Juan Carlos Vivar v. Samantha Jackson Dilts, M.D., et al.
Case No. 82, Sept. Term, 2025
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND
Opinion filed on July 8, 2026
by Berger, J.
REPORTED
Pursuant to the plain language of
DEATH – ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH – RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES – CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
The requirement that a use plaintiff file a Complaint or motion to intervene within the statutory limitations period is a condition precedent to maintaining suit. Failure to act prior to the statutory deadline extinguishes a use plaintiff‘s claim, therefore, the relation back doctrine cannot be applied to render a motion to intervene timely.
Case No. C-16-CV-23-004371
Berger,
Tang,
Kenney, James A., III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Berger, J.
Filed: July 8, 2026
2026.07.08 ‘00‘04- 15:13:02 Gregory Hilton, Clerk
On August 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a statement of claim, including a wrongful death claim, with the Maryland Healthcare Alternative Dispute Resolution Office (“HCADRO“) against the attending physician, Samantha Jackson Dilts, M.D. (“Dr. Dilts“), PM Pediatrics Management Group, LLC, and PM Pediatrics of Maryland, LLC (collectively, “Appellee-Defendants“). That same day, Ms. Perez waived arbitration. Thereafter, and pursuant to the relevant statute, Ms. Perez filed the present action in the Circuit Court for Prince George‘s County on September 22, 2023, in which she named Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff. Mr. Vivar was served with the Complaint and requisite notice on September 26, 2023. On June 7, 2024, Mr. Vivar filed the instant Motion to Intervene. The circuit court denied Mr. Vivar‘s Motion to Intervene on February 11, 2025. This appeal followed.
- Whether the circuit court erred by denying Mr. Vivar‘s Motion to Intervene as untimely under
Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2) . - Whether, provided that the previous question is answered in the affirmative, good cause was shown to excuse Mr. Vivar‘s late filing under
Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(3) .
For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the negative and, therefore, do not reach the second question. We, therefore, affirm.
BACKGROUND
Alex‘s Death and the Initiation of the Instant Action3
In August 2020, Alex, who had a history of chronic constipation, suffered from an episode of severe abdominal pain and constipation. On August 28, 2020, after Alex‘s constipation had continued for approximately two weeks, Ms. Perez took Alex to PM Pediatrics in Greenbelt, Maryland. After an enema was administered, the attending
The next morning, Alex began throwing up and having diarrhea. Ms. Perez left Alex in the bathroom to get him a glass of water. When Ms. Perez returned, she found Alex unresponsive on the floor. Ms. Perez called 911 and Alex was transported to the hospital where he was diagnosed as having suffered from cardiac arrest and gastrointestinal bleeding. On August 30, 2020, Alex passed away at the age of nine. According to the autopsy report, Alex‘s cause of death was complications of bowel obstruction due to congenital constipation.
On August 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a medical malpractice claim stemming from Alex‘s death against Appellee-Defendants in the HCADRO. That same day, Ms. Perez filed an Election to Waive Arbitration pursuant to
On September 22, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a Complaint in the circuit court naming Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff.5 The Complaint contains three causes of action: negligence,
Mr. Vivar‘s Motion to Intervene
According to Mr. Vivar, he attempted to file a formal motion to intervene at the circuit court on October 19, 2023, but the clerk refused his motion. Mr. Vivar claims that the clerk printed out a “Case Summary” showing that Mr. Vivar was already listed as a plaintiff in the action who was represented by counsel, namely the same counsel representing Ms. Perez. Thereafter, Mr. Vivar mailed the draft motion to intervene to Ms. Perez‘s counsel.
On November 1, 2023, Ms. Perez‘s counsel called Mr. Vivar to “allay any confusion” that Mr. Vivar had concerning his rights as a use plaintiff. According to Ms. Perez‘s counsel, he informed Mr. Vivar that he did not and would not represent him in the pending matter. Additionally, Ms. Perez‘s counsel explained to Mr. Vivar what a use plaintiff is and informed him that he would have to formally intervene if he wished to participate in the action, directing him to the legal options outlined in the notice letter served upon him.
