Vasquez Perdomo, et al. v. Noem, et al.Vasquez Perdomo, et al. v. Noem, et al.
ORDER
SUMMARY*
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
Stay Pending Appeal
The panel denied, except as to one clause, senior federal officials’ emergency motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court’s temporary restraining order in plaintiffs’ putative class action alleging that detentive stops requiring—but not supported by—reasonable suspicion are being conducted as part of “Operation at Large” in the Los Angeles area.
Five individual plaintiffs and three membership associations alleged that defendants, senior federal officials who share responsibility for directing federal immigration enforcement in the Los Angeles area, have an ongoing policy, pattern, and/or practice of conducting detentive stops without reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of immigration law, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.
The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO prohibiting federal officials from conducting detentive stops for the purposes of immigration enforcement without first establishing individualized, reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped was unlawfully in the United States. The district court ordered that, “except as permitted by law,” defendants were not permitted to rely solely, alone or in combination, on the following factors to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop: apparent race or ethnicity; speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accept; presence at a particular location; the type of work one does.
The panel noted that, in defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal of the TRO, defendants do not challenge the district court’s determination that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving their factual allegations regarding defendants’ stop and arrest practices. Therefore, for purposes of deciding the stay motion, the panel assumed that plaintiffs would likely succeed in proving those factual allegations.
The panel held that it had jurisdiction under the
The panel held that each of the individual plaintiffs had
In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant defendants’ motion for a stay of the TRO pending appeal, the panel considered the four “Nken factors”: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.
As to defendants’ likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal, the panel held that defendants were likely to succeed in establishing that the district court’s TRO was appealable under
As to the other Nken factors, defendants did not show that they were likely to suffer irreparable injury without a stay, plaintiffs would be substantially injured if the TRO were stayed pending appeal, and the
Accordingly, the panel granted defendants’ motion to stay as to the “except as permitted by law” clause and otherwise denied the motion.
COUNSEL
Mohammad K. Tajsar (argued), Eva L. Bitrán, Diana Sanchez, Mayra B. Joachin, and Stephanie Padilla, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, California; Bree Bernwanger, ACLU Foundation of Northern California, San Francisco, California; Brisa V. Oatis, ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, San Diego, California; Anne Lai, UC Irvine Immigrant and Racial Justice Solidarity Clinic, Irvine, California; Mark Rosenbaum and Rebecca S. Brown, Public Counsel, Los Angeles, California; Stacy Tolchin, Law Offices of Stacy Tolchin, Pasadena, California; Matthew J. Craig, Hecker Fink LLP, Los Angeles, California; Sara H. Worth, Jacob S. Kreilkamp, Henry D. Shreffler, and Paul E. Martin, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California; Elaine J. Goldenberg and Jeremy S. Kreisberg, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Yaakov M. Roth (argued), Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Jason K. Zubata, Aniello Desimone, Jacob A. Bashyrov, and Stephanie L. Groff, Trial Attorneys; Jonathan K. Ross and John Blakeley, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation; Tiberius Davis and Sean Skedzielewski, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General; Drew C. Ensign, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Alexander L. Farrell, Ryan C. Chapman, and Pauline H. Alercon, Assistant United States Attorneys; Daniel A. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section; David M. Harris, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division; Bilal A. Essayli, United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellants.
Martin Akerman, Arlington, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae Martin Akerman, Chief Data Officer of the National Guard Bureau.
E. Martin Estrada, Daniel B. Levin, John L. Schwab, Wendy Q. Xiao, V. Grace Davis, and Jin Niu, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California; Hydee F. Soto, Michael J. Dundas, Valerie L. Flores, Maria L. Cousineau, and Randall G. Sommer, Attorneys; Shubhra Shivpuri, Deputy Attorney General; Los Angeles Office of the City Attorney, Los Angeles, California; Brigit G. Alvarez, Attorney; Liliana Campos, Assistant County Counsel; Nicole D. Tinkham, Senior Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles Office of the County Counsel, Los Angeles, California; Michele B. Bagneris and Arnold F. Lee, Attorneys, Pasadena Office of the City Attorney, Pasadena, California; for Amici Curiae the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, the City of Bell Gardens, the City of Huntington Park, the City of Long Beach, the City of Lynwood, the City of Montebello, the City of Monterey Park, the City of Paramount, the City of Pasadena, the City of Santa Monica, the City of South Gate, and the City of West Hollywood.
PER CURIAM:
On June 6, 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents and officers were sent to join officers from the Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to carry out “Operation At Large” in Los Angeles, California. According to Defendants,
Plaintiffs refer to these contact teams as “roving patrols” and allege they have detained individuals without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the
To give just one example, Plaintiff Jason Brian Gavidia is a U.S. citizen who was born and raised in East Los Angeles and identifies as Latino. On the afternoon of June 12, he stepped onto the sidewalk outside of a tow yard in Montebello, California, where he saw agents carrying handguns and military-style rifles. One agent ordered him to “Stop right there” while another “ran towards [him].” The agents repeatedly asked Gavidia whether he is American—and they repeatedly ignored his answer: “I am an American.” The agents asked Gavidia what hospital he was born in—and he explained that he did not know which hospital. “The agents forcefully pushed [Gavidia] up against the metal gated fence, put [his] hands behind [his] back, and twisted [his] arm.” An agent asked again, “What hospital were you born in?” Gavidia again explained that he did not know which hospital and said “East L.A.” He then told the agents he could show them his Real ID. The agents took Gavidia’s ID and his phone and kept his phone for 20 minutes. They never returned his ID.
On July 3, Plaintiffs filed an application for a temporary restraining order, which Defendants opposed. After a hearing, the district court determined that Plaintiffs had shown they are likely to succeed in proving that seizures requiring—but not supported by—reasonable suspicion have occurred as part of Operation At Large in Los Angeles, and that Defendants have authorized or approved that practice. The district court issued the requested TRO on July 11.
On July 17, Defendants filed an emergency motion for a stay pending their appeal of the TRO.1 Defendants focus their arguments on Plaintiffs’ standing to seek equitable relief and the terms and scope of the TRO. For the following
reasons, we deny Defendants’ motion for a stay except as to a single clause.
I. BACKGROUND
In this putative class action, five individual plaintiffs and three membership associations allege that Defendants, twelve senior federal officials who share responsibility for directing federal immigration enforcement in the Los Angeles area, “have an ongoing policy, pattern, and/or practice of conducting detentive stops in [the Central District of California] without reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law, in contravention of the
The Central District includes Los Angeles County, Ventura County, Santa Barbara County, San Luis Obispo County, Orange County, Riverside County, and San
or its components undertake in the course of enforcing federal immigration law.
Plaintiffs’ allegation that the government maintains a policy mandating 3,000 arrests per day appears to originate from media reports quoting a White House advisor who described that figure as a “goal” that the Administration was “looking to set.” That quotation may have been accurate, but no such goal has been set as a matter of policy, and no such directive has been issued to or by DHS or ICE.
