599 S.W.3d 568
Tenn.2020Background
- On December 1, 2011, Dr. Thomas Killian performed a cardiac cryoablation on Randall Young; the patient died two days later and his widow, Vickie Young, sued for medical malpractice.
- Plaintiff designated Dr. Jason Rytlewski as her standard-of-care expert; at the time of the procedure he was an electrophysiology fellow at Vanderbilt practicing under a Tennessee licensure exemption (not a full Tennessee or contiguous-state medical license).
- Defendants moved for summary judgment and to exclude Rytlewski, arguing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(b) requires an expert to have been licensed in Tennessee or a contiguous state and practicing there during the year before the alleged injury.
- The trial court denied summary judgment and allowed Rytlewski to testify, reasoning the statutory license requirement did not apply to a fellow practicing under an exemption.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to interpret § 29-26-115(b) and whether a licensure exemption satisfies the statute’s license/practice requirements.
- The Court held the exemption did not satisfy § 29-26-115(b); because Rytlewski was not licensed in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the relevant year, he was not qualified to testify as a medical expert. The trial-court ruling was reversed and the case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a physician who practiced in Tennessee under a statutory licensure exemption (as a fellow) meets § 29-26-115(b)’s requirement that an expert be licensed in Tennessee or a contiguous state and have practiced there during the year before the alleged injury | Young: Exemption allowed the physician to practice in Tennessee, so the licensing requirement in § 29-26-115(b) applies only when a license is required and the exemption suffices | Defendants: Exemption does not equal being licensed in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the relevant year; therefore the witness is not statutorily qualified | The Court held the exemption is insufficient; § 29-26-115(b) requires an actual license in Tennessee or a contiguous state and practice there in the year before the injury, so Rytlewski was not qualified to testify |
Key Cases Cited
- Rich v. Tenn. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 350 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 2011) (statutory construction principles; de novo review of trial court’s statutory interpretation)
- Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (use plain meaning of statute to ascertain legislative intent)
- Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011) (expert testimony required in health-care liability cases; license requirement as exclusion ground)
- Payne v. Caldwell, 796 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. 1990) (construction of § 29-26-115’s licensing/practice requirements)
- Childress v. Bennett, 816 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1991) (affirming clarity of § 29-26-115’s dictates)
- Williams v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 545 (Tenn. 2006) (requirements for expert proof in malpractice actions)
- Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715 (Tenn. 2003) (expert-testimony standards in health-care liability suits)
- Robinson v. LeCorps, 83 S.W.3d 718 (Tenn. 2002) (same)
- City of Caryville v. Campbell Cnty., 660 S.W.2d 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (avoid interpreting statutes so language is superfluous)
- Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503 (Tenn. 2004) (apply plain meaning when statutory language is clear)