Williams v. Bur. of Workers' Comp.Williams v. Bur. of Workers' Comp.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Peter E. DeMarco and Emily M. Simmons, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio.
BRYANT, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sandra Williams, appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio granting the motion to dismiss of defendant-appellee, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. Because the trial court did not err in determining (1) the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶2} In 1998, plaintiff began her employment with defendant. In June of 2000, plaintiff suffered a work-related injury, resulting in her receiving temporary total disability (“TTD“) benefits beginning in September 2003. At the time plaintiff began receiving benefits, her doctor estimated she would be able to return to work in September 2004.
{¶3} In February of 2004, defendant began an internal affairs investigation to determine whether plaintiff, though receiving TTD compensation, was working as an independent beauty consultant for Mary Kay Cosmetics Co. (“Mary Kay“) beginning in April of 2002. In August of 2004, defendant gave plaintiff the option either to return to work part-time with defendant or face termination. Plaintiff returned to work with defendant on August 25, 2004.
{¶4} Both parties, however, pursued claims against the other. In November of 2004, plaintiff filed a discrimination charge against defendant with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC“). Defendant filed a motion with the Industrial Commission of Ohio requesting the Industrial Commission find that plaintiff, due to her work for Mary Kay, was overpaid TTD benefits and fraudulently received them. Based on the results of the investigation, the state of Ohio indicted plaintiff in December 2004 on one count of workers’ compensation fraud in violation of
{¶5} On June 23, 2005, the state entered a nolle prosequi on the sole felony charge then pending against plaintiff, releasing plaintiff from all criminal liability. In the action before the Industrial Commission, a district hearing officer of the Industrial
{¶6} Plaintiff appealed the decision of the district hearing officer. On December 5, 2005, a staff hearing officer of the Industrial Commission affirmed the district hearing officer‘s decision finding overpayment and fraud. The Industrial Commission denied plaintiff‘s request for an appeal. Unable to appeal from the Industrial Commission‘s decision, plaintiff filed a mandamus action in this court asserting the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in concluding plaintiff was overpaid TTD benefits and fraudulently obtained them. Based on the record from the Industrial Commission, this court concluded the evidence failed to demonstrate plaintiff was working for Mary Kay. Accordingly, we granted plaintiff‘s request for a writ of mandamus and ordered the Industrial Commission to vacate its finding of fraud and overpayment and to find instead that plaintiff was entitled to said compensation.
{¶7} On March 25, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant and the Industrial Commission in the Court of Claims; plaintiff subsequently dismissed the Industrial Commission as a defendant pursuant to
II. Assignments of Error
{¶8} Plaintiff timely appeals, assigning the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE (1) THERE WAS A CONFLICT AS TO WHICH STATUTE OF LIMITATION[S] WAS APPLICABLE TO APPELLANT‘S CLAIMS, SIX YEARS UNDER
R.C. §2305.07 OR TWO YEARS UNDERR.C. §2743.16 , AND (2) THE COURT‘S DECISION IN McFADDEN I SHOULD BE GIVEN PROSPECTIVELY-ONLY APPLICATION.ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE APPELLANT‘S CLAIMS DID NOT ACCRUE UNTIL MAY 24, 2007, WHEN THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION REINSTATING APPELLANT‘S COMPENSATION AND A FINDING OF NO FRAUD.
III. Standard of Review
{¶9} In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to
{¶10} The Court of Claims determined the applicable statute of limitations bars plaintiff‘s complaint. A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to
IV. First Assignment of Error – Discrimination Claim
{¶11} Plaintiff‘s first assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in determining the statute of limitations that applies to plaintiff‘s discrimination claim. Plaintiff argues the trial court erroneously applied the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶13} Despite the two-year statute of limitations for civil claims against the state contained in
{¶14} Plaintiff asserts that at the time she filed her complaint, two cases from this court, when compared to more recent cases, created an intra-district conflict regarding the applicable statute of limitations. The cases, Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 115, and Senegal v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Mar. 10, 1994), 10th Dist. No. 93API08-1161, both applied a six-year statute of limitations to discrimination claims brought against the state, not the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶16} McFadden I was decided on January 25, 2007, more than one year before plaintiff filed her complaint in the Court of Claims on March 25, 2008. Accordingly, plaintiff‘s argument that McFadden I should not be applied retroactively is unpersuasive. See McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ. (“McFadden II“), 180 Ohio App.3d 810, 2009-Ohio-362 (rejecting the same argument plaintiff poses).
{¶17} McFadden II addressed whether this court should only prospectively apply McCoy, the case McFadden I expressly reaffirmed. We held prospective-only application of McCoy would be appropriate only if that case “actually announced a new principle of law when it found that the two-year statute of limitations applies to discrimination claims brought against the state.” McFadden II at ¶13. Since “a number of cases decided after Senegal” rejected the application of the six-year statute of limitations in favor of the two-year statute, McFadden II held “appellant had no vested rights under Senegal at the time his cause of action accrued, and none of the factors for applying discretionary prospective
{¶18} Apart from her argument about retroactive application, plaintiff asserts Harris remains good law as no case has ever expressly overruled it. With that premise, plaintiff contends an intra-district conflict remains regarding the appropriate statute of limitations. In determining applicable precedent, courts apply a “principle that the more recent decision on a specific issue is controlling precedent.” McFadden II at ¶4. Although Harris has not been expressly overruled, McCoy and McFadden I eliminated it as viable precedent.