To be sure, enforcement of federal immigration law is a top priority for DHS, ICE, and the Administration. But the government conducts its enforcement activities based on individualized assessments, available resources, and evolving operational priorities—not volume metrics. Enforcement activity is firmly anchored in binding legal constraints—constitutional, statutory, and regulatory requirements that apply at every stage, from identification to arrest to custody—with multiple layers of supervisory review to ensure compliance with the law. This framework, not anonymous reports in the newspapers, governs ICE’s operations.
(footnote omitted).
We note that, on May 28, 2025, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller stated during an interview with Fox News: “Under President Trump’s leadership, we are looking to set a goal of a minimum of 3,000 arrests for ICE every day, and President Trump is going to keep pushing to get that number up higher each and every single day.” Hannity, Stephen Miller says the admin wants to create the strongest immigration system in US History, FOX NEWS (May 28, 2025, 6:29 pm PT), available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6373591405112 (last visited July 31, 2025).
Bernardino County. Those counties have a combined estimated population of 19,233,598 people, including 9,096,334 people that identify as “Hispanic or Latino.” That means people who identify as “Hispanic or Latino” make up almost half—about 47.3%—of the estimated population of the Central District.
Plaintiffs applied for an ex parte TRO seeking to prohibit federal officials “from conducting detentive stops for the purposes of immigration enforcement without first establishing individualized, reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is unlawfully in the United States.” The district court did not grant the application for an ex parte TRO and instead ordered full briefing and a hearing.
In support of their TRO, Plaintiffs submitted 21 sworn declarations. Five were from the individual named plaintiffs and described the circumstances in which they were stopped by Defendants. Three were declarations from representatives of two of the plaintiff organizations, describing the effect of Defendants’ operation on their members, including instances in which particular members were subjected to detentive stops. Five other declarants described being seized by Defendants conducting roving patrols, and five described witnessing
Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ TRO application and submitted two declarations in support of their opposition. One was from an official affiliated with ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). It described training of ERO officers and described ERO’s general practices of creating targeting packets for individuals to be arrested and conducting consensual interviews with other individuals
they encounter. The other declaration came from an official affiliated with Customs and Border Control (CBP). It described CBP’s participation in operations in Los Angeles, including both consensual encounters and investigative detentions. Neither declaration rebuts Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding any particular stop.
The district court held a hearing on the TRO on July 10. The parties discussed the factors that Defendants use when making stops, the terms of Plaintiffs’ proposed TRO, and whether imposing those terms would be consistent with the
Based on all the evidence presented, including Defendants’ evidence opposing the TRO, the district court determined that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in proving their factual allegations regarding Defendants’ stop and arrest practices. Defendants do not challenge that determination (either in whole or in part) in their motion for a stay of the TRO pending appeal. Therefore, for purposes of deciding that motion, we assume Plaintiffs will likely succeed in proving those factual allegations and summarize the pertinent facts below.
A. Since June 6, 2025, Defendants have been conducting “Operation At Large” in Los Angeles.
On June 6, 2025, federal law enforcement arrived in Los Angeles to participate in what federal officials have described as “the largest Mass Deportation Operation . . . in History.”3 As part of this operation, Defendants are
dispatching what they call “contact teams,” and what Plaintiffs refer to as “roving patrols.” As described by the Deputy Incident Commander for Defendants’ operation in Los Angeles, Kyle Harvick: “CBP agents and officers are typically divided into teams, composed of three to five agents, who contact individuals in public places such as streets and sidewalks, parking lots, or the publicly-accessible portions of businesses. Certain types of businesses, including carwashes, have been selected for encounters because past experiences have demonstrated that illegal aliens utilize and seek work at these locations.”4
i. Jason Brian Gavidia
Plaintiff Jason Brian Gavidia is a U.S. citizen, born and raised in East Los Angeles. He lives and works in Los Angeles County. He is of Latino ethnicity, a proud Christian, and a businessman. He is also an active volunteer in his church and supporter of his community. He rents space from a tow yard in Montebello, California, to work on cars. On June 12, 2025, around 4:30 p.m., he was working on his car in the tow yard when he heard someone say that immigration agents might be at the premises. Out of curiosity, he went outside to see whether agents were present.
While standing on the sidewalk outside the tow yard gate, he saw agents wearing green vests; some were carrying handguns, but at least two had military-style rifles. When Gavidia started to head back inside the tow yard, a masked agent said, “Stop right there.” Gavidia stopped because he is a “law-abiding citizen,” and he “felt [he] could not leave, and that the agent had stopped [him].” While the masked agent approached him, another “unmasked agent ran towards [him]” and questioned him, asking whether he is American. Gavidia told him, “I am an American.” The agent repeated the question, and Gavidia responded the same way, at least two more times. Then the agent asked Gavidia what hospital he was born in. Gavidia “calmly replied that [he] did not know.” The agent repeated the same question two more times, and each time, Gavidia explained that he did not know which hospital he was born in. At that point, “the agents forcefully pushed [him] up against the metal gated fence, put [his] hands behind [his] back, and twisted [his] arm.” The
agent asked again, “What hospital were you born in?” Gavidia responded again that he did not know and said “East L.A.” He then told the agents he could show them his Real ID. When he showed his Real ID, an agent took it from him. They also took his phone. After about 20 minutes, they returned his phone, but they never returned his Real ID.
ii. Jorge Luis Hernandez Viramontes
Plaintiff Jorge Luis Hernandez Viramontes is a 29-year old resident of Baldwin Park, California. He is a dual citizen of the United States and Mexico. He is of Latino ethnicity. He has lived in the United States for about 11 years, and he is married to a Legal Permanent Resident. They have two young children, both of whom are U.S. citizens. Hernandez Viramontes has worked at a carwash in Whittier, California, for about 10 years; he is currently a manager. On June 9, 2025, masked agents arrived at the carwash in unmarked vehicles, many wearing “military style clothing.” When they arrived, “the agents started grabbing people and asking their status.” On June 14, 2025, agents arrived again, this time driving border patrol vehicles and wearing clothing that identified them as border patrol. The agents asked both workers and customers if they were citizens.
On June 18, 2025, around 10:30 a.m., agents again arrived in unmarked vehicles and started asking employees their status. Hernandez Viramontes and some of his coworkers asked the agents if they had a warrant. The agents responded only by saying, “Shut the fuck up.” An agent asked
asked Hernandez Viramontes if he had his passport. Hernandez Viramontes asked if as a dual citizen he was required to carry his passport. The agent told Hernandez Viramontes his driver’s license wasn’t enough, and that because he didn’t have his passport with him, he had to go with the agents. The agent grabbed his arm and escorted him to a silver SUV. Agents took him to a warehouse area nearby. After about 20 minutes, they took him back to the carwash. The agents never identified themselves, and they did not wear any visible badges.
iii. Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and Isaac Antonio Villegas Molina
Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and Isaac Antonio Villegas Molina live in Pasadena, California. Each is of Latino ethnicity. Vasquez Perdomo is 54 years old and has lived in Pasadena since he was a young man. Osorto is 50 years old; he has lived in Pasadena for about 14 years, and he is the proud grandfather to seven U.S. citizen grandchildren. Villegas Molina is 47 years old; in 2010, he won a scholarship to study culinary arts and English in Florida, and he moved to Pasadena about 13 years ago. The three men are day laborers and coworkers. Villegas Molina is new to the trade; Vasquez Perdomo and Osorto have built homes all over Los Angeles.
