AMANDA VO, individually and on behalf of a putative class, Plaintiff, v. VSP RETAIL DEVELOPMENT HOLDING, INC., Defendant.
19 C 7187
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
March 25, 2020
Charles P. Kocoras
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant VSP Retail Development Holding, Inc.‘s (“VSP“) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Amanda Vo‘s (“Vo“) class action complaint pursuant to
STATEMENT
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the following facts from the complaint.1 Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). All reasonable inferences are drawn in Vo‘s favor. League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014).
While visiting VSP‘s website in Illinois, Vo utilized the Virtual Try-On software. The software scanned Vo‘s face and used the information regarding her facial geometry without gaining her informed, written consent or making any disclosures regarding such capture and collection of her biometric information. Moreover, VSP failed to make available any written policy regarding the retention and destruction of the biometric information.
Based on these events, Vo filed a complaint against VSP in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Chancery Division), alleging a violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA“),
A motion to dismiss pursuant to
To give context to the issues raised in the motion to dismiss, the Court must begin with a brief overview of BIPA. In order to protect individuals’ biometric identification, the Illinois General Assembly enacted BIPA, which prohibits a private entity from collecting, capturing, purchasing, receiving through trade, or otherwise obtaining an individual‘s biometric identifier or biometric information absent his or her informed, written consent.
According to BIPA, scans of facial geometry-such as those at issue here-are considered biometric identifiers.
To fall under BIPA‘s health care exemption, the biometric information obtained must either: (1) be obtained from a patient in a health care setting, or (2) be collected, used, or stored in connection with healthcare treatment, payment, or operations under HIPAA. Id. Turning to the first prong, HIPAA defines “health care” to include:
- Preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care, and counseling, service, assessment, or procedure with respect to the physical or mental condition, or functional status, of an individual or that affects the structure or function of the body; and
- Sale or dispensing of a drug, device, equipment, or other item in accordance with a prescription.
Vo claims that she was not a patient in a health care setting because “she never requested an eye exam, never received an eye exam, never provided Defendant with a prescription for corrective lenses, never received any such prescription, and never requested or received any sort of medical treatment or advice that could reasonably be construed as ‘health care.‘” 1:19-cv-7187, Dkt. 23, Pg. 11. However, this assertion is unavailing for two reasons. First, as noted above, the Virtual Try-On software provides a health care service by ensuring the appropriate fit and positioning of corrective eyewear. Therefore, Vo did receive a health care service from VSP. Second, even if Vo did not proceed past the Virtual Try-On software to the eye exam and prescription
Given the Court‘s finding that Vo‘s facial geometry was obtained as a patient in a health care setting, the biometric identifiers at issue fall within BIPA‘s health care exemption. As such, VSP cannot be held liable under BIPA for their collection or use. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to dismiss on this basis. We need not reach the arguments related to HIPAA preemption or the applicability of the “Terms of Use,” as this issue is dispositive. Additionally, the Court finds that amending the BIPA claim asserted would be futile, as this scenario falls outside of BIPA‘s scope. Thus, we deny Vo‘s request to file an amended complaint. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2015).
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss the complaint. It is so ordered.
Dated: 3/25/2020
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
