THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO v. ALEXIS ANTONIO BROWN
No. 19SA30
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
June 24, 2019
2019 CO 63
Honorable Jann P. DuBois, Judge
Intеrlocutory Appeal from the District Court, El Paso County District Court Case No. 18CR4295. Order Reversed en banc.
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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
June 24, 2019
2019 CO 63
No. 19SA30, People v. Brown — Search & Seizure — Reasonable Suspicion — Investigatory Stop.
In this original proceeding pursuant to
The supreme court considers whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant to determine his identity. Because the officer received a report of a domestic disturbance, saw the defendant walking away from the location of the reported disturbance immediately thereafter, and saw no one else in the area, we hold that the officer had reasоnable suspicion to stop the defendant to determine his identity. The supreme court therefore reverses the district court‘s suppression order and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff-Appellant:
The People of the State of Colorado,
v.
Defendant-Appellee:
Alexis Antonio Brown.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District
Austin Lux, Deputy District Attorney
Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District Attorney
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Jeremy Wooten, Deputy Public Defender
Colorado Springs, Colorado
¶1 While on patrol, a police officer heard a man and woman arguing behind the gate of a storage facility. When the officer called dispatch to report the disturbance, he was informed that a call had just come in regarding a possible domestic disturbance involving a man named Alexis Brown at that same location. Seconds later, the yelling stopped, and the offiсer saw a man walking away from the storage facility; the man was the only visible person in the area. The officer stopped the man and asked his name. When the man gave his name as Alexis Brown, the offiсer realized that it matched the name given for the possible domestic disturbance. The officer then ran a records check on Brown‘s name and found that there was an active warrant for his arrest, at which point Brown was taken into custody; a subsequent search revealed methamphetamine in his pocket.
¶2 Brown was not charged for the domestic disturbance, but he was charged based on the mеthamphetamine. Prior to trial, the court concluded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initially stop Brown, and it thus suppressed all evidence arising from the encounter. The Pеople filed this interlocutory appeal. We now reverse.
¶3 We conclude that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion that Brown was involved in an act of domestic violence. Hence, we reverse the trial court‘s suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶4 Officer Fernandes was in his police car, with the windows down, on patrol near a storage facility in Colorado Springs. As he passed the storage facility, he heard what he believed to be a man and woman yelling on the other side of the facility‘s locked gate, but he cоuld not see the people. The officer contacted police dispatch to advise them of this disturbance. Dispatch informed the officer that they were currently receiving a call rеgarding a possible domestic disturbance at his location; specifically, a woman had called to report that her significant other, Alexis Brown, had damaged the windshield of her car. When the officer finished communicating with dispatch, the yelling had stopped. At this time, the officer saw a man leaving the area; the man was the only person the officer saw. The officer contacted the man and asked him to identify himself. The man identified himself as Alexis Brown and provided his birthdate.
¶5 The officer ran a records check on Brown‘s name and birthdate, which indicated that there was an active warrant for Brown‘s arrest. Another officer arrived on the scene, took Brown into custody, and brought him to jail. While Brown was being searched prior to being put into the jail, methamphetamine was found in his pocket. Ultimately, the prоsecution did not bring charges regarding the reported domestic disturbance, but it did charge Brown with multiple crimes based on the methamphetamine found in his pocket.1
¶6 Brown moved to suppress the evidencе arising from his encounter with the officer, including the subsequent discovery of methamphetamine. He argued that the police had no reason to stop him. The court granted his motion, stating that “[t]here was no nexus between this alleged criminal activity and the defendant that would have justified an investigatory stop. There‘s no description that was even given to the officer of an alleged individual [who] had supposedly committed these acts.”
¶7 The People filed a timely interlocutory appeal.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
¶8 Pursuant to
III. Analysis
¶9 We begin by laying out the controlling authority regarding reasonable suspicion. We then apply that law to the facts of this case and conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown. Hence, we reverse the trial court‘s order suppressing the evidence arising out of this encounter.
A. Law
¶10 Both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions require that searches and seizures by the government be supported by probable cause.
¶11 When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a person, courts look to the totality of circumstances, keeping in mind that “[a]n officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the circumstantial evidence ‘even though such evidence might also support other inferences.‘” People v. Threlkel, 2019 CO 18, ¶ 20, 438 P.3d 722, 727 (quoting People v. Reyes-Valenzuela, 2017 CO 31, ¶ 14, 392 P.3d 520, 523). We have prеviously listed some nonexhaustive factors to be considered when making this determination:
(1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he fled; (2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; (3) the number of persons about in that area; (4) the known or probable direction of the offеnder‘s flight; (5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and (6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in some criminality of the type presently under investigation.
People v. Bell, 698 P.2d 269, 272 (Colo. 1985) (quoting People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101, 108 (Colo. 1983)).
¶12 With these standards in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case.
B. Application
¶13 In finding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Brown, the trial court focused on the lack of a physical dеscription from dispatch. While that is certainly a factor, it is not dispositive; instead, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. Considering all of the circumstances, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown.
¶14 To begin, the officer had received a report that a crime had just been, or was being, committed by a male who was at or near the storage facility. The officer had heard yelling before he called dispatch, but the yelling had stopped by the time he finished talking to dispatch; therefore, it was reasonable to believe that the disturbance had just ended, and that the parties may be leaving the immediate area. While dispatch did not provide a physical description of Brown, the officer could reasonably conclude that he was looking for a male who was still at or near the storage facility, but who was in the process of leaving the area. In sum, Brown was the only person in the area where
¶15 Brown argues that the storage facility was next to a tavern, suggesting that there was a perfectly innocent explanation as to why he was in the area at that time. That may be so, but “[a] reasonable, articulable suspicion ‘may exist even where innocent explanations are offered for conduct.‘” Reyes-Valenzuela, ¶ 14, 392 P.3d at 523 (quoting People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo. 2011)). Therefore, the fact that Brown сould have been coming from the tavern does not defeat the officer‘s reasonable suspicion.
IV. Conclusion
¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown. Hence, we reverse the trial court‘s suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.