On the morning of June 18, 2025, Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto, and Villegas Molina waited to be picked up for a construction job at a Metro bus stop in front of a Winchell’s Donuts in Pasadena. They were drinking coffee. Vasquez Perdomo and Osorto sat on the bench, and Villegas Molina stood next to them. Suddenly, four unmarked cars pulled up and surrounded them. The cars were large and black with tinted windows and had no license plates. The doors opened
and men in masks with guns started running at them aggressively. One of the men had a “large” military-style gun. The masked men wore regular clothes, they had no visible badges, and they did not identify themselves. Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto, and Villegas Molina were afraid they were being kidnapped. Vasquez Perdomo tried to move away but was immediately surrounded by several men with guns. They grabbed him, put his hands behind his back, and handcuffed him. Then, one of the men asked him for identification. Vasquez Perdomo said in English, “I have the right to remain silent.”
Villegas Molina stood still and tried to remain calm. A masked and armed man came up to him and yelled, “Don’t run!” Villegas Molina responded calmly, in English, “I’m not going to run.” The man asked Villegas Molina to show his ID, and Villegas Molina provided his California Driver’s license. Then the man asked Villegas Molina if he had any papers, and he said no. The man handcuffed Villegas Molina.
Osorto did not know the men were government agents. Terrified, he tried to run. The men yelled “stop” but did not identify themselves as law enforcement officers. Soon, one of the men caught up to Osorto, pointed a taser over his heart, and yelled, “Stop or I’ll use it!” Osorto stopped immediately, and the man handcuffed him.
The unidentified, masked, and armed men put Vasquez Perdomo, Osorto, and Villegas Molina into separate cars and drove them to a parking lot where they
authorized to make arrests, never stated that they had arrest warrants, and never informed the plaintiffs of the bases for their arrests.5 Vasquez Perdomo and Villegas Molina have since been released on bond, and the district court ordered that Osorto be released on bond on July 30, 2025.
C. Because of Operation At Large, members of the plaintiff associations have been detained and interrogated or credibly fear they will be detained, regardless of immigration status.
i. United Farm Workers of America
The United Farm Workers of America (UFW) is the largest farm worker union in the country. As of June 2025, UFW has approximately 10,000 members, the majority of whom reside in California, including counties across the Central District. Elizabeth Strater, National Vice President of UFW, attests that the manner in which immigration enforcement operations have been conducted—“including by individuals hiding behind masks, who fail to identify themselves, and wearing military gear—has UFW members and staff fearing for their safety,” regardless of their immigration status. UFW members who are U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, and those who have employment authorization documents, such as H-2A temporary agricultural visas, T-visas, Temporary Protected Status, Deferred Action for Labor Enforcement, or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, nevertheless express fear about being swept up in enforcement actions and seized, arrested, or detained without regard to their authorization to be in the U.S. Through her role as a UFW officer, Strater received a report about a UFW member, “Angel.”
agent then asked: “What hospital?” Angel provided the hospital‘s name. The agent then turned to Angel‘s coworker, asking, “What about you?” The coworker, Roberto, responded in Spanish. The agents exited their vehicle, grabbed Roberto, and loaded him into their truck. Angel started walking away, but the agents demanded that he return. Angel told them again that he is a U.S. citizen. The agents directed Angel to show them his identification. They did not let him leave until he showed them his California ID. Angel fears that agents will stop him again simply because of his apparent race or profession.
ii. Los Angeles Worker Center Network
The Los Angeles Worker Center Network (LAWCN) has eight member organizations. These include CLEAN Carwash Worker Center, the Garment Worker Center, the Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance, the Los Angeles Black Worker Center, the Philipino Workers Center, the Warehouse Worker Resource Center, the UCLA Labor Center, and Bet Tzedek Legal Services. LAWCN‘s member organizations currently represent over 3,800 workers.
CLEAN has approximately 1,800 individual members, all of whom are carwash workers in Southern California. CLEAN has members that live or work in Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernadino, Ventura, and Riverside counties. CLEAN‘s members are “predominantly Latine, with many being immigrants or the children of immigrants.” CLEAN‘s Executive Director is Flor Melendrez.
Since Defendants’ operation commenced in June 2025, dozens of CLEAN members who work at carwashes in Los Angeles and Orange counties have been stopped or arrested by immigration agents. Melendrez is also aware of dozens more carwash workers who work alongside CLEAN‘s members who have been detained or arrested by immigration agents. Based on reports from members, members’ families, and staff, Melendrez understands that “carwashes have been a consistent and ongoing target of immigration agents” and that “agents have targeted some carwashes more than once.”
Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from CLEAN member Jesus Aristeo Cruz Uitz. Cruz Uitz has been a member of CLEAN since 2020. He is 51 years old and has four U.S. citizen children, ages five to sixteen. Before the events at issue in this case, Cruz Uitz had lived in the U.S. for more than 30 years, and he was a resident of Inglewood, Los Angeles County, California. He had no criminal convictions, and no encounters with immigration or law enforcement.
On Sunday, June 8, 2025, Cruz Uitz went to work at a carwash in Los Angeles, where he had been working for about eight years. At about 3:30 p.m., six vehicles pulled up in a “very fast and intimidating” manner and parked at the entrance. Some vehicles were unmarked, others had green stripes that said Border Patrol. About two agents came out of each vehicle, wearing masks. Some of the carwash workers ran, but Cruz Uitz stayed where he was. One of the people who got out of the vehicles approached Cruz Uitz “angrily and grabbed [Cruz Uitz‘s] arms. He was wearing green pants and a black vest. His clothes did not have any symbols or letters.
iii. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) is a nonprofit and membership organization headquartered in Los Angeles, California, with eight offices throughout California.
CHIRLA‘s activities include providing legal services and education. It has approximately 50,000 active members across California. Its membership is predominantly Latino and includes U.S. citizens, non-U.S. citizens with lawful status, and non-U.S. citizens without lawful status. Many of its members belong to mixed-status families—that is, families consisting of both individuals with citizenship or lawful status and individuals without. Many of its members “are day laborers who wait outside Home Depots, carwash workers, and street vendors who sell their products on public sidewalks.”
