Watson v. WatsonWatson v. Watson
DECISION
Rendered on October 12, 2023
On brief: Dougherty, Hanneman & Piccin, LLC, and Douglas B. Dougherty, for appellee. Argued: Douglas B. Dougherty.
On brief: Grossman Law Offices, Tracy A. Younkin, and John H. Cousins, IV, for appellant. Argued: Tracy A. Younkin.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Division of Domestic Relations
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jesse L. Watson, now known as Jesse L. Lee (“Lee”), appeals from the November 4, 2022 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, ruling on objections filed by Lee and plaintiff-appellee, Adam T. Watson (“Watson”), to a magistrate’s decision resolving motions filed by the parties. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Watson and Lee were married on August 23, 2003 and had three children together. On August 24, 2016, Watson filed a complaint for divorce; Lee filed an answer
A. Relevant details of the shared parenting plan
{¶ 3} The shared parenting plan designated both Lee and Watson as the residential parent and legal custodian of the children, and designated Lee as the residential parent for school placement purposes. It contained a detailed parenting time schedule, including specific provisions for the two older children and the youngest child, who was 19 months old when the plan was adopted, as well as detailed provisions regarding parenting time on holidays and birthdays, and for vacations and other special days.
{¶ 4} As relevant to this appeal, the shared parenting plan provided that Lee and Watson would discuss major decisions and share information regarding the children, including the children’s medical care and activities. The children were to continue to be treated by their existing pediatrician and the parties were to mutually select any additional healthcare providers. Lee was given responsibility for scheduling routine appointments and informing Watson of those appointments. The plan also provided the parties would mutually select the children’s extracurricular activities and that Lee would enroll the children in such activities. In the event of a disagreement about a major decision involving the children, including decisions regarding medical care and extracurricular activities, the plan provided the parties would work together to resolve the dispute; if they were unable to resolve the dispute the plan required them to “follow the recommendation of the respective professional involved in the decision, i.e., the children’s pediatrician, the children’s teachers, etc.” (Shared Parenting Plan at 6.)
{¶ 5} Watson was ordered to pay child support of $1,314 per month until August 31, 2019, and then to pay $1,291 per month beginning September 1, 2019. The plan further provided that Watson would pay 55 percent of the children’s extracurricular activity expenses and Lee would pay 45 percent of those expenses.
B. Post-decree motions filed by the parties
{¶ 6} On December 17, 2018, Watson moved to reallocate parental rights and responsibilities, seeking modifications to the shared parenting plan. On February 8, 2019,
{¶ 7} The trial court appointed Eimear Bahnson as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the children; Bahnson had previously served as GAL during the divorce proceedings. The GAL issued a report recommending certain modifications to the shared parenting plan. The trial court also appointed Dr. Farshid Afsarifard to conduct psychological examinations of Lee and Watson for purposes of custody evaluation. Dr. Afsarifard issued a report recommending that shared parenting continue on a modified schedule.
C. Hearing on post-decree motions
{¶ 8} On August 4 through 6, 2021, a magistrate of the trial court conducted a hearing on Lee’s October 31, 2019 motions to modify child support and for attorney fees and litigation expenses, Watson’s January 2, 2020 motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities, Lee’s January 13, 2020 motion to modify the shared parenting plan, and Watson’s May 5, 2020 motion for contempt. The magistrate heard testimony from Lee, Watson, and Watson’s new wife.1 The magistrate also heard testimony from the GAL, Dr. Afsarifard, Lee’s former counselor, Lee’s current psychologist, and a counselor who previously worked with the children. Following the hearing, the parties submitted written closing arguments.
D. Magistrate’s decision
{¶ 9} Following the hearing, the magistrate issued a decision addressing the five motions. The magistrate noted that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. With regard to Watson’s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities and
{¶ 10} The magistrate granted in part Lee’s motion to modify child support and increased the child support award. Using Watson’s 2020 income and Lee’s 2021 monthly income, the magistrate calculated Watson’s child support obligation as of March 30, 2021 to be $1,749.52 per month.2 The magistrate noted that despite their combined income exceeding the maximum annual income listed on the basic child support schedule, the parties did not adjust the original child support calculation based on excess income. The magistrate further noted that neither party argued for such an adjustment. Therefore, the magistrate found the child support amount calculated based on the guideline worksheet was in the best interests of the children and the parties. The magistrate further found it was not in the children’s best interest to modify the allocation of child-related expenses from the 55-45 percent ratio contained in the shared parenting plan.
