Tiffаny WEBER, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MIKAROSE, LLC and Brad Lawson, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 20140415-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 21, 2015.
2015 UT App 130
¶ 31 A lot happened between 2004 and 2014. The district court entered a final judgment, the 2004 Amended Judgment. This judgment ordered Defendants to “transfer by deed” to Mardanlou “an undivided one-half interest” in the Property; ordered Mardanlou to reimburse Defendants in the amount of one-half of the $663,414.90 that Defendants had paid for the Property; and ordered Defendants to pay Mardanlou one-half of all rents received through the date of entry of judgment. Finally, it ordered “that any and all remaining claims in this action are dismissed with prejudice.”
¶ 32 We affirmed the 2004 Amended Judgment in Mardanlou I. See 2006 UT App 165, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d 904. In 2008 Defendants transferred by deed to Mardanlou “a one-half interest as tenаnt in common” in the Property. In addition, Defendants paid rents due through the date of the 2004 Amended Judgment, including post-judgment interest.
¶ 33 But in a series of orders culminating in the 2012 Ruling, the district court ruled that the parties’ partnership had not been wound up or terminated, ordered the parties to wind up the partnership, declared the parties tenants in partnership, and awarded Mardanlou a share of rents paid after entry of the 2004 Amended Judgment.
¶ 34 As explained above, once the district court entered the 2004 Amended Judgment and this court unconditionally affirmed it, the district court lost jurisdiction to act other than to enforce that judgment. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 52, 993 P.2d 191. By 2012, the 2004 Amended Judgment had been satisfied and thus required no enforcement. The 2004 Amended Judgment ordеred Defendants to “transfer by deed” to Mardanlou “an undivided one-half interest” in the Property. After the judgment was affirmed on appeal, Defendants did transfer by deed to Mardanlou an undivided one-half interest in the Property. In addition, Defendants paid to Mardanlou a share of pre-judgment rents together with pre- and post-judgment interest. The 2004 Amended Judgment required nоthing more of Defendants and in fact dismissed any and all remaining claims with prejudice.
¶ 35 But the 2012 Ruling purported to grant further relief. It adjudicated the status of the parties in 2012 with respect to the former partnership, it ordered the parties to wind up the partnership, and it required Defendants to pay Mardanlou a portion of post-judgment rents. The 2004 Amended Judgment awаrded none of this relief. The district court thus lacked jurisdiction to grant this relief in 2012, and its ruling purporting to do so is void. Accordingly, we vacate the district court‘s 2012 Ruling.3
CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The April 24, 2012 Ruling and the March 20, 2013 Order are hereby vacated.
Robert C. Avery and Nathan E. Burdsal, Orem, for Appellee.
Judge JAMES Z. DAVIS authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.
Memorandum Decision
DAVIS, Judge:
¶ 1 Mikarose, LLC and Brad Lawson (collеctively, Employer) appeal the trial court‘s grant of attorney fees to Tiffany Weber and the trial court‘s denial of two rule 60(b) motions for relief. We affirm.
I. Attorney Fees
¶ 2 First, Employer argues that the attorney fee award is in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).1 The FLSA requires a trial court to award reasonable attorney fees and costs “in addition to any judgmеnt awarded to the plaintiff ... to be paid by the defendant.”
¶ 3 “[T]he district court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable [attorney] fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Redd v. Hill, 2013 UT 35, ¶ 15, 304 P.3d 861 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record.” Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); id. at 989-90 (listing various considerations a court may take into account in determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee award).
¶ 4 First, Employer suggests that the fees awarded are unreasonable because of the vast difference between the amount of fees awarded and the amount in controversy. “[A]lthough the amount in controversy can be a factor in determining a reasonable fee,” that amount is not necessarily reliable, becаuse, for example, it often takes an attorney
¶ 5 Next, Employer argues that the fees awarded were unreasonable because the case was uncomplicated in light of the fact that Employer never denied liability and the only issue was how much overtime pay Employer owed Weber. The trial court recognized that the issues raised in Weber‘s original complaint “were not novel or complex.” However, the court explained, “The only reason the attorney fees are high is because [Weber] was required to seek orders to compel discovery and to respond to [Employer‘s] seemingly endless salvo of motions.” The court recognized that Employer had “the right to file the motions that [it] did and argue them in court” but noted that as a consequence of exercising that right, Employer “prolonged this litigation and ran up the fees.” The court acknowledged that it would have exercised its discretion to reduce the fee award “had the tables been reversed,” i.e., had Weber expended a significant amount of time “filing endless, unnecessary motions.” The court concluded, however, that such an exercise of discretion was not appropriate here, where Employer “has created the unpleasant situation which [it] now finds [itself] in.” Employer has not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
¶ 6 Employer also suggested to the trial court that some of the particular charges included in the attorney fee award were unreasonable, and on appeal, Employer challenges several specific items billed by Weber‘s attorney.2 These specific challenges were not presented to the trial court in a manner in which it could rule on them; indeed, the trial court stated, without objection, at the March 28, 2014 hearing on attorney fees that Employer “does not contest the work that has been performed” and “does not contest the rate of Plaintiff‘s Counsel.” “As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (explaining the preservation rule). These challenges are not preserved for appeal, and we decline to address them further.