CHIRLA‘s Executive Director, Angelica Salas, attests that many of CHIRLA‘s members “are experiencing significant levels of fear over the possibility of being grabbed and snatched in immigration raids in public areas based on racial profiling.” Even CHIRLA members with U.S. citizenship, work authorization, or pending applications for legal permanent residency have changed their daily routines out of fear that they will be detained based on their Latino appearance.
D. The District Court‘s TRO
The district court found that Plaintiffs “are likely to succeed in showing [that] seizures requiring reasonable suspicion have occurred.”6 Reviewing Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the stops, it found that the conditions were coercive enough that the interactions were not consensual. The district court also found that Plaintiffs are “likely to succeed in showing that the seizures are based upon the four enumerated factors” or a subset of them. Those factors are (1) apparent race or ethnicity; (2) speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent; (3) presence at a particular location; and (4) the type of work one does. The district court then concluded that “sole reliance on the four enumerated factors does not constitute reasonable suspicion.” And, finally, the district court found that Defendants’ stops based only on the four factors
supported the finding that the challenged practice was approved or authorized by officials. Based on those findings, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ application for the TRO. The TRO provides:7
a. As required by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution , Defendants shall be enjoined from conducting detentive stops in this District unless the agent or officer has reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law.b. In connection with paragraph [a], Defendants may not rely solely on the factors below, alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop, except as permitted by law:
- Apparent race or ethnicity;
- Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent;
- Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.); or
- The type of work one does.
E. Defendants’ Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal
Defendants filed a notice of appeal and an emergency motion to stay the district court‘s TRO pending appeal.
It is important to note the issues Defendants did not raise in their motion for a stay. Defendants did not dispute the district court‘s finding that detentive stops requiring reasonable suspicion have occurred. They did not dispute that these detentive stops have been based solely on the four enumerated factors. They did not challenge the district court‘s findings that those stops are part of a pattern of conduct that has apparent official approval. And, finally, they did not meaningfully dispute the district court‘s conclusion that sole reliance on the four enumerated factors, alone or in combination, does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion. Their motion so states in a single sentence, without argument or citation to any legal authority. In their reply, they addressed that issue in three paragraphs, only one of which makes any reference to legal authority.
Here are the arguments that Defendants do make: They first argue that Plaintiffs cannot show a sufficient likelihood of future injury to support standing for injunctive relief and, even if they can meet the
We begin with two threshold questions: statutory jurisdiction and
A. Statutory Jurisdiction
We have jurisdiction under the
B. Article III Standing
We have jurisdiction to consider “Cases” and “Controversies” “in Law and Equity.”
To satisfy the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” a plaintiff “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact‘—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (cleaned up). There also must be “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (cleaned up). “Because standing is ‘an indispensable part of the plaintiff‘s case,’ it ‘must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.‘” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “At this very preliminary stage of the litigation, [plaintiffs] may rely on the allegations in their Complaint and whatever other evidence they submitted in support of their TRO motion to meet their burden.” Id. “With these allegations and evidence, [plaintiffs] must make a ‘clear showing of each element of standing.‘” Id. (quoting Townley v. Miller, 722 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)).
The record shows—and Defendants do not dispute—that each of the individual plaintiffs, and members of both UFW and LAWCN, were stopped by government agents as part of the challenged operation. That is enough to make a “clear showing” of injury in fact. Id. Defendants challenge only Plaintiffs’ standing to seek prospective injunctive relief.
To have standing to seek an injunction against future unlawful conduct, a plaintiff must show a “sufficient likelihood” that they will suffer a similar injury in the future. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985). “Although questions of standing are reviewed de novo, we will affirm a district court‘s ruling on standing when the court has determined that the alleged threatened injury is sufficiently likely to occur, unless that determination is clearly erroneous or incorrect as a matter of law.” Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010).
In their motion for a stay, Defendants argue that none of the plaintiffs have standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. We consider first whether the individual plaintiffs have standing to obtain equitable relief, and then whether the association plaintiffs have standing to obtain such relief on their members’ behalf.8
1. Individual Plaintiffs
We conclude that each of the individual plaintiffs has standing to seek injunctive relief because there is a “realistic[] threat[]” that each will be stopped without reasonable suspicion as part of Defendants’ Operation at Large. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106.
As we have explained, a plaintiff can show that an injury is likely to recur by “demonstrat[ing] that the harm is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior, violative of the plaintiffs’ federal rights.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The district court here found that Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrated “a pattern of conduct,” and that “a plethora of statements suggest[ed] approval or authorization” of the challenged stop-and-arrest practices, including a recent statement by Defendant Gregory K. Bovino, the Chief Patrol Agent for the El Centro Sector of the CBP. Defendants do not meaningfully dispute these findings, and they are well supported by the record. The sworn declarations describe more than a dozen stops
based on less than reasonable suspicion—targeting Hispanic or Latino people in public places and at businesses like Home Depots and carwashes. Defendants’ declarations corroborate key allegations regarding the commencement of Operation At Large in Los Angeles and the dispatching of “contact teams” to public places and businesses. Their general descriptions of training regarding the requirements for a lawful seizure do little to overcome Plaintiffs’ specific evidence showing a series of similar detentive stops without reasonable suspicion. On this record, we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have shown that the challenged conduct is “part of a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior” and thus that the alleged injury is “likely to recur.” Id. at 997–98 (cleaned up).
Defendants argue that the record fails to show that any specific plaintiff is likely to be stopped again. As they note, the record shows only one individual, J.M.E., has been stopped by Defendants twice. But that one recurrence is significant, especially considering that Defendants’ agents stopped J.M.E. twice in just 10 days—first on June 9, and again on June 19. Gavidia and the other individual plaintiffs were each stopped only once.9 But Defendants made all those stops and dozens more in a single month. Defendants commenced Operation at Large in Los Angeles on June 6, and Plaintiffs submitted their evidence of stops on July 3. Additionally, the record shows that Defendants’ ongoing Operation At Large involves sending contact teams to public places and types of businesses, such as carwashes and
teams to the same place repeatedly. Accordingly, we conclude that there is a “real and immediate threat,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, that Defendants’ patrols will send contact teams to the same locations and encounter the same individuals.
Our conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s holding in Lyons. In that case, police officers subjected Lyons to a chokehold during a routine traffic stop. Lyons sought an injunction against future use of chokeholds by police officers under circumstances “which do not threaten death or serious bodily injury.” Id. at 100. The Supreme Court concluded that Lyons lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because it was “no more than speculation to assert [] that Lyons himself” would again be subject to a chokehold. Id. at 108.
This case is a far cry from Lyons. To start, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the stops themselves, not some subsequent conduct that might occur only after a stop, like a chokehold. In Lyons and other cases where the asserted future injury was insufficient to confer standing, “there was either little indication in the record that the plaintiffs had firm intentions to take action that would trigger the challenged governmental action, or little indication in the record that, even if plaintiffs did take such action, they would be subjected to the challenged governmental action.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (concluding that Lyons‘s risk of future injury was speculative, in part because his claim of future injury depended on him being stopped for a traffic violation or some other offense). The same is not true here. Unlike in Lyons, the individual plaintiffs here cannot escape future injury by avoiding unlawful activity. There is no predicate action that the individual plaintiffs would need to take, other than simply going about their lives, to potentially be subject to the challenged stops.
