LONNELL REGINALD WIDEMAN, Plаintiff-Appellant, v. JOSH GREEN, GOVERNOR; TOMMY JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; HAWAI#I PAROLING AUTHORITY; ADRIENNE BOXER-PO, Defendants-Appellees.
NO. CAAP-24-0000698
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
July 9, 2026
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST‘S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-24-0000698 09-JUL-2026 07:53 AM Dkt. 40 SO
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, and Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
Self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant Lonnell Reginald Wideman (Widemаn) appeals from the May 27, 2026 Final Judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court) in favor of Defendants-Appellees Josh Green, Governor; Tommy Johnson, Director of Department of Corrections and Rehabilitаtion (DCR); Hawai#i Paroling Authority (HPA); and Adrienne Boxer-Po (Boxer-Po) (together, Defendants).1 Wideman also challenges the Circuit Court‘s: (1) October 16, 2024 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss [Wideman‘s] Complaint Filed on June 19, 2024 (Order Granting Motion to Dismiss); and (2) October 16, 2024 Order Denying [Wideman‘s] Motion for Preliminary Injunction Filed on June 19, 2024 (Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction).2
Following a September 25, 2024 hearing, the Circuit Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and denied Wideman‘s motion for preliminary injunction. The court concluded, among other things, that: (1) “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for [Wideman] to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement and to seek immediate or speedier release“; (2) an alleged “international travel ban for parolees” does not violate Wideman‘s rights under the Hawai#i or United States Constitutions, including his right to marry and substantive due process rights; (3) as to Wideman‘s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Defendants’ alleged conduct “does not rise to the level of outrageousness as construed in our case law“; (4) “[t]he State has not waived its sovereign immunity for any claims for damages asserted for violations of the State Constitution, nor for arguments under
On appeal, Wideman contends that the Circuit Court erred in granting the motion to dismiss and denying the motion for preliminary injunction because: (1) Wideman “stated an actionable constitutional violation against Defendants[‘] international travel ban for Hawaii parolees“; (2) Wideman “stated an actionable constitutional violation against Defendants [for] denying [his right] to marry a Chinese national“; (3)
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve Wideman‘s contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) Wideman contends that he has a constitutional right to international travel that was violated when Defendants denied him permission to travel to China pursuant to an “international travel ban for Hawaii parolees.” He further argues that as a parolee, he “has presented no compelling legitimate security concerns to warrant reasons for the denial to travel to China for marriage.”
We review a circuit court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, under the same standard applied by the circuit court. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i 249, 256-57, 428 P.3d 761, 768-69 (2018). We view the facts alleged in the complaint, and the inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 257, 428 P.3d at 769. But we are “not required to accept cоnclusory allegations on the legal effect of the events alleged.” See Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawai#i 62, 74, 315 P.3d 213, 225 (2013) (quoting Pavsek v. Sandvold, 127 Hawai#i 390, 403, 279 P.3d 55, 68 (App. 2012)).
Construing the federal constitution, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that “an individual‘s constitutiоnal right to [interstate] travel, having been legally extinguished by a valid conviction followed by imprisonment, is not revived by the change in status from prisoner to parolee.” Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1983). By extension, the same rule applies to
Here, Wideman alleged that he was released on parole under the supervision of the DCR and the HPA. As a parolee, hе remained subject to statutory restrictions, including the requirement that state parolees obtain permission from the paroling authority before leaving the jurisdiction of the State. See
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has recognized a right to freedom of movement under the Hawai#i Constitution, likening it to the federal right to travel. See State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604,
Here, Defendants argue that international travel restrictions for parolees serve the State‘s important interest in supervising pаrolees, and that “HPA risks losing all right to supervise [Wideman] the moment he is outside the jurisdiction of the United States.” The Circuit Court similarly concluded that “[t]he State has no inherent right to enforce its criminal laws or restrictions imposed under those laws outside the Un[i]ted States.” In these circumstances, the alleged international travel restriction on Wideman serves an important State interest and does not unreasonably or unnecessarily infringe оn his freedom of movement. Wideman failed to state a claim that his alleged right to travel internationally was violated.
(2) Wideman contends that he has a constitutional right to marry that was violated when Defendants deniеd him permission to travel to China to marry pursuant to the alleged international travel restriction.
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-100 (1987), the United States Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right of prisoners to marry, which may be limited only for sound penоlogical reasons. Here, however, Wideman did not allege that any of the Defendants — or the alleged travel restriction itself — forbade him from getting married or from marrying his Chinese fiancé. At most, the alleged restriction аffected either the timing or the place of his marriage plans. “This type of incidental interference with the right to marry does not give rise to a constitutional claim if there is ‘some justification’ for the interference.” Williams, 336 F.3d at 582 (quoting Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1995)); cf. Nachtwey v. Doi, 59 Haw. 430, 442 n.18, 583 P.2d 955, 963 n.18 (1978) (“A [d]e minimis effect on a fundamental right will not evoke strict
Here, as discussed above, there is an important justification for the alleged restriction on Wideman‘s international travel, as the HPA would risk lоsing all right to supervise him if he were to leave the jurisdiction of the United States.5 Wideman failed to state a claim that his right to marry was violated.
(3) Wideman contends that he “stated an actionable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress” against Defendants. We disagree.
Rather, the Circuit Court correctly ruled that the alleged conduct of Defendants, taken as true, “does not rise to the level of outrageousness as construed in our case law.” See Goran Pleho, LLC v. Lacy, 144 Hawai#i 224, 237, 439 P.3d 176, 189 (2019) (“The term ‘outrageous’ has been construed to mean without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency.” (quoting Enoka v. AIG Hawai#i Ins. Co., 109 Hаwai#i 537, 559, 128 P.3d 850, 872 (2006))); id. at 238, 439 P.3d at 190 (“[T]he correct inquiry is simply whether ‘an average member of the community’ would exclaim, ‘Outrageous!‘” (quoting Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai#i 403, 429, 198 P.3d 666, 692 (2008))). Wideman thus failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distrеss. See id. at 237, 439 P.3d at 189 (the question of outrageousness “is for the court in the first instance,” and should be left for the jury to decide only where reasonable people could differ (quoting Young, 119 Hawai#i at 429, 198 P.3d at 692)).
(4)-(6) Because the operative complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the Circuit Court did not err in dismissing it, or in dismissing it with prejudice in these circumstances. Further, the Circuit Court did not err in denying the motion for preliminary injunction as moot.
Accordingly, we need not address Wideman‘s remaining contentions.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, July 9, 2026.
On the briefs:
Lonnell Reginald Wideman, Self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant.
Skyler G. Cruz and Yanita V. Spiker, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants-Appellees.
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Presiding Judge
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge