STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. JASON C. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 19CA9
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GALLIA COUNTY
RELEASED: 12/30/2020
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-7037.]
Wilkin, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Timothy P. Gleeson, Logan, Ohio, for Appellant.
Jason D. Holden, Gallia County Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Gallia County Court of Common Pleas judgment denying Appellant Jason C. Jones’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The State charged Appellant with three criminal counts, including aggravated murder. He filed a pretrial motion for a competency hearing, which was denied by the trial court without a hearing. Apрellant subsequently pled guilty to the murder charge. Years later, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea alleging that he was not competent to enter the guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant asserts that “the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Based upon our review of the parties’ arguments, applicable law, and the record, we overrule Appellant‘s assignmеnt of error, and dismiss Appellant‘s appeal on res judicata grounds.
{¶2} In October 2007, a grand jury indicted Appellant on charges of aggravated murder in violation of
{¶3} On January 8, 2008, Appellant filed numerous motions, including a motion to evaluate his competence to stand trial. On January 18, 2008, the trial court held a pretrial hearing during which the following exchange occurred:
Judge: “And Mr. Henry (Appellant‘s counsel), I believe, had indicated that he wаs going to withdraw the motion for determination of competency of the defendant * * * or was at least contemplating that?”
Mr. Henry: “Yes, Judge, I do need to discuss that additionally with my client.”
Judge: “Okay.”
Mr. Henry: “But I will let the Court know today.”
The case was set for trial on April 7, 2008.
{¶4} On January 25, 2008, the court issued a judgment entry resolving Appellant‘s pending motions, including denying Appellant‘s “motion for a psychiatric evaluation to determine [his] competency to stand trial.”
{¶5} On March 20, 2008, the court held a pretrial hearing, but the parties indicated that they had reached a plea agreement whereby Appellant pled guilty to murder under
{¶6} The Judge then engaged in a lengthy colloquy asking if Appellant understood: (1) the nature of the charge, (2) that he was not required to plead guilty, (3) that he was giving up the requirement that the State would have to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) that he was giving up his right to have a jury trial, (5) that he was giving up his right to self-incrimination (6) that he was giving up his right to subpoena power, (7) that he was giving up his right to examine or cross examine witnesses, (8) that he would be subject to a mandatory sentence of life in prison with a chance of parole after 15 years and (9) that the court could impose that sentence “immediately” after the plea. In each instance, the Aрpellant responded that he understood each of these issues. The Judge also inquired whether he was satisfied with his counsel‘s performance and if his plea was voluntary to which he responded “yes.” Appellant stated that except for the plea agreement, he was not promised anything or threatened or coerced into accepting the plea. Finally, the Judge asked Appellant if he was “under any mental or physical condition that would render you unable to understand what‘s happening” to which Appellant responded “No sir.” Ultimately, the Judge accepted Appellant‘s guilty plea. The Appellant signed a document titled “guilty plea” which set forth his plea agreement. On March 21, 2008, the court issued a judgment entry memorializing Appellant‘s plea and sentencing him to life in prison with the possibility of parole in 15 years.
{¶8} On July 18, 2018, approximately two and a half years after the trial court‘s dismissal entry was issued, Appellant filed the instant motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion alleged that the trial court lacked authority to accept Appellant‘s plea because it failed to first determine his competency. Appellant alleged that this failure resulted in a manifest injustice to him. The trial court, finding that there was “no indicia in the record that Defendant was incompetent,” denied Appellant‘s motion to withdraw. It is this judgment that Appellant appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA
{¶9} In Appellant‘s sole assignment of error, he alleges that the trial court erred in denying Appellant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argues that the trial court‘s failure to order a competency hearing in his murder case was a
{¶10} During a pretrial hearing, the Judge asked Appellant‘s counsel if he still intended to withdraw his motion for a competency hearing to which counsel replied that he needed to discuss it with Appellant. Appellant argues that failing to order a competency hearing was not harmless error under State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986), but rather was under a prejudicial error under State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 2002-Ohio-481, 761 N.E.2d 591. Appellant argues that the dissent in Bock reasoned, and the majority in Were adopted, the notion that committing the error of not holding a competency hearing harmless “virtually assures there will be little evidence on that issue.” Appellant argues that “this court should not follow [Bock] and decline to use [Bock] to find harmless error.”