Further, the district court in Lyons did not make an explicit finding about the likelihood of recurrence, and the record in Lyons did not establish a policy of chokeholds “authorized absent some resistance or other provocation.” 461 U.S. at 110. Here, in contrast, the district court specifically found that the evidence indicates that the challenged stops are part of an officially-sanctioned pattern and that, as a result, there is “a high likelihood of recurrent injury.”
In sum, unlike in Lyons, the district court in this case made an explicit finding of likelihood of recurrence, there is evidence that the complained-of conduct stems from a pattern or practice by Defendants, and there is no specific predicate action required by Plaintiffs to trigger Defendants’ challenged practice. We distinguished Lyons on those same bases in Melendres v. Arpaio, explaining that the district court did not err in finding that the threatened constitutional injury was likely to occur again where “the district court expressly found that the Plaintiffs [were] sufficiently likely to be seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,” the plaintiffs presented evidence that defendants “engaged in a pattern or practice of conducting [the challenged] stops,” and the plaintiffs could not “avoid injury by avoiding illegal conduct.” 695 F.3d at 998 (cleaned up). Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs must provide “direct evidence of an unlawful policy” to establish standing. But no official statement or express policy is required to demonstrate a “pattern of officially sanctioned behavior, violative of the
We therefore conclude that the individual plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of future injury to establish standing to seek injunctive relief.
2. Association Plaintiffs
To establish “associational” standing and bring suit on behalf of its members, an association must show that: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). Further, “[w]here it is relatively clear, rather than merely speculative, that one or more members have been or will be adversely affected by a defendant‘s action, and where the defendant need not know the identity of a particular member to understand and respond to an organization‘s claim of injury,” the organization is not required to “identify by name the member or members injured” to establish associational standing. Nat‘l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that, “[t]o satisfy the requirements of associational standing, all that plaintiffs need to establish is that at least one member faces a realistic danger of” being injured by the challenged practice).
a. Members’ Standing
At least some of each association‘s members would have standing to sue in their own right. UFW and LAWCN each submitted evidence regarding individual members’ experiences of detentive stops. As to CHIRLA, the district court found that it has members who “reasonably fear being subject to the stop and arrest practices challenged in this case.” Based on this reasonable fear, the record shows that CHIRLA members have changed their routines and tried to avoid leaving their homes.
As with the individual plaintiffs, we conclude that the associations’ individual members can establish standing to seek injunctive relief based on a real and immediate threat of future injury. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105. The associations have thousands of members across California and the Central District, and the evidence suggests that Defendants are engaged in a high-volume, District-wide practice of making detentive stops with less than reasonable suspicion. The large scale of the association plaintiffs’ Los Angeles-area memberships “increases the threat of future harm to [the association plaintiffs‘] members.” Cal. Rest. Ass‘n v. City of Berkeley, 89 F.4th 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 735 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013)). In these circumstances, it is highly likely that at least one member of each association will be subject to Defendants’ challenged practices. See id.; see also Fla. State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P., 522 F.3d at 1163
b. Associations’ Interests
The interests the association plaintiffs seek to protect are germane to their purposes. Each of the association plaintiffs has a mission to defend the rights of low-wage workers with various immigration statuses. The association plaintiffs’ stated “institutional goals” to protect “a broad range of rights” for their members is sufficient for purposes of establishing associational standing. Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1990).
c. Members’ Participation
Lastly, neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of the associations’ individual members in this lawsuit. As a general matter, membership organizations may bring constitutional claims on behalf of their members. See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, 600 U.S. at 200–01; Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 108 F.4th 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding organization had associational standing to seek injunctive relief to protect its members’
In sum, we have jurisdiction to decide whether to stay the district court‘s TRO pending appeal, and all Plaintiffs—the individuals and associations—have established their standing to seek prospective equitable relief.
III. DISCUSSION
We next turn to the central question before us: Should we stay the district
We consider the four “Nken factors” in deciding whether to grant a stay pending appeal. The factors are: (A) “whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is
likely to succeed on the merits” of its appeal; (B) “whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay“; (C) “whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties“; and (D) “where the public interest lies.” Newsom, 141 F.4th at 1044 (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009)). A stay pending appeal is “an exercise of judicial discretion“; “[a] stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433 (cleaned up). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433–34.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Appeal
The first stay inquiry is whether Defendants have “made a strong showing” that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Because Defendants cannot succeed on the merits of their appeal unless the TRO is appealable, we begin by addressing that issue. Then we address each of Defendants’ bases for appealing the TRO.
1. Appealability of the TRO
We first address the threshold jurisdictional question that will be a precondition to the merits of Defendants’ appeal: Is the district court‘s TRO appealable?
Under
Here, the district court entered the TRO on appeal after notice, expedited briefing, and a hearing. Defendants “strongly challenged” the district court‘s basis for entering the TRO. Id. at 762. The TRO will remain in effect for longer than 14 days.
We therefore conclude that Defendants are likely to succeed in establishing that the district court‘s TRO is appealable under
2. Sufficient Likelihood of Injury to Warrant Equitable Relief
Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiffs have shown injury sufficient for
For this argument, Defendants principally rely on Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999). In Hodgers-Durgin, this court assumed that even if plaintiffs had established a sufficient threat of future injury to confer
This case is decisively different. It is undisputed that Defendants have been conducting a massive and ongoing immigration enforcement operation in the Los Angeles region since early June. The record shows Defendants’ agents have conducted many stops in the Los Angeles area within a matter of weeks, not years, some repeatedly in the same location. For the association plaintiffs, the likelihood of harm corresponds with the likelihood that one or more of their members will be stopped by one of Defendants’ agents—which, for the reasons discussed above, is considerable.
Based on this record, the district court did not clearly err in “affirmatively find[ing] that there is a real and immediate threat that the conduct complained of will continue.” (Emphasis added). And “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.‘” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d at 1002 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
3. Objections to the Terms of the TRO
Defendants primarily argue that portions of the TRO constitute an impermissibly vague “follow-the-law” injunction. They also argue that the TRO is inconsistent with the
i. Vagueness
Whether the TRO is sufficiently clear is a context specific inquiry that “must be applied in the light of the circumstances surrounding the order‘s entry,” including “litigation history.” Id. at 1133-34 (cleaned up); see also Melendres v. Skinner, 113 F.4th 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2024) (interpreting district court‘s injunction in light of previous orders and “the [district] court‘s exchanges . . . at a status conference before the issuance of the” injunction). When interpreting the district court‘s order, we consider the text of the order itself together with the “accompanying opinion” and other documents attached to the order. See Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 476; cf. Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1132 (permitting incorporation by reference of an exhibit attached to an order). We will not set aside an injunction under
As previously noted, the TRO at issue here provides:
a. As required by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution , Defendants shall be enjoined from conducting detentive stops in this District unless the agent or officerhas reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law.
