A jury found Appellant Willie Lee Weaver guilty of the malice murder of his estranged wife Donna Weaver, two counts of aggravated stalking, and one count each of cruelty to children in the first degree and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on those guilty verdicts and sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for murder and to consecutive terms of ten years for each count of aggravated stalking, twenty years for cruelty to children, and five years for the weapons charge. A motion for new trial was denied, and Appellant appeals. *
1. Construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence, including extensive eyewitness testimony, shows that, after entry of a family violence protective order, Appellant was found after midnight outside the victim’s apartment with a knife and was arrested. Two weeks later, he was released on bond and, three days thereafter, he purchased a fish fillet knife with a 12-inch blade. The next day, Appellant followed the victim and her sister Norma Jones into a restaurant parking lot and attempted to talk with the victim before her brother intervened. The victim and Ms. Jones reported the incident at the police department, picked up the victim’s grandson from preschool, and went to a local grocery store. Appellant appeared at the store, yelled at the victim, and stabbed and slashed her multiple times, resulting in her death in the presence of her grandson. Appellant waited for police, stating that he would not hurt anyone else, that he came to do what he needed to do, that no one gets away with hurting him, and that the victim, whom he called by
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a derogatory term, deserved it because of what she did to him in court. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Prior to trial, the trial court ordered a mental evaluation of Appellant. Pursuant to that order, a forensic psychologist employed by the State examined Appellant and concluded, among other things, that he was provisionally competent to proceed to trial and to assist his attorney. Several months later, defense counsel obtained a separate evaluation by an independent psychologist, who determined that Appellant was competent to counsel with his attorney and to stand trial. The defense psychologist also noted in his report that Appellant’s scores on tests of malingering suggested that he was not putting forth his best effort, and he appeared to have been attempting to come across as more impaired than he truly was. When trial was held three months later, Appellant refused to dress for court and had to be brought in by eight deputies. Before and during voir dire, he yelled and screamed incoherently numerous times, tried to bite his attorney on the arm, and eventually had to be restrained and removed from the courtroom. He could still be heard screaming in the holding cell and was returned to the jail. He then would bite his thumb and cause it to bleed when he knew that he was being watched. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to suspend the trial after such bizarre and psychotic behavior until a mental evaluation could ascertain that he was competent to proceed.
A motion for a continuance is always addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and so is a request for a mental evaluation where, as here, a special plea of incompetence has not been filed.
Watkins v. State,
Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to find that Appellant’s courtroom behavior was actually “not evidence of incompetence but the very [malingering] that the [defense psychologist] warned [about] . ...”
Thaxton v. State,
While there was testimony that [Appellant] was competent to stand trial, there was no testimony that he was incompetent. . .. The fact that the court allowed the trial to go forward after testimony concerning [Appellant’s competency is in effect a sub silentio finding that he was competent.
Harris v. State,
3. Appellant urges that the trial court violated his federal constitutional right to be present for his jury trial by failing to determine properly whether he waived that right.
As the Supreme Court of the United States held in
Illinois v. Allen,
“after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently *543 with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” [Cit.]
State v. Fletcher,
Upon request by the trial court, defense counsel repeatedly visited Appellant in jail and informed the court that Appellant did not wish to appear in the courtroom, even when the court met just two doors down from his cell. See
Richards v. State,
The conduct of a defendant may be such that either the initial warning or returning him to the courtroom “would be a totally useless act.”
State v. Fletcher,
supra at 501. We also “do not believe it would be reasonable to impose upon a trial judge the duty to make moment-by-moment inquiries as to whether the defendant’s state is such that a [return to the courtroom] could be [allowed].”
State v. Fletcher,
supra. Instead, the accused’s right to be present at all stages of trial “can be waived if the accused’s counsel makes the waiver in the accused’s presence, or with his or her express authority, or if the accused subsequently acquiesces to the waiver made by counsel. [Cits.]”
Williams v. State,
The
Allen
court did not set forth specific requirements for inviting a disruptive defendant to reclaim his right to be present.
State v. Chapple,
[L]ower courts have interpreted this right to require varying degrees of trial court involvement in the reclamation. We hold that the trial court’s requirement that defense counsel speak with the defendant and report back to the court was appropriate in these circumstances and adequate to give the defendant an opportunity to reclaim his right to return. [In fact,] [i]t might be inappropriate for a trial court to insinuate into a decision to return and thus communication through defense counsel is preferable.
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State v. Chapple,
supra at 1033 (I). See also
Bailey v. State,
4. Appellant further contends that, after being arrested and informed during custodial interrogation of his rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona,
Resolution of this issue depends upon whether Appellant “articulated a ‘desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.’ ”
Perez v. State,
Soon afterwards, Appellant stated, “I don’t want to say nothing. There’s just so much to say.” The GBI agent interpreted this statement to mean that “there was so much to say that maybe he didn’t want to get into it at that point or didn’t know where to start . . . .” “Viewed in this context, the statement T [don’t want to] say[ ] nothing’ is plainly not an attempt to cut off questioning .. ..”
Reeves v. State,
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
The crimes occurred on July 21 and August 9, 2005, and the grand jury returned an indictment on November 14, 2005. The guilty verdicts were returned on August 24, 2006, and the trial court entered the judgments of conviction and sentences on August 30, 2006. The motion for new trial was filed on September 20,2006, amended on January 4, 2010, and denied on February 10, 2010. Appellant filed the notice of appeal on March 5, 2010. The case was docketed in this Court for the January 2011 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.