{¶11} Appellant also cites the subsequent disbarment of his trial counsel and clerical errors in several motions he filed on behalf of Appellant in his murder case, suggesting that his counsel‘s failure to pursue a competency hearing was the result of his neglect/ineffectiveness.
{¶12} Finally, Appellant argues that res judicatа should not bar his appeal of the trial court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Appellant argues that the “trial court could have deprived [him] of any opportunity to present evidence
{¶13} Therefore, Appellant argues, this court should reverse the trial court‘s judgment denying his motion to withdraw his plea аnd remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
{¶14} In response, the State argues that Appellant could have raised the lack of a competency hearing on the direct appeal of his murder case. Therefore, the State argues, res judicata should apply to prevent us from considering his appeal.
{¶15} Alternatively, the State effectively argues that there was no indicia of incompetency, so the trial court‘s failure to hold a competency hearing was harmless error pursuant to State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 109, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986).
{¶16} Finally, the State argues that Appellant‘s counsel‘s signature of a certificate that Appellant was competent equates to a stipulation that Appellant was competent.
{¶17} Therefore, the State argues this court should deny Appellant‘s appeal and affirm the trial court‘s judgment denying Appellant‘s motiоn to withdraw his plea.
LAW
1. Standard of Review for a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea
{¶18}
{¶19} “The decision to grant or to deny a
2. Competency to Stand Trial
a. Evaluating Competency
{¶20} “[A] criminal defendant is rebuttably presumed competent to enter a guilty plea.” State v. Collins, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 18CA11, 2019-Ohio-3428, ¶ 8, citing
The test for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial [or to plead guilty] is ’ ’ ” whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ’ ”
State v. Collins, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 18CA11, 2019-Ohio-3428, quoting Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 2762, quoting State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995), quoting Dusky v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).
We have also recognized some factors that would require a court to sua sponte order а competency including “(1) doubts expressed by counsel as to the defendant‘s competence, (2) evidence of irrational behavior, (3) the defendant‘s demeanor at trial, and (4) prior medical opinion relating to competence to stand trial.” State v. Barnhart, 4th Dist. Washington No. 96 CA 32, 1997 WL 600045, at *2 (Sept. 24, 1997)
{¶21} “The competency standard for standing trial is the same as the standard for pleading guilty,” i.e. that a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St. 3d 350, 359, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, 1075, ¶ 57, citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). “A trial court viоlates a defendant‘s due process rights, and hence may produce a manifest injustice, if it accepts a guilty plea that the defendant did not enter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Hall, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 99CA847, *2 (Feb. 25, 2000), citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. Therefore, “the conviction of a defendant who is not competent to enter a plea violates due process of law.” State v. Collins, 2019-Ohio-3428, ¶ 8, citing State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, at ¶ 155. Conversely, “a defendant who pleads guilty is not entitled to a subsequent comрetency hearing when the record does not contain a sufficient indicia of incompetence.” State v. Hall, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 99CA847, 2000 WL 245492, *3 (Feb. 25, 2000), citing State v. Brookins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73345, 1998 WL 686210, (October 1, 1998).
b. Pretrial Request for a Competency Hearing
{¶22}
{¶23} Interpreting this same language in former
{¶24} Sixteen years later, the Ohio Supreme Court again visited the issue of competency in State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 2002-Ohio-481, 761 N.E.2d 591. Citing Bock, the Court confirmed that if a competency hearing is requested before trial, the court must hold a competency hearing. The Court in Were found that defense counsel filed a pretrial motion requesting a competency hearing, and the trial court ordered a hearing, but none was held. Id. at 174. Unlike in Bock, the Court in Were found that the record was “replete with suggestions of appellant‘s incompetency,” e.g. defense counsel raised Appellant‘s competency with the trial court numerous times, letters from Appellant‘s pro se filings make statements reflecting Appellant‘s “bizarre belief[s],” such as his attorneys were racially bias, had threatened his life, etc. Id. at 175, 176. Accordingly, the Court found that Bock was distinguishable on its facts, and the trial court‘s failure to hold a competency hearing was reversible error. Id. at 177.