Ms. Perez contended that she complied with
Appellee-Defendants argued that, irrespective of the served notice deadline, Mr. Vivar was precluded from participating in the suit as a party plaintiff because he failed to file a Complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline, August 30, 2023. Mr. Vivar agreed with Appellee-Defendants that, if a plain language interpretation of
The Circuit Court‘s Ruling
On February 11, 2025, the circuit court denied Mr. Vivar‘s Motion to Intervene. Reading from
file [with] the clerk of court in which this action is pending a motion to intervene in the action in accordance with the Maryland rules no later than the earlier of one, the applicable deadline stated in 3-904(g), which is the statute of limitations, and section 5-201(a), which is regarding a disability, or 30 days after being served with the complaint and [the Rule 15-1001] notice.
The circuit court proceeded to discuss the rule‘s waiver by inaction provision,
If a use plaintiff who is served with the complaint and notice . . . does not file a motion to intervene by the served notice deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the
action or claim any recovery unless for good cause shown the Court excuses the late filing. So (e)(3) is really broken up into two sections. One, if the notice of the motion to intervene is not filed by the served notice deadline, then the Court can excuse the late filing if good cause is shown. However, that sentence ends at, the use Plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim any recovery unless for good cause shown the Court excuses the late filing, period.
The next sentence is applicable here. The Court may not excuse the late filing if the statutory deadline is not met. Statutory deadline in this particular case is August 30th, 2023.
Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that, even if it credited Mr. Vivar‘s assertion that he had tried to file a motion to intervene on October 19, 2023, the Motion to Intervene must still be denied because it was filed after the statutory deadline of August 30, 2023. Mr. Vivar noted a timely appeal. We shall provide additional facts as necessary in our forthcoming analysis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a circuit court‘s decision on a motion to intervene for abuse of discretion. WAMCO, Inc. v. Northeast 400, LLC, 251 Md. App. 196, 205 (2021) (citing Maryland-Nat‘l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm‘n v. Town of Washington Grove, 408 Md. 37, 64 (2009)). A circuit court abuses its discretion “when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.” WAMCO, Inc., 251 Md. App. at 205 (quoting Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 201 (2020)). Questions of law, such as statutory construction and
DISCUSSION
I. The circuit court did not err in denying Mr. Vivar‘s motion to intervene.
On appeal -- as he did before the circuit court -- Mr. Vivar concedes that his Motion to Intervene was untimely under
A. The legal landscape of wrongful death actions in Maryland
To begin, we turn briefly to the history of Maryland‘s wrongful death statute. As explained in Carter,
“[t]he common law not only denied a tort recovery for injury once the tort victim had died, it also refused to recognize any new and independent cause of action in the victim‘s dependents or heirs for their own loss at his [or her] death.” Walker v. Essex, 318 Md. 516, 522, 569 A.2d 645, 648 (1990) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)). In 1846, to counter this harsh rule, the English legislature created a cause of action for wrongful death, known as Lord Campbell‘s Act, which required a wrongful death suit to be brought by the executor or administrator of the estate for the use of the parties named in the complaint. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23, 569 A.2d at 648. The purpose of Lord Campbell‘s Act was “to compensate the families of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another person[,]” and the measure of damages was based on the loss sustained by the parties on whose behalf the action was brought. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 343, 65 A. 49, 53 (1906). Subsequently, every American state adopted its own wrongful death statute, with many states requiring the suit to be brought by the executor, administrator, or personal representative of the
deceased person‘s estate. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23, 569 A.2d at 648.
Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 439 Md. 333, 361 (2014).
Maryland adopted its wrongful death statute, bearing close resemblance to Lord Campbell‘s Act, in 1852. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23. Notably, under Maryland‘s statute, unlike under the English law, a wrongful death action “is brought in the name of a person entitled to recover, and to the use of all such parties who may have an interest.” Id. at 523. “It follows then, based on the history of the wrongful death cause of action, that a beneficiary (or a personal representative with an interest) would bring the suit for the use of the other parties in interest.” Carter, 439 Md. at 362.
Maryland‘s wrongful death statute is codified in Sections 3-901 through 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Critical to our resolution of the present case,
(a)(1) [With exceptions that do not apply here], an action under this subtitle shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased person.
. . .
(c)(1) In an action under this subtitle, damages may be awarded to all beneficiaries proportioned to the injury resulting from the wrongful death.
(2) Subject to
§ 11-108(d)(2) of this article , the amount recovered shall be divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict.(d) The damages awarded under subsection (c) of this section are not limited or restricted by the “pecuniary loss” or
“pecuniary benefit” rule but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable for the death of: . . .
(2) A minor child;
. . .