{¶ 11} The magistrate denied Watson’s motion for contempt, finding he failed to prove his contempt claim by clear and convincing evidence. The magistrate also denied Lee’s motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses, concluding neither party acted in bad faith and that certain changes to the shared parenting plan were necessary.
E. Objections to the magistrate’s decision and trial court’s decision on objections
{¶ 12} Both Lee and Watson filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court conducted a hearing on the objections on October 17, 2022. Following the hearing, on November 4, 2022, the trial court issued a decision fully granting some of the objections, granting in part other objections, and denying the remaining objections. As relevant to this appeal, the trial court denied Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred in determining how
{¶ 13} The trial court granted Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred in calculating the child support amount. Noting that the magistrate did not file a child support worksheet with the decision, the trial court conducted its own calculation using the child support worksheet and determined Watson’s child support obligation as of January 1, 2022 to be $2,795.12 per month. Although the trial court recalculated the child support obligation, it found the magistrate did not err by not extrapolating the child support award based on the parties’ total income exceeding the maximum annual income listed on the basic child support schedule. The trial court denied Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred by not granting her request for attorney fees, concluding the magistrate considered the proper factors in denying Lee’s request for attorney fees and litigation expenses.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 14} Lee appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred, abused its discretion, and ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence to modify the existing agreed shared parenting plan with regard to medical decision-making authority for the parties’ minor children.
[II.] The trial court erred, abused its discretion, and ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence and not in the best interest of the children in determining how the children are enrolled in extracurricular activities and the allocation of extracurricular expenses between the parties. [III.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion and ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence in determining plaintiff-appellee’s income and not extrapolating for purposes of child support.
[IV.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to award attorney fees and litigation expenses.
III. Analysis
A. Standard of review
{¶ 15} When ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision, a trial court must “undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.”
B. Whether the trial court erred by modifying the shared parenting plan regarding medical decision-making and extracurricular activities
{¶ 16} In her first assignment of error, Lee argues the trial court erred by modifying the shared parenting plan with respect to final decision-making authority regarding the children’s medical care. Similarly, in her second assignment of error, Lee argues the trial
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} The parties presented evidence at the hearing regarding the children’s medical conditions, some of which developed or were diagnosed during and after the divorce proceedings, and the parties’ management of those conditions. During the parties’ marriage and after the shared parenting plan was in place, Lee took the children to most of their medical appointments and to all dental and orthodontic appointments.3 Watson admitted he had not attended any medical appointments related to the oldest child’s condition but asserted he had attended several appointments with the middle child.
{¶ 19} The parties disagreed about aspects of the children’s mental health care, particularly whether the children needed to continue in counseling after the divorce decree and the appropriate counselor or therapist. Lee testified the children’s pediatrician recommended they be assessed and possibly treated by the practice’s in-house psychologist. The children’s former counselor advised against changing the children to a different therapist because the transition could have been difficult for them. Lee believed that under the shared parenting plan the parties were required to follow the
{¶ 20} Watson claimed Lee sometimes manipulated the scheduling of the children’s medical appointments to prevent them from occurring during his parenting time, specifically testifying about a time that one of the children’s medical appointments was scheduled during his parenting time and Lee rescheduled the appointment so it would be during her parenting time. Watson asserted he felt he could not trust Lee’s decision-making with regard to the children’s medical care. Lee testified she tried to accurately convey the information she received from the children’s medical providers and introduced a sample of the messages she had sent to Watson regarding the children’s medical appointments. Lee believed Watson did not regularly review her messages about the children’s medical care. Lee claimed that other than the disagreement about counseling she did not recall Watson objecting to her decisions related to the children’s medical care. Lee contended she should be the final decision-maker regarding the children’s medical care based on her history of managing the children’s medical care if the court chose to modify the shared parenting plan.
{¶ 21} The GAL testified that when speaking to the children’s medical providers there was an “underlying theme” that Lee “had no issue undermining [Watson] in front of the children at [medical] appointments.” (Aug. 6, 2021 Tr. at 581.) The GAL further testified that she tended to receive different information from the medical providers than she heard from Lee. The GAL was concerned that Lee misinterpreted recommendations from professionals, although she believed Lee did not do so intentionally. Because the children had “health issues that need to be communicated properly,” the GAL recommended Watson be given final medical decision-making authority in the event of an unresolvable dispute. (Aug. 6, 2021 Tr. at 581.)
