ADA).
The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety, concluding that the defendants established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they lacked probable cause for his arrest, detention, and prosecution. As pertinent to this appeal, the court concluded that the eyewitness‘s affidavit improperly raised a new theory of liability and, in any event, was insufficient because it presented feigned issues of fact. The court‘s determination left unresolved certain alternative contentions raised by the defendants in support of their summary judgment motion.
The plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to
“The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution” (Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d 815, 817; see Shaw v City of New York, 139 AD3d 698, 699; Batten v City of New York, 133 AD3d 803, 805), and this includes “causes of action asserted pursuant to
Here, contrary to the Supreme Court‘s determination, the eyewitness‘s affidavit did not raise a new theory of liability (see generally Mezger v Wyndham Homes, Inc., 81 AD3d 795, 796). The complaint alleged that the defendants arrested, detained, and prosecuted the plaintiff without probable cause and that they knew that the criminal complaint contained falsehoods. The eyewitness‘s affidavit, rather than raising a new theory of liability, supported these allegations by asserting that police and an ADA coerced the eyewitness to make a false identification of the plaintiff. Therefore, the court erred in concluding that the affidavit impermissibly asserted a new theory of liability for the first time in opposition to the defendants’ summary judgment motion (cf. Hubbard v City of New York, 84 AD3d 1313, 1314; Araujo v Brooklyn Martial Arts Academy, 304 AD2d 779, 780; Winters v St. Vincent‘s Med. Ctr. of Richmond, 273 AD2d 465).
Further, contrary to the Supreme Court‘s determination, the eyewitness‘s affidavit did not present feigned issues of fact. The eyewitness did not give any prior testimony in this action (cf. Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d at 817; Capasso v Capasso, 84 AD3d 997, 998). Moreover, his affidavit did not contradict the plaintiff‘s prior testimony, including the plaintiff‘s deposition testimony that the eyewitness was “scared” when the police talked to him about the shooting. Accordingly, the court erred in determining that the affidavit presented feigned issues of fact (cf. Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d at 817; Keizer v SCO Family of Servs., 120 AD3d 475, 477).
Considering all the evidence, including the eyewitness‘s affidavit, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Santelises v Town of Huntington, 124 AD3d 863, 865), we conclude that he raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had probable cause to arrest, detain, and prosecute him. Specifically, the eyewitness‘s affidavit raised an issue of fact as to whether the police and the ADA coerced a false identification of the plaintiff or otherwise acted in bad faith (see Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d at 82-83; cf. Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d at 817).
The defendants also assert several alternative grounds for affirmance that the Supreme Court did not address because of its erroneous determination that the eyewitness‘s affidavit failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding probable cause (see generally Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539; Smith v New York City Hous. Auth., 124 AD3d 625, 626).
Contrary to the defendants’ contention, in opposition to their prima facie showing, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Detective Failla‘s evaluation of probable cause was objectively reasonable, thus precluding an award of summary judgment in Detective Failla‘s favor on the ground of qualified immunity (see Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 845-846; Doyle v Rondout Val. Cent. School Dist., 3 AD3d 669, 671).
The defendants’ contention that the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution must be dismissed insofar as asserted against Detective Failla because the plaintiff failed to name him in the notice of claim is unavailing. A timely and sufficient notice of claim is a condition precedent to asserting a tort claim against a municipality (see
However, the defendants correctly contend that they were entitled to dismissal of the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment on the ground that they are time-barred.
However, unlike the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, the state common-law cause of action alleging malicious prosecution was not time-barred because the statute of limitations for that cause of action did not begin to run until the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding on July 28, 2010 (Williams v CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 126 AD3d at 891). The cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to
The defendants’ contention that the plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim (see
Accordingly, those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the state common-law causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment were properly granted, but on grounds different than those relied upon by the Supreme Court, and those branches which were for summary judgment dismissing the state common-law cause of action alleging malicious prosecution and the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to
BALKIN, J.P., COHEN, HINDS-RADIX and MALTESE, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court