{¶19} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining the statute of limitations that applies to plaintiff‘s discrimination claim is the two-year limitation contained in
V. Second Assignment of Error – Accrual Date
{¶20} Plaintiff‘s second assignment of error asserts her wrongful termination claim did not accrue until May 24, 2007, the date this court adopted the magistrate‘s decision concluding plaintiff was not overpaid TTD compensation and vacating the Industrial Commission‘s finding of fraud. She thus contends that even under a two-year statute of limitations, her complaint filed March 25, 2008 is timely.
{¶21} Determining the date a cause of action accrued is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Bowman v. Tyack, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-815, 2009-Ohio-1331, ¶10, citing Ruckman v. Zacks Law Group LLC, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-723, 2008-Ohio-1108, ¶17. See also O‘Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, paragraph one of the syllabus (stating that “[a]bsent legislative definition, it is left to the
{¶22} Plaintiff relies on Esselburne v. Ohio Dept. of Agriculture (1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 578, which addressed the accrual date for a claim for wrongful exclusion from employment, to support her contention that her cause of action accrued when this court determined her mandamus action. In that case, the State Personnel Board of Review (“SPBR“) affirmed Esselburne‘s layoff, but a mandamus action determined the layoff was unlawful and ordered Esselburne‘s reinstatement in August 1987. Although Esselburne ultimately filed his complaint for wrongful exclusion in the Ohio Court of Claims on November 7, 1989, the court granted a motion to dismiss based on Esselburne‘s failure to file within the statute of limitations. Applying the two-year statute of limitations in
{¶23} Plaintiff‘s reliance on Esselburne for the proposition that her claim did not accrue until this court‘s decision on May 24, 2007 is flawed. Initially, Esselburne addressed the accrual date for a claim of wrongful exclusion from employment, not an accrual date in general. Plaintiff does not assert a claim for wrongful exclusion from
{¶24} A judicial decision generally is not necessary to trigger the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Bell v. Ohio State Bd. of Trustees, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1174, 2007-Ohio-2790, ¶27 (stating “[a] cause of action for breach of contract accrues when the breach occurs or when the complaining party suffers actual damages“); Burden v. Lucchese, 173 Ohio App.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-4497, ¶21 (finding “the statute of limitations begins to run” in medical malpractice action when “the injured party is put on notice of the need to pursue possible remedies and not when an attorney actually identifies the pertinent legal injury and remedy“); Kozma v. AEP Energy Servs., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-643, 2005-Ohio-1157, ¶38 (finding cause of action for wrongful discharge accrues “when [the plaintiff] was unequivocally informed” of his discharge). As neither this court nor any other has expanded the narrow holding in Esselburne to apply to the accrual date of any cause of action but wrongful exclusion from employment, we decline plaintiff‘s invitation to do so. Esselburne is not controlling, and this court‘s decision on May 24, 2007 is not the accrual date of plaintiff‘s claim for wrongful termination.
A. Discriminatory Termination
{¶26} The first count of plaintiff‘s complaint asserts a claim for discriminatory termination pursuant to
{¶27} Plaintiff‘s complaint alleges she “was continuously treated differently than similarly situated non-minority employees.” (Complaint, ¶37.) According to her complaint, the “proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff was nothing more than a pretext designed to mask the fact that the Plaintiff was terminated on the basis of her racial composition.” (Complaint, ¶40.) The latest discrete discriminatory act plaintiff alleges is her termination from employment, which her complaint states occurred in March 2005. Her March 25, 2008 complaint thus was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations.
B. Retaliatory Discharge
{¶28} Plaintiff next asserts a claim for retaliatory discharge as a result of her filing a claim with the OCRC. According to plaintiff‘s complaint, the instances of alleged retaliation are defendant‘s initiating proceedings against her and discharging her from employment. As her complaint states her discharge occurred in March 2005 and her
C. Abuse of Process
{¶29} Plaintiff‘s complaint also asserts a claim for abuse of process, stating defendant used the criminal proceedings instituted against plaintiff as a pretext to terminate her from employment. Under those allegations, plaintiff‘s claim accrued either on the date of her termination in March 2005 or when the state entered a nolle prosequi on the indictment pending against plaintiff on June 23, 2005. Even if we apply the later of those two dates, plaintiff‘s claim for abuse of process accrued on June 23, 2005. Her March 25, 2008 complaint thus was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations.
D. Breach of Contract
{¶30} Plaintiff‘s complaint alleges defendant breached its contract with her when it violated a clause in the employee handbook that required defendant to return plaintiff to the same position and worksite when it rehired her. According to the complaint, defendant instead transferred plaintiff to a new worksite and “forced plaintiff to travel to Canton to work,” also violating a handbook provision precluding certain activities when the employee has restrictions from a physician. (Complaint, ¶63.) A claim for breach of contract accrues when the breach actually occurs. See Bell at ¶27. Plaintiff returned to work on August 25, 2004. The complaint does not specify on what date defendant required plaintiff to travel to Canton, but it necessarily occurred sometime prior to her termination in March 2005. The latest date at which plaintiff‘s claim for breach of contract
E. Wrongful Termination
{¶31} Lastly, plaintiff asserts a claim for wrongful termination, arguing defendant had no cause to terminate plaintiff because she did not engage in any fraudulent behavior. A claim for wrongful termination accrues on the actual date of termination from employment. See Gleason v. Ohio Army Natl. Guard (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 697, 703. Because we concluded plaintiff‘s Esselburne argument is unpersuasive, plaintiff‘s claim for wrongful termination accrued at the latest on March 31, 2005. Her March 25, 2008 complaint thus was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations.
{¶32} The trial court did not err in granting defendant‘s motion to dismiss based on plaintiff‘s failure to commence her action within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in
VI. Disposition
{¶33} Because the trial court did not err in determining the two-year statute of limitations contained in
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK, P.J., and FRENCH, J., concur