VICKIE S. YOUNG, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RANDALL JOSH YOUNG, DECEASED v. FRIST CARDIOLOGY, PLLC ET AL.
No. M2019-00316-SC-R11-CV
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
April 20, 2020
Fеbruary 11, 2020 Session; Appeal by Permission from the Circuit Court for Davidson County; No. 17C597; Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.; FILED 04/20/2020 Clerk of the Appellate Courts
SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, HOLLY KIRBY, and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.
Travis B. Swearingen, Andrew D. Tharp, and James A. Beakes III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Frist Cardiology, PLLC and Thomas J. Killian, M.D.
D. Russell Thomas, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Vickie S. Young.
I.
On December 1, 2011, Thomas J. Killian, M.D., performed a cardiac cryoablation procedure1 on Randall Josh Young at TriStar Centennial Medical Center in Nashville. Two days later, Mr. Young died from a stroke.
In March 2017, Vickie S. Young, Mr. Young‘s surviving spouse and the administrator of his estate, sued the Defendants, Dr. Killian and Frist Cardiology, PLLC, in the Davidson County Circuit Court.2 Ms. Young alleged that the Defendants failed to appropriately evaluate and monitor Mr. Young‘s condition befоre and during the cryoablation procedure, and that the procedure should not have been performed on a patient in Mr. Young‘s medical condition. Ms. Young alleged that the Defendants’ negligent conduct caused her husband‘s death.
The trial court‘s cаse management order required the parties to identify the expert witnesses they planned to use at trial. Ms. Young named Dr. Jason A. Rytlewski as the expert witness who would testify that Dr. Killian deviated from the applicable standard of care in his treatment of Mr. Young, which caused or contributed to his death. The Defendants identified two experts who were expected to testify that Dr. Killian followed the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in his treatment of Mr. Young.
The Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Young had failed to come forward with competent proof to support her claim that Dr. Killian did not follow the applicable standard of care, as required by
Ms. Young responded that Dr. Rytlewski was competent to testify. According to Dr. Rytlewski‘s curriculum vitae, hе had received a medical degree from the University of Michigan Medical School in 2005. He then pursued postdoctoral training in internal medicine and cardiology from 2005 to 2012. When Mr. Young died in December 2011,
Ms. Young explained that the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners had granted Dr. Rytlewski an exemption that allowed him to practice medicine without a medical license during his fellowship at Vanderbilt University. Ms. Young argued that the requirements of
The Defendants did not dispute that a limited licensure exemption allowed Dr. Rytlewski to practice medicine as а fellow in training at Vanderbilt University during the year before Mr. Young‘s death. They argued, however, that Dr. Rytlewski was not competent to testify under
Thе trial court denied the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and allowed Dr. Rytlewski‘s testimony, finding that under
II.
Our decision in this case hinges on our interpretation of the language of
When construing a statute, the intent of the legislature must prevail, and that intent is to be determined from the naturаl and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute, within the context of the entire statute. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526–27 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). We must “construe a statute so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant,” and the court “must give effect to every word, phrase, clаuse and sentence . . . in order to achieve the Legislature‘s intent . . . .” City of Caryville v. Campbell Cnty., 660 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676–77 (Tenn. 1975)). When the language of a statute is clear, we enforce the statute by applying the plain meaning of the written language “without complicating the task.” In re Estate of Davis, 308 S.W.3d at 837 (citing Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004); Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006)). “We ‘presume that the legislature sаys in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.‘” Rich, 350 S.W.3d at 926 (quoting Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tenn. 2000)).
Under
No person in a health care profession requiring licensure under the laws of this state shall be competent to testify in any court of law . . . unless the person was licensed to practice in the state or a contiguous bordering state a profession or specialty which would make the person‘s expert testimony relevant to the issues in the case and had practiced this profession or specialty in one (1) of these states during the year preceding the date that the alleged injury or wrongful act occurred.
It is undisputed that Dr. Rytlewski was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee оr a contiguous bordering state during the year before the alleged injury or wrongful act. Dr. Rytlewski was exempt from the licensure requirement during his fellowship at Vanderbilt under
Our focus is on the meaning of the introductory language of
A contrary finding—that Dr. Rytlewski was competent to testify as an expert witness even though he was not licensed in Tennesseе—would make the licensure requirement of
In sum, we hold that under the clear and unambiguous language of
III.
We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court did not decide, and therefore we do not address, whether waiver of the requirements of
SHARON G. LEE, JUSTICE
Notes
In a malpractice action, the claimant shall have the burden of proving by evidence as provided by
- The recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and the specialty thereof, if any, that the defendant praсtices in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community at the time the alleged injury or wrongful action occurred;
- That the defendant acted with less than or failed to act with ordinary and reasonable care in accordance with such standard; and
- As a proximate result of the defendant‘s negligent act or omission, the plaintiff suffered injuries which would not otherwise have occurred.