Paula J. Wilkins v. The Village of Harrisburg et al.
Nos. 18AP-809 & 19AP-386
In the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District
March 10, 2020
2020-Ohio-886
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
(C.P.C. No. 12CV-14070); (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on March 10, 2020
On brief: Paula J. Wilkins, pro se. Argued: Paula J. Wilkins.
On brief: Peterson Conners LLP, and Istvan Gajary, for appellees. Argued: Istvan Gajary.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Paula J. Wilkins, pro se, appeals from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entering judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, The Village of Harrisburg (“the Village“) and the individual council members of the Harrisburg Village Council, and from a judgment entry denying her motion for new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In 2012, Wilkins filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, sanctions, and civil damages related to the Village‘s rezoning of property owned by Larry Taylor. Wilkins named the defendants as the Village of Harrisburg, several Village of Harrisburg Council members in their official and individual capacities, the Harrisburg Fiscal Officer in her official and individual capacity, several
{¶ 3} The trial court granted the motion to dismiss of the Ohio Attorney General. Subsequently, the Harrisburg defendants and Taylor each filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court converted those motions into motions for summary judgment. On November 14, 2014, the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision granting the motions for summary judgment in favor of Taylor and the Harrisburg defendants.
{¶ 4} Wilkins appealed the decision of the trial court, and this court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Wilkins v. Village of Harrisburg, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-1028, 2015-Ohio-5472 (“Wilkins I“). Specifically, this court determined Wilkins had sufficiently established that her property was “adjacent” to Taylor‘s property such that she may have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. Wilkins I at ¶ 35. Accordingly, we remanded the matter to the trial court “to consider, pursuant to the
{¶ 5} On remand to the trial court, the Harrisburg defendants renewed their motion to dismiss on April 4, 2016, and the trial court denied the motion on June 30, 2016. The parties also attempted to resolve the dispute through mediation but were unsuccessful. In their answer to Wilkins’ complaint filed July 13, 2016, the Harrisburg defendants raised their immunity as a political subdivision and its employees as affirmative defenses under
{¶ 6} Eventually, the Harrisburg defendants decided to rescind the two ordinances at issue in the case. In response to the decision to rescind the ordinances, Wilkins filed a
{¶ 7} Wilkins again appealed to this court. In a November 2, 2017 decision, this court determined that the trial court erred in granting the oral motion to dismiss of the Harrisburg defendants on the issue of political subdivision immunity. Wilkins v. Village of Harrisburg, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-274, 2017-Ohio-8551, ¶ 40 (“Wilkins II“). This court reasoned that, given the requirements of notice pleading, it could not say that Wilkins could prove no set of circumstances in which appellees’ conduct would fall outside political subdivision immunity, thereby entitling Wilkins to relief. The Harrisburg defendants then filed an application for en banc consideration or, in the alternative, reconsideration. Wilkins v. Village of Harrisburg, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-274, 2018-Ohio-759 (“Wilkins III“). In a March 1, 2018 decision, this court denied the Harrisburg defendants’ application for en banc consideration or, alternatively, reconsideration, and clarified its decision in Wilkins II, stating:
On remand, the remaining allegations of the complaint with respect to Wilkins’ third claim will stand or fall on the record that is developed before the trial court. The trial court can then examine all of the alleged conduct of appellees and characterize each action as legislative, administrative, or outside the scope of either. * * * The degree of immunity will depend on the results of that determination.
Wilkins III at ¶ 9.
{¶ 8} On remand, the trial court conducted a trial on September 17, 2018. Following the trial, in which Wilkins called two witnesses and submitted numerous documents into evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of the Harrisburg defendants. Specifically, the trial court found “there was no evidence submitted that the [Harrisburg defendants‘] actions were willful, knowingly and/or malicious toward [Wilkins]. In addition, [Wilkins] submitted no evidence that the actions of the [Harrisburg defendants] in depriving her of a hearing caused her any damage.” (Sept. 19, 2018 Decision at 2.) Further, the trial court found “all actions taken by the [Harrisburg defendants] in depriving [Wilkins] of a hearing on the zoning ordinances were done in their legislative function.” (Decision at 2.) Thus, because Wilkins failed to prove the actions of the Harrisburg defendants were a willful, knowing, and malicious violation of her constitutional rights, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Harrisburg defendants. The trial court journalized its findings and decision in a September 19, 2018 findings of fact and conclusions of law and an October 25, 2018 judgment entry.
