WILLIAM J. WEBB, JR. v. STATE OF DELAWARE
No. 467, 2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
July 10, 2024
Submitted: May 22, 2024; Court Below - Superior Court of the State of Delaware; Cr. Id Nos. 1902015015, 1904001943, & 1906000296 (N)
ORDER
This 10th day of July, 2024, after consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) William J. Webb, Jr. has appealed his convictions in the Superior Court of one count each of stalking, act of intimidation, and criminal contempt, and forty-seven counts of breach of conditions of bond. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court‘s judgment.
(2) Webb was arrested on three separate occasions in 2019. Webb‘s first arrest, on February 14, 2019, resulted from an incident reported by Patricia Burgess, the mother of Webb‘s child. Burgess, who had a no-contact order in place against
(3) In June 2019, Webb was indicted on charges stemming from the three arrests plus additional charges resulting from Webb‘s breach of the no-contact order. Thе charges included robbery first and second degree, theft of a motor vehicle, offensive touching, non-compliance with bond, act of intimidation, stalking, harassment, breach of conditions of bond, criminal contempt, and misuse of the mail. The State entered a nolle prosequi on, and the Superior Court dismissed, certain charges;1 the remaining charges were scheduled for a single trial.
(4) Webb was provided with court-appointed counsel from the Office of Defense Services (“ODS“). At a February 25, 2019 preliminary hearing in the Court of Common Pleas, Webb complained that his counsel, then Andrew J. Meyеr, was not providing effective representation. The court advised Webb he could “discuss any issues [he] had with [his] attorney,”2 after the hearing, but Webb demanded that thе court “give [him] a counsel waiver form right now”3 so that he could represent himself. Because Webb continued to interrupt the hearing, he was removed from the courtroom but continued to be represented by Meyer at the hearing. After Meyer
(5) In July 2019 the court ordered a psychological evaluation to determine whether Webb was competent to stand trial. While the results of that evaluation were pending, Webb filed a pro se “motion for self-representation.” After Webb was deemed competent to stand trial, the Superior Cоurt held a case review and addressed Webb‘s motion. At that hearing Dade Werb from the Office of Conflicts Counsel replaced Layton as Webb‘s appointed attorney. After speaking with Webb, the court determined that he wished to remain represented and considered the motion withdrawn.4
(6) Two months later, however, Webb filed a motion to disqualify Werb. The motion requested Werb‘s disqualification, in part, on the grounds that “Mr. Werb worked at the Public Defender‘s office when [d]efendant thrеatened an [a]ssociate friend of Mr. Werb‘s” and that “[Webb] ha[d] filed a lawsuit against Mr.
(7) Werb also filed a motion to withdraw as Webb‘s counsel. In the motion Werb averred that the “appointment arose because Mr. Webb had previously threatened physical harm and/or civil lawsuits upon his prior three attorneys[.]”7 The motion stated that Webb had threatened Werb: by telephone message, including а voicemail telling Werb to “go kill himself before I catch his f...cking a[...]s“; in multiple letters, that stated: “keep up your n.....d ways g[...]p and you aren‘t going to be breathing“; and with сivil lawsuits against Werb and his law firm.8 Werb also testified that Webb told him that he was fired and refused to cooperate with his efforts to represent him in any way.9 In the motion to withdraw, Werb argued that Webb had forfeited his right to appointed counsel under Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 761 (Del. 2006), a case in which this Court held that a criminal defendant‘s right to appointed counsel may be forfeited by “extremely serious misconduct.”10
(8) The Superior Court denied Webb‘s motion to disqualify and granted counsel‘s motion to withdraw. In so doing, the court told Webb that it had “probably
(9) Webb represented himself at trial and was convicted on all charges. Because Webb was convicted of felony stalking—a violent felony—and he hаd prior violent felony convictions, the State moved to declare Webb a habitual offender under
(10) On appeal, Webb argues that the Superior Court erred by “forcing Webb to proceed pro se without first engaging in a proper colloquy to determine that Webb was knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Article I, § 7 оf the Delaware Constitution.”12 The State responds that Webb did not waive, but forfeited, his right to court-appointed counsel based on his “extremely serious misconduct” toward counsel.13
(11) We agree that the question is whether Webb forfeited his right to counsel. “If a defendant‘s behavior is sufficiently egregious, it will constitute
(12) The Superior Court‘s decision not to appoint new counsel is reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion.15 An abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court‘s decision is based on “clearly unreasonable or caрricious grounds.”16
(13) In Bultron v. State, this Court held that the defendant engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” by displaying “insulting and unacceptable behavior” toward appointed counsel that was intended to “prevent the trial from going forward.”17 The defendant‘s conduct was sufficient to warrant a forfeiture even though it “fell short of violenсe or threats.”18
(14) The record here shows, and Webb does not deny, that he threatened to kill his court-appointed counsel. Webb also harassed, refusеd to cooperate with, and filed civil lawsuits against, his counsel. Webb‘s conduct was more than sufficient
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice