THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO v. BROOKE E. ROJAS
No. 18SC225
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
October 15, 2019
2019 CO 86
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 15CA126
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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
October 15, 2019
2019 CO 86
No. 18SC225, People v. Rojas—Statutory Interpretation—Plain Language—Theft.
In this opinion, the supreme court considers whether an individual who receives food stamp benefits to which she is not legally entitled is properly prosecuted under
Judgment Reversed
en banc
October 15, 2019
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Rachel K. Mercer, Deputy Public Defender
Denver, Colorado
¶1 Brooke E. Rojas received food stamp benefits to which she was not legally entitled. The prosecution charged her with two counts of theft under the general theft statute,
¶2 Rojas contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss because
¶3 We disagree with Rojas and the division majority. Based on the statute‘s plain language, we hold that the legislature didn‘t create a crime separate from general theft by enacting
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶4 The relevant facts unfolded over the course of a year. In August 2012, Rojas applied for food stamp benefits from the Larimer County Department of Human Services (“the Department“) because she had no income. She received a recertification letter in December, which she submitted in mid-January, stating that she still had no income. And technically that was true. Rojas had started a new job on January 1, but she
¶5 Fast forward to August 2013 when Rojas reapplied for food stamp benefits. Although she was still working, she reported that she had no income. When the Department checked Rojas‘s employment status, it learned that she was not only employed, but making some $55,000 a year (to help support a family of seven). After some more digging, the Department determined that Rojas had received $5,632 in benefits to which she was not legally entitled.
¶6 The prosecution charged Rojas with two counts of theft (for two time periods) under
¶7 Rojas appealed. Applying the factors from People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Colo. 1987), a split division of the court of appeals concluded that “the General Assembly intended section 26-2-305 to supplant the general theft statute.” See People v. Rojas, 2018 COA 20, ¶ 38, __ P.3d __. It then held that “the prosecution was barred from prosecuting Rojas under the general theft statute” and vacated her theft convictions. Id.
¶8 Judge Richman dissented. He concluded that
¶9 We granted the People‘s petition for certiorari review.1
II. Analysis
¶10 After briefly discussing the standard of review, we interpret
A. Standard of Review
¶11 We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation, such as those here. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. In interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Id. To do so, we look first to the statute‘s plain language, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. We may not add or subtract words from the statute, but instead read the words and phrases in context, construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id. at ¶¶ 37–38, 442 P.3d at 389; People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 621, 624.
¶12 We also read the legislative scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts and avoiding an interpretation that would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to an illogical or absurd result. McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further aids of construction. Id.
¶13 From our perspective, the crucial language of
[a]ny person who obtains . . . [food stamp benefits to which they are not legally entitled] . . . by means of a willfully false statement or representation . . . with intent to defeat the purposes of the food stamp program commits the crime of theft, which crime shall be classified in accordance with
section 18-4-401(2), C.R.S. , and which crime shall be punished as provided insection 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. , if the crime is classified as a felony, orsection 18-1.3-501, C.R.S. , if the crime is classified as a misdemeanor. Any person violating the provisions of this subsection (1) is disqualified from participation in the food stamp program for one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense, and permanently for a third or subsequent offense.
¶14 Based on the ordinary meaning of the phrase “commits the crime of theft,” we must assume the legislature meant what it said—when an individual engages in the conduct outlined, he or she commits the crime of theft.
¶15 The legislature has used similar, but more specific, language in other statutes to create a separate crime. For example,
¶16 Thus, the legislature clearly knows how to use the phrase “commits a [crime]” to create a separate crime when it intends to do so. It didn‘t do that in
¶17 So, we‘re done, right? Not quite. Rojas posits several arguments premised on the surrounding statutory language and on another statute that seem to suggest that theft and theft of food stamps are separate crimes. We address each.
C. Rojas‘s Supplemental Arguments Based on the Statute‘s Plain Language
1. The Classification Language
¶18 Rojas contends that our interpretation ignores the statute‘s subsequent language: “which crime shall be classified in accordance with
¶19 We reject this argument because it would render superfluous the plain language that someone who violates
¶20 Moreover, the reference to classification seems to undercut Rojas‘s argument. Consider that, unlike other statutes creating a separate crime,
¶21 By contrast, in
2. Separate Elements
¶22 Rojas also argues that because the general theft statute and
¶23 Let‘s compare the “elements.” The relevant statutory provisions provide that a person commits theft when he or she:
| Knowingly obtains | Obtains |
| Anything of value of another | Food stamp benefits |
| By deception | By means of a willfully false statement |
| With the intent to permanently deprive the other person of the use or benefit of that thing of value | With the intent to defeat the purposes of the food stamp program |
[b]y incorporating the theft statute, the effect of
section 26-2-305(1)(a) is to specify that food stamps are a thing of value, akin to dollars, and that although obtained from a government agency that issues but does not “own” the food stamps, the agency nonetheless has a proprietary interest in the food stamps, as provided in18-4-401(1.5) .
Rojas, ¶ 49 (Richman, J., dissenting).
¶24 Thus, reading
3. Separate References
¶25 Lastly, Rojas directs us to
D. Bagby
¶27 We decline to analyze this statute under Bagby because that analysis is unnecessary. Courts employ the Bagby factors when discerning whether the legislature, by enacting a specific criminal statute, intended to preclude prosecution of the same conduct under a more general criminal statute. Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1061–62. In other words, the Bagby factors serve as a tool to determine legislative intent when that intent is unclear. Here, however, the legislature‘s intent is clear from the statute‘s plain language. Thus, a Bagby analysis is unnecessary.
III. Conclusion
¶28 The legislature didn‘t create a separate crime by enacting