II. Attorney Fees as a Discovery Sanction
¶ 7 Next, Employer argues that the trial cоurt abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees as “sanctions” because the court did not make the necessary findings to support a sanction in its Order to Compel Discovery (the Order to Compel).3
¶ 8 In the Order to Compel, the trial court ordered Employer to pay Weber‘s “reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs associated with preparing and filing [her] State-ment of Discovery Issues.”
¶ 9 Here, in the court‘s subsеquent order imposing a default judgment against Employer as an additional discovery sanction, the court explained that Employer “failed to provide responses to [Weber‘s] written discovery requests within the time prescribed under the rules,” that Weber “properly contacted [Employer] in a good faith attempt to resolve the issues in accordance with Rule 4-502(2)(A)” of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, and that “[w]hen that good faith attempt failed to resolve the issues, [Weber] properly filed her Statement of Discovery [I]ssues in compliance with the provisions of Rule 4-502.” Employer “did not object to [Weber‘s] Statement of Discovery Issues,” and in turn, the trial court entered an Order to Compel Discovеry. The court described Employer as having “willfully withheld” and “outright refused” to supply the requested discovery materials throughout the proceedings. There is no question that Employer failed to provide the requested electronic discovery materials, and the record clearly indicates that Employer has maintained the attitude that it needed to provide only the discovery materials it deemed relevant to Weber‘s claim. In light of this evidence of Employer‘s lack of good faith, the trial court‘s failure to make the relevant specific finding to support its order that Employer pay Weber‘s attorney fees and costs incurred in securing the Order to Compel is not a reversible error. See Amica Mut., 768 P.2d at 962. Aсcordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s decision to impose attorney fees and costs against Employer in the Order to Compel.
¶ 10 Employer also argues that the trial court improperly granted the Order to Compel because Weber‘s discovery request for “all electronic documents and spreadsheets” was not reasonable or proportional under
III. Rule 60(b) Motions
¶ 11 Finally, Employer argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Employer‘s rule 60(b) motion on the basis that Lawson failed to demonstrate excusable neglect or a meritorious defense. “A district court has broad discretion to rule on a motion to set aside a ... judgment under
¶ 12 To set aside a judgment pursuant to
¶ 13 Here, Employer asserted that its failure to respond to the Statement of Discovery Issues should be excused because at the time Weber filed the Statement, Lawson, who represented himself pro se, and his wife were out of the state, meaning there was “no one authorized to open the mail.” In other words, Employer did not learn that Weber had filed the Statement of Discovery Issues until after the trial court issued its Order to Compel. In ruling on Employer‘s rule 60(b) motions, the trial court held that Employer “demonstrated no diligence at all” by leaving “the state during the discovery period without designating anyone to check a message or open an envelope.” Because the trial court concluded that Employer failed to make even “some effort,” the court denied its rule 60(b) motions.4
¶ 14 The trial court did not abuse its discrеtion in reaching this conclusion. “[D]iligence on the part of the party claiming excusable neglect is an essential element of that inquiry, and relief may not be granted based on other equitable considerations where a party has exercised no diligence at all.” Bodell, 2014 UT App 203, ¶ 10, 334 P.3d 1004 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While representing himself pro sе, Lawson left the state during the discovery period and did not designate anyone to check his messages or open envelopes sent by opposing counsel. We agree that this behavior does not constitute diligence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer‘s rule 60(b) motions.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 15 We affirm the trial court‘s award of attorney fees under the FLSA, its imposition of attorney fees as a discovery sanction, and its denials of Employer‘s rule 60(b) motions. Because Weber was awarded fees below under the FLSA, has prevailed on appeal, and has requested fees on appeal, we remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of awarding fees reasonably incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (“This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially authorizes them. In addition, when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).