{¶25} Therefore, contrary to Appellant‘s argument, both Bock and Were remain good law, but are factually distinguishable. Accordingly, we decline to
ANALYSIS
{¶26} Appellant argues that the trial court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea was a manifest injustice because the trial court in his murder case denied his pretrial motion for a competency evaluation without a hearing despite the existence of indicia of his incompetence in the record. The State argues there was no indicia of incompetence in his murder case, so the trial court‘s failure to hold a hearing was harmless error under Bock. Therefore, the State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶27} While Appellant‘s counsel did file a motion for a competency hearing, at Appellant‘s pretrial hearing counsel informed the Judge that he was considering withdrawing the motion. And not only did counsel fail to object to the Judge‘s denial of the motion several days later, but he subsequently negotiated Appellant‘s plea bargain with the State. Counsel‘s actions are not those of an attorney who believed his client was incompetent. See Bock at 111 (counsel‘s
{¶28} Moreover, The Judge engaged in a lеngthy colloquy with the Appellant during the plea hearing. The Judge advised the Appellant that by pleading guilty, he would waive his rights to a jury trial, to cross-examine witnesses, to present a defense, to use the subpoena power, and to present witnesses. The Judge further informed the appellant that by pleading guilty, he would be admitting the truth of the allegations. The Appellant responded that: (1) he understood his rights; (2) he understood the nature of the charges; (3) he entered his pleas voluntarily; and (4) no one threatened him or promised him anything in exchange for his guilty plea. In fact, at one point during the court‘s explanation, the Appellant stated: “I understand everything completely.” The Judge then accepted the appellant‘s guilty plea. The Judge also asked if he was satisfied with his attorney, to which Appellant responded, yes. And when the Judge asked Appellant whether he was “undеr any mental or physical condition that would render you unable to understand what‘s happening,” the Appellant responded “No sir.” And after the trial judge accepted Appellant‘s plea and imposed sentence, he informed the Appellant that he had a right to file an appeal and if could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed. The fact that Appellant‘s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntаry indicates that he was competent under Mink, at ¶ 57.
{¶30} Because, after examining the record, we find no indicia that Appellant was incompetent, we hold that the Judge‘s denial of Appellant‘s motion for a competency heаring without holding a hearing was harmless error under Bock. Therefore, we find that the trial court‘s denial of Appellant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was incompetent was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. However, that does not end our analysis.
3. Res Judicata
{¶31} The State argues that res judicata should bar our consideration of Appellant‘s appeal because he could have raised the competеncy issue on direct appeal of his plea, but he failed to do so. Appellant admits that “it might have been possible for [him] to raise [the lack-of-a-competency-hearing] argument on direct appeal[],” but adds that “applying res judicata in this case would be unjust.” Appellant suggests that applying res judicata would be unjust because “[he] could have been sentenced to prison unaware or unable to appreciate his right to advance a direct appeal because of the incompetency issues.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶32} “[T]he ‘doctrine of res judicata bars a defendant from raising any issue in a post-sentence
{¶33} Although seldom applied, courts have recognized “that in some cases ‘circumstances render the application of res judicata unjust.’ ” State v. Houston, 73 Ohio St. 3d 346, 347, 1995-Ohio-317, 652 N.E.2d 1018 (1995), quoting State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 66, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), see also State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 05CA7, 2006-Ohio-1482, ¶ 27.
ANALYSIS
{¶34} Having found no indicia of incompetence in the record and that Appellant was informed of his appeal rights after the Judge accepted his plea and imposed sentence, we find nothing that would have prevented Appellant from appealing the competency issue in his dirеct appeal. Yet, Appellant never contested his plea until six years later, after learning that his counsel had been
{¶36} Appellant appears to suggest that Henry supports the proposition that his counsel was ineffective by not pursuing a comрetency hearing. As we noted above Appellant‘s counsel was not disbarred until years after he represented Appellant in his murder case, and none of the disciplinary violations that resulted in his disbarment arose from any criminal cases. Henry, 127 Ohio St. 3d 398, 2010-Ohio-6206, 939 N.E.2d 1255. Therefore, we reject the notion that Henry is in any way applicable to evaluate his motion to withdraw his plea. Nor do we find counsel‘s clerical errors in some the pleadings filеd in Appellant‘s murder case are pertinent to this appeal. These claims would appear to be more properly raised in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and no such claim is before this court on appeal.
CONCLUSION
{¶38} Although we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, wе decline to consider Appellant‘s appeal on res judicata grounds. Accordingly, we dismiss Appellant‘s appeal.
APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and costs be assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Gallia County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a periоd not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Suрreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment Only.
For the Court,
BY:
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.