{¶ 22} With respect to extracurricular activities, there was evidence that each of the children was involved in multiple activities, including team sports. Both Lee and Watson testified about Lee’s frequent travel with the children to St. Albans, West Virginia, where
{¶ 23} The magistrate’s decision adopted the GAL’s recommendations regarding the children’s medical care, including that in the event of a dispute, each parent would have the option to obtain a second opinion, and that if after obtaining a second opinion no decision could be reached, Watson would have the final decision-making authority. The magistrate’s decision also adopted the GAL’s recommendations regarding extracurricular activities, including that neither parent could enroll a child in an activity without consent of the other parent and that if the parents could not reach an agreement, either parent could submit the issue to the court for a final decision. The magistrate’s decision did not modify the existing provision for paying the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities, which provided that Watson was responsible for 55 percent of the costs and Lee was responsible for 45 percent of the costs.
{¶ 24} The trial court denied Lee’s objection to the magistrate’s adoption of the GAL’s recommendation regarding the children’s medical care, which gave Watson final decision-making authority regarding the children’s medical care. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Lee’s objection to the magistrate’s adoption of the GAL’s recommendation regarding the children’s extracurricular activities. The trial court modified the magistrate’s decision to provide that if the parties could not reach an agreement, each parent could enroll a child in one extracurricular activity and any other activities would have to be by mutual agreement or the child could not be enrolled. The trial court retained the 55-45 percent division of extracurricular activity expenses.
{¶ 26} Lee’s arguments on appeal are largely a reiteration of her arguments from the hearing, asserting the evidence supports her claims and that Watson failed to support his claims. However, as explained above, we review the trial court’s decision on the parties’ objections to the magistrate’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. “When applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Byers v. Robinson, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-204, 2008-Ohio-4833, 61. “An abuse of discretion will not be found when the reviewing court simply could maintain a different opinion were it deciding the issue de novo.” Id., quoting Peterson v. Crockett Constr., Inc., 7th Dist. No. 99-CO-2 (Dec. 7, 1999). In this case, the magistrate considered the evidence presented at the hearing and addressed the appropriate factors when determining the children’s best interests. Although Lee clearly disagrees with the magistrate’s conclusions and the trial court’s adoption of those conclusions, she has failed to demonstrate the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in adopting the magistrate’s decision and modifying the shared parenting plan.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we overrule Lee’s first and second assignments of error.
{¶ 28} In her third assignment of error, Lee proffers two arguments. First, she asserts the trial court erred in determining Watson’s income for purposes of calculating child support. Second, she claims the trial court erred by not extrapolating the child support obligation because the parties’ combined income exceeded the maximum amount under the basic child support schedule.
{¶ 29} Lee sought a modification of Watson’s child support obligation. Generally, we review child support issues for abuse of discretion.5 Boone v. Holmes, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-449, 2015-Ohio-2242, ¶ 6. Accordingly, “[u]nless [a] trial court’s modification of its original support award was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable, we will not overturn its determination on appeal.” Id. See Bates v. Bates, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-137, 2005-Ohio-3374, ¶ 20 (“A trial court’s modification of a prior child support order is within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”).
{¶ 30} Watson testified he was employed as a veterinary radiologist at MedVet and was paid on a production basis, rather than a salary or an hourly wage. Watson introduced evidence of his income from his employment with MedVet and from a side business, indicating he had total income of $481,036.00 in 2018, $484,700.00 in 2019, and $574,077.00 in 2020. Lee introduced a copy of Watson’s paystub from June 30, 2021, establishing Watson earned $343,874.00 from MedVet for the first half of that year. When asked whether he expected to receive similar income in the second half of the year, Watson testified it was hard to determine because his income was based on production and his caseload fluctuated. Lee began working full-time as a medical data review manager in March 2021, earning a fixed salary of $10,208.34 per month.
{¶ 31} The magistrate’s decision noted that if Watson matched his year-to-date income for the remainder of 2021, he would have a salary of $687,749.86 for the year. Based on Watson’s testimony that he was paid based on production, however, the
{¶ 32} For purposes of calculating child support, a fully employed parent’s income is defined as gross income.