-
In connection with paragraph [a], Defendants may not rely solely on the factors below, alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop, except as permitted by law:
- Apparent race or ethnicity;
- Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent;
- Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.); or
- The type of work one does.
As Defendants point out, paragraph b. prohibits sole reliance on the four factors to form reasonable suspicion to support a detentive stop, “except as permitted by law.” We agree with Defendants that the “except as permitted by law” clause makes paragraph b. impermissibly vague: what is “permitted by law” is not clear to lawyers and judges, much less lay persons who are the “target of the injunction.” Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1134. We therefore conclude that Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits as to that specific clause. Defendants, however, are not likely to succeed on their remaining arguments.
Defendants contend that paragraph a. is impermissibly vague because it simply “restates the constitutional requirement of reasonable suspicion.” The first paragraph, standing alone, could be an impermissible follow-the-law injunction. But, as the TRO states, paragraph a. must be read “[i]n connection with” with paragraph b., which specifies exactly what Defendants are prohibited from doing. When read together, paragraphs a. and b. prohibit Defendants from making detentive stops based solely on the four factors, or some combination of them. The TRO does not expose Defendants to the threat of contempt when they make a stop based on other factors—even if a court later concludes that Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop.
ii. Fourth Amendment
As Defendants correctly note, when making reasonable-suspicion determinations, “reviewing courts . . . must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Further, in light of Arvizu, we have recognized that “the nature of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” precludes courts from “holding that certain factors are presumptively given no weight without considering those factors in the full context of each particular case.” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Thus, in Valdes-Vega, we concluded that earlier Ninth Circuit decisions “holding that certain factors are per se not probative or are per se minimally probative do not now comply with Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1079. As the Arvizu Court explained, a “divide-and-conquer” analysis of individual factors is inappropriate because, even when each in a series of facts is innocent on its own, those facts may give rise to reasonable suspicion when viewed together. 534 U.S. at 274.
Defendants primarily argue that the TRO runs afoul of Valdes-Vega because, in their view, the TRO enjoins them from relying on the four factors at all, even in combination with other factors.
Defendants also argue that, even if the TRO prohibits only detentive stops based solely on the four factors, the TRO creates a categorical rule about the relevance of those factors which, in Defendants’ view, is inconsistent with the general principle that reasonable-suspicion determinations depend on the “totality of the circumstances.” This argument fails for several reasons.
To begin, the TRO does not create a categorical rule. Rather, the TRO prohibits Defendants from relying solely on the four factors in the context of the current enforcement activities in a particular place, the Central District. The district court concluded that, in that context, the four factors establish only a “broad profile” that, without “additional information that winnows the broad profile into an objective and particularized suspicion of the person to be stopped,” “do[es] not demonstrate reasonable suspicion for any particular stop.” Additionally, the TRO does not establish an impermissible per se rule because it says nothing about how to weigh the four factors in other circumstances or if other relevant factors are present. If future stops are based on additional, relevant facts, those scenarios will be unaffected by the TRO.
Moreover, the TRO‘s rule—that Defendants may not rely solely on the four factors to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop in the Central District—is entirely consistent with the general principle that reasonable-suspicion determinations must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Courts routinely assess specific groupings of factors to determine whether those factors together give rise to reasonable suspicion. That is exactly what a reasonable-suspicion determination entails. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996). Moreover, in Ornelas, the Supreme Court held that a de novo standard of review for reasonable-suspicion determinations is appropriate because “de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law enforcement officers with a defined set of rules” regarding what constitutes reasonable suspicion. Id. at 697. In so holding, the Court acknowledged that, “because the mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, one determination will seldom be a useful precedent for another.” Id. (cleaned up). “But,” the Court explained, “there are exceptions.” Id. The Court went on to identify multiple pairs of cases in which the circumstances of two cases “were so alike” that precedent compelled the same reasonable-suspicion determination
Finally, Defendants argue that the TRO is improper because “some combination of the enumerated factors will at least sometimes support reasonable suspicion for a stop.” Because Defendants “fail[ed] to develop” this argument by offering any analysis, legal authority, or examples in support, we are not obligated to consider it. See, e.g., Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2021). We nonetheless address Defendants’ argument to explain why the TRO is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
The TRO prohibits Defendants from making a detentive stop based only on the following four factors, or some subset of these factors: (1) the person‘s apparent race or ethnicity; (2) that the person speaks Spanish or speaks English with an accent; (3) the person‘s presence at a particular location—whether that be a random location, such as a sidewalk or front yard, or a location selected “because past experiences have demonstrated that illegal aliens utilize or seek work at these locations“; and (4) the type of work the person does or appears to do, even if that is a job that, in the officers’ experience, is more often performed by illegal immigrants than are other jobs.
“The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court considered the Border Patrol‘s authority to stop automobiles in areas near the Mexican border. The Court held that, “[e]xcept at the border and its functional equivalents,” the Fourth Amendment does not allow immigration enforcement officers to make detentive stops unless they are “aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that the persons stopped or detained “may be illegally in the country.” Id. at 884.
Reasonable suspicion must be “particularized and objective.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. That is, an officer must have reasonable suspicion as to “the particular person being stopped.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); accord Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). In making a reasonable-suspicion determination, “the facts must be filtered through the lens of the agents’ training and experience,” Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1079 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885), “but ‘experience’ does not in itself serve as an independent factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1131. “In other words, an officer‘s experience may furnish the background against which the relevant facts are to be assessed,” id., but the officers’ “rational inferences” and “permissible deductions” must “flow from objective facts and be capable of rational explanation.” Nicacio, 797 F.2d at 705.
To form reasonable suspicion, an officer must rely on facts and inferences specific enough that they do not describe “[l]arge numbers,” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886, or a “broad profile” of individuals, United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2006). Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on “generalizations that, if accepted, would cast suspicion on large segments of the lawabiding population.” Id. at 935. Rather, the specific facts articulated “must provide a rational basis for separating out the illegal aliens from American citizens and legal aliens.” Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). Accordingly, “[a] characteristic common to both legal and illegal immigrants does little to arouse reasonable suspicion.” Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 937.
We agree with the district court that, in the context of the Central District of California, the four enumerated factors at issue—apparent race or ethnicity, speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent, particular location, and type of work, even when considered together—describe only a broad profile and “do not demonstrate reasonable suspicion for any particular stop.”
The Central District‘s demographics are relevant to this analysis. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885–87 & n.12 (considering probative value of “apparent Mexican ancestry” near the Mexican border in light of the demographics of the border states). Plaintiffs’ undisputed evidence shows that nearly half—about 47 percent—of the Central District‘s population identifies as Hispanic or Latino.