(f) Only one action under this subtitle lies in respect to the death of a person.
(g)(1) [With exceptions that do not apply here], an action under this subtitle shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person.
. . .
The so-called “one action rule” embodied in
The procedure for providing notice to use plaintiffs and the subsequent joinder of use plaintiffs is delineated in
(a) Applicability. This Rule applies to an action involving a claim for damages for wrongful death.
(b) Plaintiff. If the wrongful act occurred in this State, all persons who are or may be entitled by law to damages by reason of the wrongful death shall be named as plaintiffs whether or not they join in the action. The words “to the use of” shall precede the name of any person named as a plaintiff who does not join in the action.
(c) Notice to Use Plaintiffs. The party bringing the action shall mail a copy of the complaint by certified mail to any use plaintiff at the use plaintiff‘s last known address. Proof of mailing shall be filed as provided in
Rule 2-126 .(d) Complaint. In addition to complying with
Rules 2-303 through 2-305 , the complaint shall state the relationship of each plaintiff to the decedent whose death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act.
Id. at 364 (quoting
The conclusions drawn from the case law interpreting
Rule 15-1001 (prior to Muti) can be summarized in two general propositions: (1)Maryland Rule 15-1001(b) did not require formal joinder; and (2)Maryland Rule 15-1001 was more than just a notice rule because use plaintiffs are real parties in interest whose interests must be acknowledged and protected throughout the litigation.
Carter, 439 Md. at 364-65 (citing Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 418 Md. 400, 422 (2011) (superseded by
[t]he first affirmative directive to use plaintiffs explaining how to join in a wrongful death action occurred in [the Supreme Court of Maryland‘s] 2012 opinion in Muti. In that case, [the] Court undertook the task of clarifying the case law on use plaintiffs. In a section entitled “Some Considered Dicta,” the majority opinion explained the standard for a named use plaintiff to join in the wrongful death action when it stated:
Rule 15-1001(b) distinguishes between those beneficiaries who join in the action for damages and those, the use plaintiffs, who do not. Use plaintiffs who wish to assert their respective claims for damages must timely join the action by indicating to the court and to the original parties in some clear fashion that they are claiming their “share.” Ordinarily, this is done by intervening.
Carter, 439 Md. at 367 (quoting Muti, 426 Md. at 384).
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Committee (“Rules Committee“) “closed th[e] door” for “interpretation [of] the precise manner by which a use plaintiff could clearly claim [their] share” by recommending amendment to
Effective January 1, 2013, “[t]he new version of []
(c) Complaint. The complaint shall state (1) the relationship of each plaintiff to the decedent whose death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act, (2) the last known address of each use plaintiff, and (3) that the party bringing the action conducted a good faith and reasonably diligent effort to identify, locate, and name as use plaintiffs all individuals who might qualify as use plaintiffs. The court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to join all use plaintiffs if the court finds that the party bringing the action made such a good faith and reasonably diligent effort.
(d) Notice to Use Plaintiff. The party bringing the action shall serve a copy of the complaint on each use plaintiff pursuant to
Rule 2-121 . The complaint shall be accompanied by a notice in substantially the following form:[Caption of case]
NOTICE TO [Name of Use Plaintiff]
You may have a right under Maryland law to claim an award of damages in this action. You should consult
Maryland Code, § 3-904 of the Courts Article for eligibility requirements. Only one action on behalf of all individuals entitled to make a claim is permitted. If you decide to make a claim, you must file with the clerk of court in which this action is pending a motion to intervene in the action in accordance with the Maryland Rules no later than the earlier of (1) the applicable deadline stated in§ 3-904(g) and§ 5-201(a) of the Courts Article [“the statutory deadline“] or (2) 30 days after being served with the complaint and this Notice if you reside in Maryland, 60 days after being served if you reside elsewhere in the United States, or 90 days after being served if you reside outside of the United States [“the served notice deadline“]. You may represent yourself, or you may obtain an attorney to represent you. If the court does not receive your written notice to intervene by the earlier of the applicable deadline, the court may find that you have lost your right to participate in the action and claim any recovery.
(e) Waiver by Inaction.
(1) Definitions. In this section and in section (f) of this Rule, “statutory deadline” means the applicable deadline stated in
Code, Courts Article, § 3-904(g) and§ 5-201(a) , and “served notice deadline” means the additional applicable deadlines stated in the notice given pursuant to section (d) of this Rule.(2) Failure to Satisfy Statutory Time Requirements. An individual who fails to file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline may not participate in the action or claim a recovery.
