Junior WALKER, Tahera Bullen-Walker, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their infant children T.W. and N.W., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Sharon Rogers, Deputy Director for Brooklyn Field Office, Zone E, New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, Stacey Robinson, a Caseworker for the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, Jacqueline McKnight, Assistant Commissioner Brooklyn, New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, Burton Lewis, Supervisor for the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, Natarsky Louissaint, Caseworker for the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, Gladys White, a Caseworker Supervisor for the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, Karen Sawyer-Barro, Supervisor for the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, John Mattingly, former Commissioner of the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-4576-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 2, 2015.
627 Fed. Appx. 74
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, ROBERT D. SACK, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed all of Whelehan‘s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. We thus AFFIRM the March 17, 2014 and August 29, 2014 orders of the District Court.
Kathy A. Polias, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Susan P. Greenberg, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Junior Walker and Tahera Bullen-Walker, on behalf of themselves and their infant children, T.W. and N.W. (“Plaintiffs“), appeal from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellants, the City of New York and various officers and employees of the New York City Administration for Children‘s Services (“ACS“) (collectively, “Defendants“), on Plaintiffs’
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of summary judgment. See Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.2009). Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“[I]t is well settled that child protective services workers are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct during the course of abuse investigations.” Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.1999). In deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts conduct a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the facts before the court establish the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). In analyzing the second prong, the standard is one of objective reasonableness. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
We have “adopted a standard governing case workers which reflects the recognized need for unusual deference in the abuse investigation context.” Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 104. Under that deferential standard, “[a]n investigation passes constitu-
We agree with the district court that the record is devoid of evidence that Defendants perjured themselves or manufactured false evidence. None of the alleged misstatements or inconsistencies identified by Plaintiffs rises to the level of a due process violation. Cf. Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir.2010) (“[T]his Court has found no constitutional violation where caseworkers allegedly committed ‘sins of commission and omission in what they told and failed to tell ... the Family Court Judge.‘” (quoting van Emrik v. Chemung Cty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir.1990))). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural due process claims.1
We likewise affirm the district court‘s grant of qualified immunity with respect to the children‘s Fourth Amendment seizure claims. The children were removed pursuant to Family Court orders; and the individuals effecting their removal were thus entitled to qualified immunity absent “a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement” in procuring the removal orders. Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 146 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence to suggest that the alleged misstatements resulted from more than mere negligence.
Turning to Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims, we note that the law in our Circuit is unsettled as to whether child removal proceedings can give rise to a federal claim for malicious prosecution of a parent. See, e.g., Estiverne v. Esernio-Jenssen, 833 F.Supp.2d 356, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). We need not resolve this question at present, however, as Plaintiffs base their malicious prosecution claims on the same allegations of fabricated evidence that form the basis of their due process claims. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, no factual questions remain with respect to whether Mr. Walker was maliciously prosecuted.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, arguing that Mr. Walker‘s objections to the ACS investigation motivated Defendants’ conduct. Even if there were sufficient evidence to support such an inference of retaliatory intent in this case (an issue we do not reach), the existence of a “reasonable basis” for the removal proceedings would
We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.