Streeter v. SullivanStreeter v. Sullivan
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has certifiеd the following question as being one of great public importance:
DOES SECTION 440.11(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983) PERMIT SUITS AGAINST CORPORATE EMPLOYER OFFICERS, EXECUTIVES, AND SUPERVISORS AS “EMPLOYEES” FOR ACTS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN FAILING TO PROVIDE A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE IN WHICH OTHER EMPLOYEES MAY WORK?
Sullivan v. Streeter, 485 So.2d 893, 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The Second District Court of Appeal, in Kaplan v. Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, 495 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), certified express conflict between that court‘s decision and the Fourth District‘s decision in Sullivan. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Streeter
Suzanne Sullivan was employed as a branch manager of the Davie branch of Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan (Atlantic). In 1981 Atlantic, through Streeter and Melcher, made the economic decision to remove the armed guard from the Davie branch, despite persistent requests from the employees of that branch to maintain the guard. The Davie branch was robbed once in the fall оf 1981 and again in June of 1982. Throughout this period the Davie branch employees stepped up their requests to Streeter and Melcher to reassign the armed guard to the branch.
During the June, 1982 robbery, the perpetrator threatened Suzanne Sullivan‘s life. In July of 1982 the same man returned to the Davie branch and killed Suzanne Sullivan.
Mark Sullivan, Suzanne‘s husband, brought suit against Atlantic, as well as Streeter and Melcher, alleging that the defendants had acted with gross negligence in failing to provide adequate security, and that this failure proximately caused Suzanne‘s death. The trial court granted all defendant‘s motions for summary judgment and Sullivan appealed. The Fourth District affirmed the summary judgment as to Atlantic, but reversed as to Streeter and Melcher, holding that section 440.11(1) expressly imposes liability upon grossly negligent employees. The court stated that corporate officers are “employees” under the statute, and certified the above-styled question to this Court.
Stanlick
Stanlick, a truck driver for Kaplan Industries, was injured when he fell asleep while
The trial court granted Kaplan Industries’ motion to dismiss, but denied the Kaplan brothers’ similar motion. The Kaplans petitioned the Second District for a writ of prohibition on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Stanlick‘s complaint. The court granted the writ, holding that corporate officers are not employees; rather they are employers entitled to the immunity under section 440.11(1). The court certified that its decision was in express conflict with Sullivan.1
The liability or immunity of all defendants rests upon our interpretation of
The same immunities from liability enjoyed by an employer shall extend as well to each employee of the employer when such employee is acting in furtherance of the employer‘s business and the injured employee is entitled to receive benefits under this chapter. Such fellow employee immunities shall not be applicable to an employee who acts, with respect to a fellow employee, with willful and wanton disregard оr unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence when such acts result in injury or death or such acts proximately cause such injury or death, nor shall such immunities be applicable to employees of the same employer when each is operating in the furtherance of the employer‘s business but they are assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or public employment (emphasis added).
We believe the emphasized portion of the statute to be an unambiguous statement of the legislature‘s desirе to impose liability on all employees who act with gross negligence with respect to their fellow employees, regardless of the grossly negligent employee‘s corporate status.
The defendants request this Court to define the term “employee,” fоr the purposes of this statute, to exclude corporate officers who are performing the employer‘s nondelegable duty to maintain a safe work-place. In defining the term “employee,” as used in section 440.11(1), we turn to the definitional section оf the Worker‘s Compensation Act,
When used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
... .
(2)(b) The term “employee” includes any person who is an officer of a corporation and who perfоrms services for renumeration for such corporation within this state, whether or not such services are continuous.
We believe that the plain language of this statute definitively brings corporate officers within the scope of the term “employee.”
The defendants argue that a distinction be drawn between classes of employees. In support of their arguments, defendants rely primarily on their interpretation of the legislative intent behind the statute, as well as case law having roots that extend to a
The first argument еspoused by the defendants is that in order to be liable to a fellow employee, a corporate officer must have committed some affirmative act going beyond the scope of the employer‘s nondelegable duty to provide a safе workplace. Kaplan v. Tenth Judicial Circuit, 495 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), West v. Jessop, 339 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Defendants argue that if any affirmative acts were committed in either of these cases they did not go beyond the employer‘s nondelegable duty to provide a safe place to work. On this basis, the defendants contend that for purpоses of providing a safe workplace, the corporate officer is not an employee, but rather an “alter-ego” of the employer, deserving the benefits of the employer‘s immunity. See Zurich Insurance Co. v. Scofi, 366 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1979). To support these contentions, defendants rely on what they perceive is the legislative intent behind the statute.
Inquiry into legislative intent may begin only where the statute is ambiguous on its face. See State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). Were these provisions even slightly ambiguous, an examination of legislative history and statutory construction principles would be nеcessary. We believe, however, that the plain language of sections 440.01 and 440.11(1) precludes any further explanation of legislative intent. These statutes unambiguously impose liability on all employees for their gross negligence resulting in death or injury to their fellow еmployees. This imposition of liability is blind to corporate status. Nowhere does
The affirmative act doctrine has its roots in cases interpreting
Because of the unambiguous language used in the statute we will not here attempt to define any further legislative intent. The first rule of statutory interpretation is that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and cоnveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 1144, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1973). Accord, State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). To attempt to discern the legislative intent when the language is so plain would be both unnecessary and futile. The statute herein serves as ample evidence of what the legislature intended.6
The legislature has expressed the policy of this state to impose liability upon those employees who injure a co-employee by their grossly negligent behavior. This policy was plainly and unambiguously stated in section 440.11(1), and we are bound by it. We are further bound by the statutory definition of the term “employee,” which includes with equal clarity corporate officеrs and supervisors. The context of section 440.11(1) does not clearly require any other definition of employee. As such, the statutory definition is controlling. It would be inappropriate for this Court to read any more into section 440.11(1) than what is plainly there.
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Furthermore, we quash the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, and remand that case back to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., and ADKINS, J. (Ret.), concur.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which McDONALD, C.J., concurs.
OVERTON, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. The majority‘s interpretation of
The majority decision appears to require immediate legislative review.
McDONALD, C.J., concurs.