578 F. App'x 34

2d Cir.

2014

Stephanie HAYLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NASSAU HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-2991

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Sept. 18, 2014

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges, LEWIS A. KAPLAN,* District Judge.

was when the government first acknowledged that Connecticut drug convictions do not categorically qualify as felony drug offenses under § 841(b). McCoy, 707 F.3d at 188. Accordingly, the performance of Vailette‘s trial counsel was not constitutionally defective because “[a]n attorney is not required to forecast changes or advances in the law’ in order to provide effective assistance.” Id. (quoting Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 315 (2d Cir. 2001)). Given that Vailette has not established that his counsel‘s performance fell below the range of professionally competent assistance, we need not address the government‘s argument that he has not established prejudice from his counsel‘s actions.

Because Vailette‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks merit, we reject his argument that his appeal waiver is unenforceable. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is DISMISSED.

Doreen Whethers, Freeport, N.Y., pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian J. Clark, Nicholas Marco Reiter, Venable LLP, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.

Doreen WHETHERS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Doreen Whethers brought an action against her former employer Nassau Health Care Corporation (“NHCC“), and several NHCC employees, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL“), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296 et seq. Whethers alleged discrimination on the basis of her race (African-American), as well as retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Whethers had not stated a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, and had not demonstrated a violation of her constitutional rights. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant; the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts revealed in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Assoc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon such review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants for the reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum and order.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Notes

Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.