Versie Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy Inc.Versie Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy Inc.
- Reporters:
- , , , ,
- Before:
- White
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The first part of
“If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified.”
The second part of
“[I]f two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.”
These two clauses are separated by a semicolon: The lower federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions concerning the effect of that semicolon.
*1111Petitioner was employed as an oil driller by respondent D. J. McDuffy, Inc., from December 1972 until April 1973. In March 1973, McDuffy joined the Industrial Foundation of the South (IFS). IFS is a nonprofit corporation, the purpose of which is to provide information to its members concerning workers’ compensation claims and personal injury lawsuits in state and federal courts filed by employees or prospective employees of the employer/members. Apparently, the employer/members believe that they can reduce their employers’ insurance and workers’ compensation costs by obtaining this information, which may indicate whether a particular employee is likely to be an insurance or compensation risk.
Petitioner alleges that when McDuffy joined IFS, McDuffy learned that petitioner had previously pursued a lawsuit in federal court against a former employer and had obtained a large judgment. Contending that he was fired by McDuffy because of this prior suit, petitioner filed a class action in Federal District Court on behalf of all individuals who had been denied employment by IFS members because they had filed workers’ compensation or personal injury claims against companies in the oil drilling business.1 The complaint, based entirely on
By a vote of 11 to 10,3 the court held that the language of the statute is not as important as its history. Thus, the fact that the phrase “equal protection of the laws” is included in the second, but not the first, part of
This dispute over the scope of
“The first half of§ 1985(2) aims at conspiracies the object of which is intimidation of or retaliation against parties or witnesses . . . in any court of the United States. The federal nexus, then, is not the class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus required by the second half of the subsection, but the connection of the proscribed activities to a federal court.”
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agrees with the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in this case: “the racial or class-based discrimination rationale expressed by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 101-102 [(1971),] applies equally to [
In order to settle this conflict in the Circuits over the scope of a federal remedy for interference with the federal judicial process, I would grant the petition and set the case for plenary consideration.4
Notes
Besides McDuffy, the defendants included IFS and all its members.
The District Court certified a class only with respect to the claim for injunctive relief.
Judge Clark concurred in the majority’s decision, but stated that it was not necessary to reach this issue.
An alternative ground for the decision below was the majority’s reversal of the panel’s holding that the filing of a complaint in federal district court falls within the scope of the term “attending” as used in the statute. The fact that the Court of Appeals could have relied solely on this ground to reverse the panel decision does not mitigate the precedential effect of its holding that invidious discrimination must be alleged to state a cause of action under
“It does not make a reason given for a conclusion in a case obiter dictum that it is only one of two reasons given for the same conclusion. . . . [W]e can not hold that the use of the section in the opinion is not to be regarded as authority except by directly reversing the decision in that case on that point.” Richmond Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 340 (1928).
See also Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, 623 (1948); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U. S. 472, 486 (1924); Union Pacific R. Co. v. *1114Mason City & Fort Dodge R. Co., 199 U. S. 160, 166 (1905). In any case, the intended scope of the term “attending” can only be determined by reviewing the same legislative history as is involved in resolving the question of whether an action under
Lead Opinion
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.