Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. VasquezWells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Vasquez
Dated: March 2, 2015
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendants Cheylene L. and George Vasquez appeal from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} In 2012, Wells Fargo Bank, NA (“Wells Fargo“) filed a complaint for foreclosure and reformation of a mortgage, in which it named the Vasquezes as defendants. The complaint sought monetary judgment on a note signed by the Vasquezes and foreclosure on the mortgage that secured the note. The Vasquezes did not answer the complaint, and Wells Fargo moved for default judgment against them. On May 31, 2012, the trial court granted default judgment and issued a decree in foreclosure. On July 30, 2013, the Vasquezes filed a common law motion to vacate the foreclosure decree, in which they specifically maintained that
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [THE VASQUEZES] COMMON LAW MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT WHEN THE SUBJECT JUDGMENT WAS NEITHER A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER NOR HAD THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURT BEEN INVOKED BY THE PLEADING OF A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY IN THE COMPLAINT OF [WELLS FARGO.]
{¶4} In their sole assignment of error, the Vasquezes argue that the trial court erred in denying their common law motion to vacate. We disagree.
{¶5} Initially, we note that the Vasquezes argue on appeal that the trial court‘s decree of foreclosure was not a final appealable order. We will address this argument first, as it raises an issue as to our jurisdiction to review this matter.
{¶6}
{¶7} “A judgment entry ordering a foreclosure sale is a final, appealable order pursuant to
{¶8} The Vasquezes maintain that the trial court‘s foreclosure decree, which they sought to vacate, was not a final, appealable order because it failed to set forth the amount owed for the following expenses: “advances made for the payment of real estate taxes and assessments and insurance premiums, and all costs and expenses incurred for the enforcement of the [n]ote and [m]ortgage, except to the extent the payment of one or more specific such items is prohibited by Ohio law.” The Vasquezes maintain that these expenses could include property preservation expenses and attorney fees, and they maintain that these amounts were required to be set forth in the decree.
{¶9} In regard to expenses associated with property preservation, the Vasquezes rely heavily on the Fifth District case of CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012-CA-93, 2012-Ohio-4901, ¶ 9, 12. There, the Fifth District held that the computation of the dollar amount for “for costs of evidence of title required to bring th[e] action, for payment of taxes, [and for] insurance premiums” were easily ascertainable by normal diligence, and the absence of these amounts from the foreclosure decree did not affect its finality. Id. at ¶ 9. However, it concluded that “expenses incurred in property inspections, appraisal, preservation and maintenance” were not easily ascertainable. Id. Because amounts owed for property preservation were not easily ascertainable, the Fifth District held that when these expenses were awarded, the amounts were required to be included in the foreclosure decree. Id. at ¶ 9, 12.
{¶11} Accordingly, the foreclosure decree here was not required to include specific money amounts for property preservation for it to constitute a final, appealable order.
{¶12} In regard to attorney fees, “Ohio has long adhered to the ‘American rule’ with respect to recovery of attorney fees: a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees as a part of the costs of litigation.” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 548, 2009-Ohio-306, ¶ 7, citing Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Darby, 33 Ohio St.3d 32, 33-34 (1987), and State ex rel. Beebe v. Cowley, 116 Ohio St. 377, 382 (1927). “However, there are exceptions to this rule. Attorney fees may be awarded when a statute or an enforceable contract specifically provides for the losing party to pay the prevailing party‘s attorney fees, * * * or when the prevailing party demonstrates bad faith on the part of the unsuccessful litigant[.]” Wilborn at ¶ 7, citing Nottingdale at 34, and Pegan v. Crawmer, 79 Ohio St.3d 155, 156 (1997).
{¶13} Here, Wells Fargo did not in its complaint request attorney fees pursuant to any of these exceptions, nor did it file a motion for attorney fees during these proceedings. Accordingly, we cannot agree that the language in the foreclosure decree awarding Wells Fargo “expenses incurred for the enforcement of the [n]ote and [m]ortgage” included attorney fees.
{¶14} Therefore, we conclude that the foreclosure decree here was a final appealable order, and thus the denial of the Vasquezes’ motion to vacate the foreclosure decree was likewise
{¶15} The Vasquezes maintain that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the foreclosure decree because Wells Fargo did not plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that it had standing in this matter.
{¶16} “[T]he issue of subject-matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time[,] and * * * a court‘s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders that court‘s judgment void ab initio.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 79, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 17, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. “Challenges to a trial court‘s jurisdiction present questions of law and are reviewed by this Court de novo.” (Citation and quotations omitted). State ex rel. DeWine v. 9150 Group, L.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 25939, 2012-Ohio-3339, ¶ 8, quoting Eisel v. Austin, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009653, 2010-Ohio-816, ¶ 8.
{¶17} In Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 41-42, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff must have standing at the time it files the complaint in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. However, the Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified that “a court of common pleas that has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action does not lose that jurisdiction merely because a party to the action lacks standing.” Kuchta at ¶ 17. Instead, standing relates to “jurisdiction over a particular case, not subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 22. “If a court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the invocation or exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case causes a judgment to be voidable rather than void.” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶18} Therefore, because the lack of standing does not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that the trial court did not error in denying the Vasquezes’
{¶19} Accordingly, we overrule the Vasquezes’ sole assignment of error.
III.
{¶20} The Vasquezes’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Costs taxed to Appellants.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
MARC E. DANN, GRACE M. DOBERDRUK and DANIEL M. SOLAR, Attorneys at Law, for Appellants.
SCOTT A. KING and TERRY W. POSEY, JR., Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.