(3) Other Late Filing. If a use plaintiff who is served with a complaint and notice in accordance with section (d) of this Rule does not file a motion to intervene by the served notice deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim any recovery unless, for good cause shown, the court excuses the late filing. The court may not excuse the late filing if the statutory deadline is not met.
(f) Subsequently Identified Use Plaintiff. Notwithstanding any time limitations contained in
Rule 2-341 or in a scheduling order entered pursuant toRule 2-504 , if, despite conducting a good faith and reasonably diligent effort to identify, locate, and name all use plaintiffs, an individual entitled to be named as a use plaintiff is not identified until after the complaint is filed, but is identified by the statutory deadline, the newly identified use plaintiff shall be added by amendment to the complaint as soon as practicable and served in accordance with section (d) of this Rule andRule 2-341(d) .
Relevant here, the Court went on to explain:
[I]f we were evaluating the facts of this case under the state of the law following the 2012 amendments to
Rule 15-1001 (effective January 1, 2013), our inquiry would be whether the use plaintiffs “file[d] a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline.”Rule 15-1001(e)(2) . This would be a very brief inquiry because it is clear by all accounts that the use plaintiffs did not ever formally join in the present action. Therefore, if the trial in the case at bar took place on or after January 1, 2013, the use plaintiffs would all be barred from recovery because the statute of limitations would have run long before any formal joinder occurred.
B. A plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001 is proper
We now turn to interpreting the pertinent provisions in
Ms. Perez and Appellee-Defendants (collectively, “Appellees“) counter that a plain reading of
“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly‘s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” Leford v. Jenway Contracting, Inc., 490 Md. 666, 680 (2025) (quoting Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 490 Md. 243, 264 (2025)) (cleaned up). In so doing, “[w]e assume that the General Assembly‘s intent is ‘expressed in the statutory language’ and therefore begin our analysis with the plain language of the statute.‘” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264 (quoting Spevak v. Montgomery Cnty., 480 Md. 562, 571-72 (2022)). We begin “by looking to the normal, plain meaning of the text, ‘ensur[ing] that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.‘” Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 490 Md. 243, 264 (2025) (quoting Spevak v. Montgomery Cnty., 480 Md. 562, 572 (2022)). “The same principles which are applied in statutory interpretation apply with equal force to our interpretation of the Maryland Rules.” In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711 (2001) (citing Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264 (2000)).
Although we focus our analysis on the plain text, we do not read “statutory language in a vacuum” or confine our interpretation “to the isolated section [at issue] alone.” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010)). Rather, “we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole, considering the ‘purpose, aim or policy of the [General Assembly] reflected in the statute.‘” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264-65 (quoting McClanahan v. Wash. Cnty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 701 (2015)). “If we are satisfied that the statute‘s plain language is unambiguous and clearly communicates the General Assembly‘s intent, then our inquiry ends, ‘and we apply the plain meaning of the statute.‘” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 265 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 448 Md. 648, 655 (2016)).
To be sure, pursuant to
We are unpersuaded by Mr. Vivar‘s argument that a plain language interpretation is improper because such a result fails to further the legislative intent underpinning Maryland‘s wrongful death statute. First, contrary to Mr. Vivar‘s assertion, the waiver that results from a plain language application of
Second, the result of a plain language interpretation here does not ignore the intent to compensate aggrieved families. Rather,
That Mr. Vivar was not served with the Complaint and the
Moreover, as Appellee-Defendants aptly note, Mr. Vivar could have filed a Complaint prior to the statutory deadline; nothing required Mr. Vivar to wait for Ms. Perez to file a suit. Not serving a use plaintiff until after the statutory deadline, therefore, does
C. The relation back doctrine does not apply
Next, Mr. Vivar urges us to apply the relation back doctrine to overcome his motion‘s untimeliness under the statutory deadline. Specifically, Mr. Vivar argues that his Motion to Intervene should relate back to the date on which Ms. Perez filed her initial claim with the HCADRO. Mr. Vivar contends that the Supreme Court of Maryland expressly left open the question of whether the relation back doctrine applies in wrongful death actions to allow use plaintiffs to formally join after the expiration of the statutory deadline in Carter. As explained supra, the Carter Court applied
1. The relation back doctrine cannot be applied because the three year statutory deadline is a condition precedent
The relation back doctrine allows for amended causes of action after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations in certain situations. See Nam v. Montgomery Cnty., 127 Md. App. 172, 186 (1999) (“Maryland recognizes the doctrine of ‘relating back.’ The doctrine of relation back provides that if the factual situation remains essentially the same after the amendment as it was before it, the doctrine of relation back applies and the amended cause of action is not barred by limitations.“).