In the United States generally, apparent Hispanic or Latino race or ethnicity generally has limited probative value, because “[l]arge numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with [Hispanic or Latino ethnicity].” Id. at 886. That probative value is even less in an area like the Central District in which “a substantial part . . . of the population is Hispanic.” Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132.
Speaking Spanish and speaking English with an accent are likewise characteristics that “appl[y] to a sizable portion of individuals lawfully present in this country.” Cf. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 936–37 (discussing the limited probative value of observation that “group members spoke to each other exclusively in Spanish and did not understand English“). These characteristics have very little probative value in the Central District of California. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Language Spoken at Home (Table S1601), Am. Cmty. Survey (indicating that more than 55% of the population in Los Angeles County speaks a language other than English at home, including 37.7% of the population that speaks Spanish at home).
As to location, both the Supreme Court and this court have made clear that an individual‘s presence at a location that illegal immigrants are known to frequent does little to support reasonable suspicion when U.S. citizens and legal immigrants are also likely to be present at those locations. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882–83 (holding that “roving” border patrols must have reasonable suspicion to make stops even on roads “near the border,” because those roads “carry not only aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large volume of legitimate traffic as well“); United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an individual‘s presence on a highway that “smugglers” “common[ly]” used was “of only minimal significance” given that the highway connected various cities and “substantially all of the traffic in and around these cities is lawful” (cleaned up)).
The district court found that Defendants select certain types of public places and businesses because their “past experiences” indicate that illegal immigrants are present at and seek work at those locations. Defendants, however, provide no evidence—not even a bald assertion—that any of the public places or types of businesses they are targeting are used exclusively,
Like location, the type of work one does is at most “marginally relevant to establishing reasonable suspicion,” even if it is work commonly performed by immigrants without legal status. See id. at 937–38. In Manzo-Jurado, we held that a group‘s “appearance as a work crew” was only “marginally relevant” because it was a “characteristic common to both legal and illegal immigrants“—even though officials testified they had encountered “numerous” individuals in that type of work who were present in the country illegally. Id. We have also explained that evidence that a particular employer is employing a large number of undocumented workers does not create reasonable suspicion as to each individual employee. Perez-Cruz v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019).
Even taken together, the four enumerated factors describe only a “broad profile” that does not supply the reasonable suspicion required to justify a detentive stop. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 939. We considered a very similar set of factors in Manzo-Jurado. There, we concluded that the Border Patrol lacked reasonable suspicion that any individuals in a group were in this country illegally where the officers observed that the individuals (1) appeared Hispanic; (2) appeared to be a work crew; (3) spoke Spanish and were unable to speak English; and (4) were within 50 miles of the Canadian border. Id. at 932, 939–40. We held Border Patrol lacked reasonable suspicion to justify its stop based on those facts even though “proximity to the Canadian border supports reasonable suspicion,” id. at 936, and even though Border Patrol had encountered numerous work crews in the city that employed illegal aliens, in some cases, “all illegal aliens,” id. at 938 & n.9.12
As in Manzo-Jurado, the factors at issue here impermissibly “cast suspicion on large segments of the lawabiding population,” including anyone in the District who
A combination of factors that describes a large segment of the population has “weak” probative value and therefore cannot amount to reasonable suspicion “unless . . . combined with other more probative factors,” Nicacio, 797 F.2d at 704, that “corroborate[] [the officers‘] initial suspicions,” Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 939. “Although an officer, to form a reasonable suspicion . . . , may rely in part on factors composing a broad profile, he must also observe additional information that winnows the broad profile into an objective and particularized suspicion of the person to be stopped.” Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 939–40. 13 Because the enumerated factors fail to “provide a rational basis for separating out the illegal aliens from American citizens and legal aliens,” they do not, without more, give rise to reasonable suspicion that an individual is in this country illegally. Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 497 (cleaned up).
In sum, we conclude that Defendants are likely to succeed only on their objection that the TRO is rendered impermissibly vague by the phrase “except as permitted by law.” Defendants have not shown that they are likely to prevail as to any other arguments aimed at the substance of the TRO.
4. Scope of Relief Granted
Finally, in evaluating the likelihood that Defendants will succeed on their appeal of the TRO, we consider the remaining remedial question that would be raised by the appeal: Did the district court exceed its jurisdiction, or abuse its discretion, in entering a district-wide TRO?
“[T]he scope of a district court‘s equitable powers . . . is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (cleaned up). Courts thus have “broad discretion in fashioning a remedy.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1265 (9th Cir. 2015). Injunctions “must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.” Id. But “a federal court may order relief that the Constitution would not of its own force initially require if such relief is necessary to remedy a constitutional violation.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971)); see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d at 1265.
Consistent with the nature of equitable relief, we review the district court‘s “choice of [equitable] remedies” for “abuse of discretion.” Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 861 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1992). Our inquiry is not whether there is some conceivable injunction that is more tailored while providing equal relief; Defendants must establish that “no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id.
We review factual findings underlying the district court‘s decision for clear error, and we review de novo any underlying legal determinations. Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2020). The scope of a district court‘s statutory jurisdiction is a legal question we review de novo; to the extent that determination relies on factual findings, we review those findings for clear error. Cf. Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court‘s findings of fact relevant to its determination of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed for clear error.“).
Here, the district court‘s decision to award temporary preliminary relief relied on factual determinations about the effects that potential remedies would have and whether various remedies would be sufficient to completely rectify the alleged harms. The district court specifically “[found] that the breadth of the TRO is necessary to give Plaintiffs what they are entitled to.” Defendants have not pointed to any clear errors in the district court‘s factual findings, nor can we discern any based on our review of the evidence each side submitted.
As to the breadth of the TRO, one limitation on the district court‘s discretion to order injunctive relief is that, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, district courts likely lack authority to issue “universal injunctions“—orders that “prohibit enforcement of a law or policy against anyone“—to the extent ”broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540, 2548, 2562–63 (2025) (second emphasis added). Party-specific injunctions may “advantage nonparties,” but “only incidentally.” Id. at 2557 (cleaned up).
At the same time, “[t]he equitable tradition has long embraced the rule that courts generally may administer complete relief between the parties.‘” Id. (quoting Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 507 (1928)). Accordingly, we recently held in Washington v. Trump that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a universal injunction in order to give the State[ plaintiffs] complete relief.” — F.4th —, 2025 WL 2061447, at *17 (July 23, 2025).
