William Scott v. Brad LivingstonWilliam Scott v. Brad Livingston
Finally, Van Deelen claims that his amended pleading, which dropped the district from the negligence claim, superseded all previous versions of his complaint. In other words, he asserts that the amendment mooted Defendants’ attempt to enforce the TTCA election-of-remedies provision. But no amended pleading can moot his initial election, which must be and was made “at the outset” of the litigation. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex.2008) (Section 101.106 “force[s] a plaintiff to decide at the outset whether an employee acted independently and is thus solely liable, or acted within the general scope of his or her employment such that the governmental unit is vicariously liable, thereby reducing the resources that the government and its employees must use in defending redundant litigation and alternative theories of recovery“).
III.
Van Deelen requested leave to amend in his oppositions to Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The requests consisted of a single paragraph. He did not explain what new factual allegations he could offer that would address the deficiencies in his complaint. As noted by appellees, a “bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—without any indication of the particular grounds on which the amendment is sought—does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The district court entertained the motion, however, and denied leave on the basis of futility and undue prejudice to the Defendants, who collectively had moved for dismissal in five separate motions to dismiss (three had been mooted by prior amendments). In denying Van Deelen a fourth opportunity to plead, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
IV.
For these reasons, the judgment below is AFFIRMED.
Deborah Carleton Milner, Stephanie Lynn Miller, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Alex Potapov, Douglas D. Geyser, Esq., Kyle David Highful, Michael P. Murphy, Andrew S. Oldham, Deputy General Counsel, Autumn Hamit Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General Office of the Solicitor General, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*
William Scott (“Scott“), a Jehovah‘s Witness and a prisoner then incarcerated at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice‘s (“TDCJ“) Huntsville Unit, filed a pro se complaint against TDCJ alleging that he was unconstitutionally and statutorily deprived of sufficient access to religious services. The district court interpreted his complaint as raising causes of action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA“) and the First Amendment. During the course of litigation, Scott was transferred from
DISCUSSION
“Following a bench trial, we review the district court‘s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Cerda v. 2004-EQR1 L.L.C., 612 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir.2010). On appeal, TDCJ argues, that the clear language of the parties’ February 2013 settlement agreement decisively resolves any question about whether Scott settled his claims. That language provides, in pertinent part,
“I hereby agree to a full and final settlement of the above-referenced matter upon delivery of the sum of $3,000.00 by Defendant.” Additionally, Scott attested that “Defendant will be entitled to a signed release and dismissal with prejudice of all my claims and costs as Plaintiff herein.”
Texas law governs the interpretation of this settlement agreement. Further, because “[a] settlement agreement is a contract,” Texas contract law guides our interpretation. White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1986). Under Texas law, a settlement agreement must be in writing, signed, and included as part of the record, or made in open court and entered on the record to be enforceable.
The February 2013 settlement agreement is in writing, signed by the parties, and was entered into the district court record. Additionally, it includes a price term and a release of claims, which Texas law indicates as the essential components of settlement agreements. See Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460-61 (Tex.1995); Stergiou, 438 S.W.2d at 745; CherCo Props., Inc. v. Law, Snakard & Gambill, P.C., 985 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999). Therefore, the February 2013 settlement agreement is binding under Texas law.
Scott raises a welter of arguments, none of which is persuasive, in an effort to overcome the plain language of the agreement. First, he contends that he did not intend to be bound by the agreement because he believed he was signing a preliminary agreement to agree, not a final settlement agreement. Whether the parties had a meeting of the minds and intended to be bound, however, is determined by an “objective standard of what the parties said and did, not on their subjective state
Second, Scott argues that TDCJ did not intend to be bound because: the document signed was an affidavit, TDCJ attorneys’ countersignatures were prefaced with the word “witnessed,” and the attorneys did not have final authority to approve the settlement, which required approval by the Attorney General, Governor, and Comptroller of Texas. Scott cites no case law supporting the novel proposition that a settlement agreement written as an affidavit negates contractual intent. Similarly, that the TDCJ attorneys’ signatures were prefaced with the term “witnessed” is not enough to overcome the clear language of the agreement and cast doubt upon TDCJ‘s intention to be bound. Additionally, the conditional language in the settlement agreement indicates that the requirement of approval of the Attorney General, Governor, and Comptroller was a condition precedent to the contract‘s effectiveness, Cedyco Corp. v. PetroQuest Energy, LLC, 497 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir.2007), rather than evidence of lack of intent to be bound. Thus, the condition precedent in no way negates TDCJ‘s intention to be bound.
Finally, Scott contends that the agreement did not contain all of the material terms because he was not given the ability to review TDCJ‘s new administrative directive concerning religious worship practices of inmates and because the agreement did not specify the precise manner in which he would be paid. Nothing in the agreement, however, specifies that these two terms were part of the settlement. When interpreting a valid contract, a court must seek to “ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument” by examining the writing to determine “whether it is possible to enforce the contract as written, without resort to parol evidence.” J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.2003). If the contract can be given a “definite or certain legal meaning,” it is unambiguous; for enforcement purposes, the court is limited to the plain language in the four corners of the document. Addicks Servs. v. GGP-Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir.2010) (citing J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229). The plain language of this settlement agreement is clear, complete, and unambiguous. We may not graft additional terms onto it.
Because Scott settled his claims with TDCJ, his claims have been rendered moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (noting that mootness occurs “when the parties have settled,” because settlement deprives a party of a “continuing interest” in the litigation). Accordingly, we VACATE the court‘s judgment and REMAND to the district court to enforce the settlement agreement and DISMISS the case.