{¶ 33} The trial court noted that Watson’s 2020 income was “substantially similar” to the three-year average from 2018 through 2020. (Nov. 4, 2022 Jgmt. Entry on Objs. at 8.) This suggests the trial court considered averaging Watson’s income under
{¶ 34} Lee further argues the trial court erred by not extrapolating the child support obligation beyond the maximum amount contained in the basic child support schedule. Under
{¶ 35} In this case, the trial court determined the parties had a combined adjusted annual gross income of $691,559.08. Because this exceeded the maximum guideline income amount under the basic child support schedule, the trial court was required to compute a child support obligation no less than the maximum amount contained in the basic child support schedule. In completing its child support worksheet, the trial court used the combined child support obligation equal to the maximum amount under the basic child support schedule for a family with three children (i.e., $40,760.00). Lee argues the trial court erred by not extrapolating the child support obligation beyond the maximum amount contained in the basic child support schedule.
{¶ 36} This court recently explained the application of
The law * * * steers a trial court in setting child support levels for a child of higher income parents to make a calculation of the basic worksheet amount. That basic amount sets a preliminary floor for the support obligation, which may be adjusted downward only on a written determination, supported by findings, that such an amount would be “unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, obligor, or oblige[e].” The preliminary floor is not a preliminary cap, however, and the court is to set the support level “on a case-by-case basis and shall consider the needs and the standard of living” of the child and the parents.
Moore v. Moore, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-276, 2022-Ohio-1862, ¶ 76, quoting former
{¶ 37} Unlike Moore, where the trial court effectively concluded it was required to extrapolate the child support obligation based on the parties’ excess income, Lee asserts the trial court erred in the present case because it did not extrapolate despite the parties exceeding the maximum annual income amount.
{¶ 38} The Moore decision warned against rote extrapolation in high-income cases, citing an Eighth District Court of Appeals decision authored by then-Judge (now-Justice) Stewart. Moore at ¶ 89. Rather than mechanically applying the percentages from the child support schedule to the parents’ excess income, the trial court must engage in a case-by-case determination based on the needs and standard of living of the children and parents. Id.
{¶ 39} The parties presented very little evidence at the hearing regarding the children’s financial needs and standard of living, and the magistrate noted that Lee “made no real mention of her motion for child support until her closing.” (Mag.’s Decision at 12.) The magistrate further noted the parties did not adjust the child support amount upward in the shared parenting plan based on excess income and concluded that applying the maximum guideline amount when calculating child support was in the best interest of the children and the parties. The trial court found the magistrate did not err by not extrapolating the child support obligation, thereby effectively adopting the magistrate’s conclusion that it was not necessary to extrapolate to meet the needs and standard of living of the children and the parties.
{¶ 40} On appeal, Lee claims there is a great disparity of income between herself and Watson. However, other than broadly asserting the children would experience a different lifestyle in her home as compared to Watson’s home due to that disparity, Lee cites nothing to establish that the trial court failed to consider the needs and standard of living of the children or the parties when making its child support award. Moreover, in her own child support worksheet, attached to her post-hearing brief, Lee did not extrapolate the child
{¶ 41} Accordingly, we overrule Lee’s third assignment of error.
D. Whether the trial court erred by denying Lee’s motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses
{¶ 42} In her fourth assignment of error, Lee asserts the trial court erred by denying her motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses.
{¶ 43} Lee sought attorney fees and litigation expenses under
{¶ 44} At the hearing, Lee testified the proceedings had been a financial hardship on her. She introduced evidence that she had incurred $122,692.78 in legal fees and expenses, and testified she believed those fees and expenses to be reasonable and appropriate. Watson stipulated that Lee’s attorney charged a reasonable rate and that the attorney fees were reasonable and necessary. Watson also introduced evidence of his own attorney fees and expenses, amounting to $81,101.98.
{¶ 46} On appeal, Lee contests the magistrate’s conclusion that neither party acted in bad faith, alleging Watson sought to modify the shared parenting plan only nine months after the divorce decree was entered. She claims Watson made unsupported allegations against her during litigation. Lee also cites Watson’s income advantage and claims he used his greater financial resources to extend the litigation.
{¶ 47} Disparity in income is one factor the trial court may consider when determining a motion for attorney fees under
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Lee’s four assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations.
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.