Here, the TRO enjoining a certain practice of suspicionless stops within the Central District of California is not an impermissible “universal” injunction like the ones disapproved in CASA. One obvious difference is geographical: the injunction here is not national, but limited to one judicial district. But much more importantly, the scope and structure of the TRO is reasonably necessary to provide complete relief to the Plaintiffs and benefits non-plaintiffs only incidentally. Here is why:
Plaintiffs assert that federal officials are stopping people “based not on individualized suspicion, but . . . profiling“—in other words, individuals in the Los Angeles area are being subjected to detentive stops
We considered an analogous injunction in Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501–02 (9th Cir. 1996). Easyriders involved an injunction intended to prevent Fourth Amendment violations by the California Highway Patrol (CHP). The injunction applied statewide, rather than only to the named individual and association plaintiffs. This court explained that due to the nature of the challenged conduct, the injunction was appropriately tailored:
The injunction‘s limitations on the CHP‘s actions against all motorcyclists, instead of an injunction that merely restricts the CHP‘s citation of the named plaintiffs, is appropriate in this case. . . . While there are only fourteen named plaintiffs in this case . . . and an unknown number of members of Easyriders [the association plaintiff], an injunction against the CHP statewide is appropriate. Because . . . it is unlikely that law enforcement officials who were not restricted by an injunction governing their treatment of all motorcyclists would inquire before citation into whether a motorcyclist was among the named plaintiffs or a member of Easyriders, the plaintiffs would not receive the complete relief to which they are entitled without statewide application of the injunction.
Id. 1501–02. Notably, in Easyriders, we held that a statewide injunction was appropriate because it was merely “unlikely” that CHP officers would determine whether someone was a plaintiff before impermissibly issuing a citation. Here, as noted, the nature of the challenged misconduct means that the federal agents will almost certainly not determine whether an individual is a plaintiff (or association member) before stopping them—and here, it is the detentive stop, not any later citation or arrest, that is the asserted constitutional violation.
The inadequacy of a list-of-protected-people injunction is multiplied because the list would have to include all of the members of the plaintiff associations, which have thousands of members who live or work in the area. Requiring organizations to share membership lists with Defendants could raise additional constitutional problems regarding the freedom of association and privacy. Cf. NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.14
In sum,
In sum, Defendants have not established that the district court‘s order likely exceeded the district court‘s authority to completely protect the named individual and association plaintiffs from the threatened injuries.
B. Injury to Defendants
Our second stay inquiry is whether the absence of a stay will irreparably injure Defendants. The burden is on the applicant to show that a stay is necessary to avoid likely irreparable injury. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
Here, Defendants have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury without a stay. The TRO enjoins Defendants only from conducting detentive stops based solely on any combination of a subject‘s race or ethnicity, language or accent, presence at a particular location, or the type of work, in the Central District of Los Angeles. Defendants, of course, “cannot reasonably assert that [they are] harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983).
Defendants also assert that the TRO will have a “chilling effect” on enforcement operations given the threat of contempt for violating the TRO. This argument rests primarily on the premise that the TRO is a vague follow-the-law injunction. Although we agree the TRO‘s “except as permitted by law” clause created such a problem, this order cures it. Likewise, Defendants can no longer profess to be confused about whether the TRO prohibits them from considering the four factors at all—it does not.
In sum, Defendants have not established either of the first two Nken stay factors: they have not established that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal, except as to the “as permitted by law” exception, and they have not shown that they will likely be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal. Although these “first two factors of the . . . [stay] standard are the most critical,” we briefly address the two final factors. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
C. Injury to the Plaintiffs
Our third stay inquiry is whether a stay will substantially injure Plaintiffs. As noted, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs were “likely to suffer irreparable harm” without a TRO, because there was a sufficiently “real possibility that irreparable harm will continue absent the instant TRO in place.” Defendants have failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs would be irreparably injured without a TRO. See supra, Section III.A.2.b. The future injuries from which Plaintiffs seek to be protected are violations of their constitutional rights. “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). For the same reasons the district court concluded a TRO was warranted, we conclude that Plaintiffs would be substantially injured if the TRO were stayed pending appeal.
D. Public Interest
Our final stay inquiry is whether the public interest favors a stay. “[P]ublic interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). As Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that their constitutional rights would be violated absent the TRO, and Defendants have not established that they will be irreparably harmed if the TRO is not stayed, we conclude that the public interest does not weigh in favor of staying the TRO pending appeal.
E. District Court‘s TRO Proceedings
Finally, we address Defendants’ complaint that “any factual findings by the district court were a product of fundamentally unfair procedures,” in part because Defendants had only two business days and a holiday weekend to prepare their materials in opposition to the TRO. That argument is severely undercut by the fact that Defendants had the exact amount of time they requested to file their opposition to Plaintiffs’ TRO application. They requested a deadline of Tuesday, July 8, 2025, to file their opposition to both of Plaintiffs’ proposed TROs, and the district court adopted that deadline. And, like the emergency stay procedure Defendants are invoking now, the district court‘s procedure was, by design, expedited and
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we GRANT Defendants’ motion to stay as to the “except as permitted by law” clause in paragraph b., and otherwise DENY it.
Notes
Plaintiffs contend that these practices stem in part from an official target of 3,000 arrests per day by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
During oral argument, we asked Defendants’ counsel whether the federal government has a policy of directing ICE field offices to make 3,000 arrests or deportations per day—whether that directive may come from ICE, the President, or some other official in the administration. Defense counsel replied that he was aware of no such policy. We asked him to look into the matter and submit a 28(j) letter with an answer.
Defendants submitted a 28(j) letter, which states:
In response to the Court’s inquiry at oral argument, DHS has confirmed that neither ICE leadership nor its field offices have been directed to meet any numerical quota or target for arrests, detentions, removals, field encounters, or any other operational activities that ICE
In opposing the TRO, Defendants submitted a declaration from Andre Quinones, the Deputy Field Office Director of the Los Angeles Field Office ERO. Quinones attested that ERO Los Angeles officers sometimes apprehend illegal aliens by using “targeted investigations” which “focus on aliens with final removal orders and/or serious criminal history.” “Individual targeting packages, consisting of the targeted alien’s immigration history and/or status, criminal history, last known residence and employment information are prepared during the targeted investigation, prior to contact with the targeted alien.” “When non-targeted individuals are encountered during the targeted operations, ERO Los Angeles officers are trained to develop reasonable suspicion through consensual encounters. ERO Los Angeles officers identify themselves to the arrestee at the time of arrest/encounter or as soon as practicable when safe to do so.” Defendants did not provide any evidence that any of the stops experienced by the individual Plaintiffs or described in Plaintiffs’ other evidence involved the detention or arrest of a targeted individual.
When Defendants filed their motion for a stay of the TRO, they provided a supplemental declaration by Quinones in which he states: “Regarding the allegations of Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, Carlos Alexander Osorto, and Issac Villegas Molina, all three arrests arose or were the result of a targeted enforcement action at a particular location where past surveillance and intelligence had confirmed that the target or individuals associated with him were observed to have recruited illegal aliens to work on landscaping jobs. It was also determined to be a location where the target and the workers would get food before heading off for a job.” Notably, Quinones represents only that these Plaintiffs were at a location where the target had been seen in the past. Quinones does not state that any of the Plaintiffs are the target or associates of the target. Nor does Quinones state that agents observed the target at or near the bus stop when they detained the Plaintiffs there.