WEBB GOLDEN VALLEY, LLC, Respondent, Evelyn Thomson, Plaintiff, v. STATE of Minnesota, et al., Appellant, Global One Golden Valley, LLC, Appellant, Golden Valley Housing and Redevelopment Authority, Appellant.
No. A13-2044.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
July 1, 2015.
865 N.W.2d 689
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Natasha M. Karn, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant State of Minnesota.
Scott M. Hoffman, Hoffman Law Offices, Minneapolis, MN, for intervenor Global One Golden Valley, LLC.
Allen D. Barnard, John T. Sullivan, Kyle R. Hardwick, Best & Flanagan LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Golden Valley Housing and Redevelopment Authority.
Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, MN, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.
OPINION
WRIGHT, Justice.
This appeal arises from a dispute over the State of Minnesota‘s proposed conveyance of land to the Golden Valley Housing and Redevelopment Authority (“HRA“) pursuant to
I.
Appellant State of Minnesota acquired three parcels of land for use during the construction of Interstate 394. The Minnesota Department of Transportation owns the three parcels, which are referred to as Tract N, Lot 18, and the Alley Parcel. Because the State no longer needs the parcels, it plans to convey the land to the HRA, pursuant to
The HRA has an agreement to convey Tract N to a private company, Global One Golden Valley, LLC (“Global One“) after receiving the parcel from the State. Global One will build on the land an $85 million living facility (“the Project“) comprising 120 units of senior housing and 314 units of
Webb had purchased a remainder interest in the Alley Parcel from its previous owner in 2003 and also owns property adjoining Tract N to the west. In March 2013, Webb sued the State, seeking a declaratory judgment that the transfer of the three parcels from the State to the HRA violates
On July 22, 2013, the district court denied the motions to dismiss as to the Alley Parcel. The district court concluded that Webb may have a remainder interest in the parcel, giving Webb standing to challenge the transfer of the parcel to the HRA. See
On September 24, 2013, the HRA made a special appearance in the district court to move for an order directing Webb to post a surety bond, pursuant to
The court of appeals reversed both the district court‘s partial dismissal for lack of standing and the dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to pay a surety bond and remanded for further proceedings. Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State, No. A13-2044, 2014 WL 3022813, at *3-5 (Minn.App. July 7, 2014). The court of appeals held that Webb‘s interest in purchasing
We subsequently granted the petitions for further review of Global One, the State, and the HRA on both the issues of standing and the surety bond.
II.
We first address whether Webb has standing to challenge the State‘s conveyance of land pursuant to
To have standing, a party must have a sufficient stake in the controversy to seek relief from the court so that the issues before the court will be “vigorously and adequately presented.” Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007). A party has standing when (1) the party has suffered an injury-in-fact, or (2) the party is the beneficiary of a legislative enactment granting standing. Id.; Snyder‘s Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 301 Minn. 28, 32, 221 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1974). In this case, Webb must establish an injury-in-fact to have standing because
“An injury-in-fact is a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lorix, 736 N.W.2d at 624. The injury must be more than mere dissatisfaction with the State‘s interpretation of a statute. In re Complaint Against Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1992). Here, Webb must articulate a legally cognizable interest that it has suffered because of the State‘s action and that “differs from injury to the interests of other citizens generally.” Id.
Webb contends that its loss of the opportunity to bid on Tract N and Lot 18 is an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. We agree. Because Webb has demonstrated its interest in obtaining the parcels at issue, Webb has a concrete interest in bidding on the property that is distinguishable from the interests of the general public. Specifically, Webb seeks the opportunity to purchase Tract N and Lot 18 to add to its holdings in the area. Webb is not challenging the State‘s authority simply to ensure that
III.
We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering Webb to post a surety bond pursuant to
We first determine whether Webb‘s lawsuit questions the authority of the HRA. Next, we consider whether loss or damage to the public or taxpayers may result from Webb‘s lawsuit. Finally, we determine whether the public purpose definition from
A.
To qualify for a surety bond in this case, Webb‘s lawsuit must “draw[ ] in question the right, power, or authority of [the HRA] to do any act or to make or perform any contract or agreement or to undertake or enter upon the discharge of any obligations.”
In Anderly v. City of Minneapolis, we concluded that a redevelopment agency was eligible for a surety bond, even though the plaintiffs were not directly challenging the authority of the redevelopment agency. Id. at 240-41. The plaintiffs in Anderly sued the City of Minneapolis, seeking to enjoin the development of a parcel of land based on a purported wrongful issuance of a conditional use permit by the City of Minneapolis. Id. at 237. We determined that the redevelopment agency could not have entered into the development project without obtaining the conditional use permit. Id. at 240-41. Therefore, the lawsuit drew into question the authority of the agency to contract for the parcel‘s redevelopment, even though the plaintiffs had directly challenged only the City‘s issuance of the permit. Id. at 241.
Similarly, Webb‘s lawsuit challenges the State‘s authority to convey the three parcels to the HRA, thereby drawing into question the HRA‘s right to receive the land. Without the State‘s conveyance of the land to the HRA, the HRA will be precluded from moving forward with its development contract. Accordingly, this lawsuit challenges the authority of the HRA to redevelop the parcel.
B.
We next address the potential harm, if any, to the public posed by this action. The district court may order a party to post a surety bond when “the court determines that loss or damage to the public or taxpayers may result from the pendency of the action or proceeding.”
The HRA submitted an affidavit from the manager of Global One, stating that if the litigation is not resolved soon, “the Project will abruptly unravel.” The manager indicated that an investor had already pulled out of the Project, and the district court found that with further delay, “the three parcels are at risk to remain abandoned and unused.” In addition, the manager‘s affidavit and the City‘s planning documents state that construction of the Project will generate hundreds of jobs. According to the manager‘s affidavit, the ongoing litigation delays and threatens the creation of those anticipated jobs.
Webb argues, and the court of appeals held, that this evidence cannot support a finding of damage to the public because it fails to meet the definition of “public purpose” in the eminent domain statute. See
The court of appeals erred when it imported the “public purpose” definition from section 117.025 and applied it to the district court‘s determination under section 469.045 that the lawsuit may harm the public. Section 117.025, subdivision 11, defines “public purpose” for laws authorizing the exercise of eminent domain. The “public purpose” definition expressly excludes “an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health.”
Further, section 117.025 applies to “chapter [117] and any other general or special law authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain.”
Section 469.045 does not authorize the exercise of eminent domain. It allows the district court to require a party that instituted an action against a public corporation to post a surety bond.
IV.
Although we conclude that Webb had standing, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Webb to post a surety bond. Because Webb did not post the surety bond, we reinstate the district court‘s dismissal of Webb‘s lawsuit with prejudice.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
PAGE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alton Dominique FINCH, Appellant.
No. A14-0203.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
July 8, 2015.