Although the relation back doctrine may overcome an expired statute of limitations, it cannot overcome the failure to meet a condition precedent. Ferguson v. Loder, 186 Md. App. 707, 727 (2009). Indeed, “the failure to meet a condition precedent extinguishes the
We have previously defined a “condition precedent” as “a condition attached to the right to sue at all.” Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 626 A.2d 353, 356 (1993). It “operates as a limitation of the liability itself created, and not of the remedy alone.” Id., quoting State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 480, 129 A. 793, 794 (1925). “The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of that right.” Id. Conversely, “a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, not the cause of action.” Id. A condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied.
Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 127 (2005).
In University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp. v. Muti, 426 Md. 358 (2012), the Court explained that,
[s]ince at least State, u/o Stascieicz v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 479-82, 129 A. 793, 795 (1925), this Court has construed the time limit in the wrongful death statute to be a substantive provision, that is, a condition precedent to asserting the statutorily created cause of action. See, e.g., Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446 (1985) (superseded in part by statute,
§ 3-904(g)(2) , regarding occupational disease); Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076, 96 S. Ct. 862, 47 L.Ed.2d 87 (1976). A plaintiff who does not assert the cause of action within the statutorily prescribed time, now three years, loses the right to sue a defendant who is not estopped to assert the defense. See Chandlee v. Shockley, 219 Md. 493, 502-03, 150 A.2d 438, 443 (1959).
Mr. Vivar contends that Muti is inapposite because, unlike Ricky who was unknown to UMMSC prior to the expiration of the statutory deadline, Mr. Vivar was named as a use plaintiff at the initiation of the present action and, therefore, was known to Appellee-Defendants. We disagree.
Although it is accurate that Ricky had not been identified to the defendants in Muti, that fact was not the center of the Court‘s relation back analysis as Mr. Vivar suggests. To be sure, Muti‘s holding that “[r]elation back cannot be applied [] because Ricky‘s claim has expired by operation of the three year condition precedent” is not qualified by the fact that he was not known to UMMSC. Id. at 376-77. Rather, the holding in Muti is based on the statutory deadline being a condition precedent which, if not met, extinguishes a putative party plaintiff‘s claim. Id. at 370-71.
Mr. Vivar does not cite any case holding that the three year limitation to maintaining a wrongful death action -- either by intervening in an existing suit or filing a complaint -- is not a condition precedent, nor can we find one.
We are not persuaded by Mr. Vivar‘s argument that construing the three year limitation to wrongful death actions as a condition precedent would frustrate the policy underpinning Maryland‘s wrongful death statute. Mr. Vivar contends that treating any part of
Similarly, we are not persuaded by the additional language from Ace cited by Mr. Vivar at oral argument. The language cited provides:
As we see it,
Rule 15-1001 is in the nature of a joinder rule or a condition precedent that requires that all known statutory beneficiaries, i.e., the real parties in interest, be identified as parties to the litigation.***
Although
Rule 15-1001(b) does not require formal joinder, the failure to include a known statutory beneficiary as a plaintiff or a “use plaintiff” in a wrongful death action and to settle without providing for the beneficiary can be analogized to thefailure to join a necessary party in an action where joinder is required. In our view, because of the one action rule, the failure to do so is a “defect” or “mistake” of jurisdictional proportions in the proceeding, which may be raised at any time. See S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Kevin Willes Constr. Co., 382 Md. 524, 550[, 856 A.2d 626, 641] (2004) (“Failure to join a necessary party constitutes a defect in the proceedings that cannot be waived by the parties, and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.“). That would be true whether the failure to name the statutory beneficiary as a plaintiff or use plaintiff is attributed to a failure to file or to a clerk‘s error in docketing a filed pleading. In a situation where no financial provisions were made for known beneficiaries, the former is in the nature of a jurisdictional mistake and the latter is an irregularity of process or procedure. Either would permit, and, in the circumstances of this case, require, opening the judgment to protect the interests of those beneficiaries.
