Weber v. DobbinsWeber v. Dobbins
We have for review Dobbins v. Weber, 585 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance:
DO THE IMMUNITIES PROVIDED BY SECTION 440.11, FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), EXTEND TO A CORPORATE OFFICER WHO ELECTS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.05, TO EXEMPT HIMSELF FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 440?
Id. at 1145. We have jurisdiction based on article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and we answer the question in the affirmative and quash the decision below.
On July 24, 1984, Herbert Dobbins (Dobbins) suffered personal injuries when the boom of a truck-mounted crane came into contact with a high-voltage transmission line. Dobbins was an employee of Dobbins Sign Services, Inc. However, at the time of the accident, Dobbins was working under the direction of Howard Weber (Weber), a corporate officer of Preferred Enterprise Signs. Weber had elected to be exempt from coverage under the Worker‘s Compensation Act based on his status as a corporate officer, pursuant to
Following the accident, Dobbins made a claim for and received worker‘s compensation benefits from Preferred Enterprise Signs. In addition, Dobbins and his wife also filed suit against Weber and several other defendants as a result of his injuries.
Dobbins’ second amended complaint alleged simple negligence on Weber‘s part and that Weber had “filed an election not to be covered with the Division of Worker‘s Compensation.” Weber again filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, Dobbins argued that because of Weber‘s election, Weber could not be considered a co-employee under
On appeal, the district court strictly construed
The issue here is whether the district court erred in applying the definition of “employee” found in
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the courts will give a statute its plain and ordinary meaning. Streeter v. Sullivan, 509 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1987). An inquiry into the legislative history may begin only if the court finds that the statute is ambiguous. State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). However, this Court has recognized that
a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion. Such a departure from the letter of the statute, however, “is sanctioned by the courts only when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter [of the law] does not accurately disclose the [legislative] intent.”
Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Hanbury v. Tunnicliffe, 98 Fla. 731, 735, 124 So. 279, 281 (1929)).
Section 440.02, which defines the terms used in chapter 440, begins with the following predicate: “[w]hen used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meaning.” The section then provides an extensive definition of the term “employee,” including:
[a]ny person who is an officer of a corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous. However, any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the division as provided in s. 440.05.
The same immunities from liability enjoyed by an employer shall extend as
well to each employee of the employer when such employee is acting in furtherance of the employer‘s business and the injured employee is entitled to receive benefits under this chapter.
Although the language of both these sections is clear, the word “employee” in
Accordingly, we quash the district court‘s decision and remand for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I believe the district court was correct in finding that Weber‘s rejection of coverage removed him from the statutory immunity granted to an “employee” by
The reason for the rule that courts must give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning is that only one branch of government may write laws. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984). Just as a governor who chooses to veto a bill may not substitute a preferable enactment in its place, courts may not twist the plain wording of statutes in order to achieve particular results. Even when courts believe the
In order for a court to ignore the plain meaning of statutory language, the result reached by the literal interpretation must be unreasonable or ridiculous, Holly, 450 So.2d at 219, or there must be overwhelming evidence of contrary legislative intent. Hamm, 414 So.2d at 1073. This case does not satisfy those tests.
SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Notes
While not persuasive in our discussion today, we note that the legislature has amended section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1983), to extend the immunity granted under the statute. See ch. 88-284, § 1, Laws of Fla. The amended statute, section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1991), reads in relevant part:
The same immunity provisions enjoyed by an employer shall also apply to any sole proprietor, partner, corporate officer or director, supervisor or other person who in the course and scope of his duties acts in a managerial or policy-making capacity and the conduct which caused the alleged injury arose within the course and scope of said managerial or policy-making duties and the conduct was not a violation of a law, whether or not a violation was charged, for which the maximum penalty which may be imposed exceeds 60 days imprisonment as set forth in s. 775.082, F.S.