{¶ 9} Following the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law but prior to the trial court‘s final judgment, Wilkins filed a motion for new trial on October 3, 2018 pursuant to
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 10} Wilkins assigns the following errors for our review:
- To the prejudice of the appellant, the court abused its discretion by having rendered judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of all defendants on plaintiff‘s remaining claims as decision was based on false and/or misleading testimony of defendant Patsy Frost.
- To the prejudice of the appellant, the court abused its discretion by ruling the actions of the defendants in depriving appellant of a hearing on the zoning ordinances were done in their legislative function.
- To the prejudice of the appellant, the court abused its discretion by failing to hear and/or address the issues raised by appellant that the witness(s) had committed perjury during their testimony.
- To the prejudice of the appellant, the court abused its discretion when it failed to give appropriate weight to the evidence and testimony of the appellant.
- To the prejudice of the appellant, the court abused its discretion when it failed to grant appellant a new trial.
- To the prejudice of the appellant, the court abused its discretion by finding that appellees violated appellant‘s rights of due process but rendered judgment against appellant and in favor of the appellees and failed to award compensatory and/or punitive damages to appellant.
III. First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Assignments of Error – Trial Court‘s Judgment in Favor of Harrisburg Defendants
{¶ 11} Wilkins’ first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are interrelated, and we address them jointly. Taken together, these five assignments of error assert the trial court erred when it entered judgment in favor of the Harrisburg defendants following trial. More specifically, Wilkins argues the trial court erred in concluding the actions of the Harrisburg defendants falls within political subdivision immunity, and she challenges the weight the trial court assigned to the evidence in support of that conclusion.
{¶ 12} Through these five assignments of error, Wilkins asserts the trial court‘s conclusion that the Harrisburg defendants are entitled to immunity as employees of a political subdivision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978), syllabus. In determining whether a civil judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court is guided
{¶ 13} During the extensive litigation history of this case, the Harrisburg defendants conceded it did not comply with
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} Willful misconduct, as defined by the Supreme Court, “implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a deliberate purpose not to
{¶ 16} Wilkins presents various arguments as to why the trial court erroneously weighed the evidence presented during the trial to reach its factual conclusions. However, having reviewed the record, we find competent, credible evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion that although the Harrisburg defendants did not comply with
{¶ 17} For these reasons, we overrule Wilkins’ first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error.
IV. Fifth Assignment of Error – Motion for New Trial
{¶ 18} In her fifth assignment of error, Wilkins argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial.
{¶ 19} As relevant here,
- Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, magistrate, or prevailing party, or any order of the court or magistrate, or
abuse of discretion, by which an aggrieved party was prevented from having a fair trial; - Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;
* * * - The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence; however, only one new trial may be granted on the weight of the evidence in the same case;
- The judgment is contrary to law[.]
{¶ 20} The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial, pursuant to
{¶ 21} Wilkins’ argument in support of her fifth assignment of error is a restatement of the arguments she made in her first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error. More specifically, Wilkins argues the trial court erroneously entered judgment in favor of the Village and the Harrisburg defendants, asserting that judgment relied on allegedly false and perjured testimony. In support of her motion for new trial, Wilkins relies on minutes from several meetings before the Village‘s council that Wilkins claims contradict the testimony the Harrisburg defendants provided at trial. This is the same information Wilkins presented during her trial, and the trial court had the opportunity to assess the credibility of all witnesses during the trial. Having already determined in our disposition of Wilkins’ first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error that the trial court did not err in finding the Harrisburg defendants were entitled to immunity on Wilkins’ claims, Wilkins’ arguments similarly do not support her motion for new trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkins’ motion for new trial, and we overrule Wilkins’ fifth assignment of error.
V. Disposition
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding the Village and the Harrisburg defendants were entitled to immunity as employees of a political subdivision, and the trial court did not err in rendering judgment in favor of appellees. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkins’ motion for new trial. Having overruled Wilkins’ six assignments of error, we affirm the judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgments affirmed.
BROWN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.