Ace Am. Ins. Co., 418 Md. at 423 (quoting Williams, 192 Md. App. at 452, 455-56)).
This language is inapposite for two reasons. First, Mr. Vivar does not allege, nor could he, that Ms. Perez failed to name him as a use plaintiff. Rather, Mr. Vivar‘s argument is that he was served after the statutory deadline, making it so he could not join the suit. Second, and critically, the unnamed use plaintiffs at issue in Ace asserted their rights within the three year limitations period. Indeed, in distinguishing Ace, the Muti Court noted:
Ace . . . recognized the viability of claims of known beneficiaries who asserted their rights within three years of the decedent‘s death, but who had not been accounted for in a settlement that was reduced to a judgment. Ace [allowed for the] reopening [of] an enrolled judgment in order to permit the resolution of the claims of the omitted beneficiaries.
Muti, 426 Md. at 390. Mr. Vivar concedes that he did not file a Complaint or Motion to Intervene within three years of Alex‘s death. Ace, therefore, does not alter our conclusion.
Even if the statutory deadline is not a condition precedent rendering Mr. Vivar‘s claim expired, the relation back doctrine does not apply. As explained in Crowe v. Houseworth, 272 Md. 481 (1974), upon which Mr. Vivar relies:
A frequently encountered problem, which is the result of the more liberal use of amendments, is whether a new action has commenced, an action which may be barred by limitations, or whether the doctrine of relation back is applicable: that is, whether the assertion of the original complaint tolled the running of the statute. The modern view seems to be that so long as the operative factual situation remains essentially the same, no new cause of action is stated by a declaration framed on a new theory or invoking different legal principles. As a consequence, the doctrine of relation back is applied, and the intervention of a plea of limitations prevented[.] . . . Similar problems are encountered where amendments involve the addition of, or substitution of, parties.
Our cases involving the doctrine of relation back have dealt more frequently with the amendment of the averments of a declaration than with the addition or substitution of parties by amendment. . . .
Noting that “there is scant authority on the question of the applicability of the doctrine in cases where new plaintiffs seek to come in,” id. at 486, the Court adopted the rule that, “when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist,” and the relation back doctrine “should be applied.” Id. at 489 (quoting N.Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922)). The Court concluded that the amendment at issue to add additional joint tenants as parties should have
Our courts, however, have declined to apply the relation back doctrine in cases where “an additional plaintiff seeks to intervene after the statute of limitations has run[,] [u]nless the additional plaintiff will merely be sharing in the damage award, and not ‘pyramiding’ the original amount requested.” Grand-Pierre v. Montgomery Cnty., 97 Md. App. 170, 178 (1993) (collecting cases).
Mr. Vivar contends that the relation back doctrine should be applied -- as it was in Crowe -- because his identity was known to Appellee-Defendants since the initiation of the suit because of his status as a use plaintiff. We are not convinced. To be sure, the language in Crowe upon which Mr. Vivar relies expressly states that the doctrine applies when a defendant “has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff set[] up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct.” Crowe, 272 Md. at 489. By definition, however, a use plaintiff is someone who does not participate in the action. See supra note 1. It is not the naming of an individual as a use plaintiff by the individual filing suit, but the subsequent filing of a motion to intervene by a use plaintiff that signifies that the use plaintiff is trying to enforce a claim.
Here, as Appellees aptly note, if Mr. Vivar was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff, he would not merely share in the potential damages. Rather, Mr. Vivar may be eligible for additional damages that would pyramid Appellee-Defendants’ liability. To be sure, under the wrongful death statute, damages may be awarded for, among other things,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Mr. Vivar‘s Motion to Intervene as untimely. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE‘S COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
- Did the Circuit Court err by denying Mr. Vivar‘s Motion to Intervene as untimely pursuant to
Md. Rule 15-1001(e)(2) ? - If the answer to Question Presented #1 is yes, was Mr. Vivar‘s late filing excused under
Md. Rule 15-1001(e)(3) when the clerk refused to accept his Motion to Intervene, informing him that he was already a plaintiff in the case?
According to Mr. Vivar,Other Late Filing. If a use plaintiff who is served with a complaint and notice in accordance with section (d) of this Rule does not file a motion to intervene by the served notice deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim any recovery unless, for good cause shown, the court excuses the late filing. The court may not excuse the late filing if the statutory deadline is not met.