THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO v. TONY LEE ASHFORD
No. 19SA226
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
March 2, 2020
2020 CO 16
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Intеrlocutory Appeal from the District Court, El Paso County District Court Case No. 19CR684, Honorable Gregory R. Werner, Judge. Order Reversed en banc.
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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
March 2, 2020
2020 CO 16
No. 19SA226, People v. Ashford—Fourth Amendment—Scope of Investigatory Stops.
After a police officer felt a pill bottle in the defendant‘s jacket during the course of an investigatory stop, the officer asked the defendant, “I know this is a pill bottle, what is it?” In rеsponse, the defendant removed a pill bottle from his pocket and showed it to the officer, who could see that it contained baggies of illegal drugs. In this case, the supreme court considers whеther that question exceeded the scope of the investigatory stop. Because the supreme court concludes that the officer‘s question did not measurably extend the stop of the defendant, it holds that the question about the pill bottle did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop. Thus, it reverses the district court‘s suppression order.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District
Andrew Lower, Deputy District Attorney
Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District Attorney
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee:
Jennifer Charlier Cox, Deputy Public Defender
Colorado Springs, Colorado
¶1 While searching Tony Ashford for weapons in the сourse of an investigatory stop, a police officer felt a pill bottle in Ashford‘s pocket and asked him, “I know this is a pill bottle, what is it?” Ashford then took the bottle out of his pocket, and the officer сould see that it contained baggies of methamphetamine. Ashford was arrested, and after a more thorough search, he was charged with several drug-related offenses, as well as six habitual offender counts.
¶2 Ashford moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The district court granted Ashford‘s motion, finding that the officer‘s question about the pill bottle exceeded the scope of the stop. The People filed this timely interlocutory appeal.
¶3 Because we conclude that the officer‘s question did not measurably extend the stop of Ashford, we hold that the question аbout the pill bottle did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop. Thus, we reverse the district court‘s suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶4 A man told police officers on patrol that he had just argued with Ashford and Ashford‘s girlfriend, and that he was concerned Ashford was going to “lay hands” on his girlfriend. He further informed the officers that Ashford regularly sold methamphetamine.
¶5 Shortly thereafter, another officer located Ashford and his girlfriend and asked them to stop so that he could speak with them about the domestic abuse allegations. Ashford appeared nervous. The officer patted Ashford down for weapons and felt a pill bottle in Ashford‘s jacket pocket. The officer asked Ashford, “I know this is a pill bottle, what is it?” In response, Ashford removed a pill bottle from his pocket and showed it to the officer, who could see that it contained baggies of methamphetamine. The officer then arrested Ashford and conducted a more thorough search of him, during which he discovered $233 in small-denomination bills and unused baggies.
¶6 The People charged Ashford with one count each of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, as well as six habitual offender counts.
¶8 In response, the People filed this interlocutory appeal.1
II. Standard of Review
¶9 A district сourt‘s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is a “mixed question of law and fact.” People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 13, 450 P.3d 724, 728 (quoting People v. Threlkel, 2019 CO 18, ¶ 15, 438 P.3d 722, 727). When reviewing such an order, we defer to the district court‘s factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Id. But we review the district court‘s conclusions of law de novo. Id.
III. Analysis
¶10 We begin by laying out the controlling authority for investigatory stops. We next apply that law to the facts and conclude that the officer‘s question about the pill bottle did not measurably extend the stop of Ashford, meaning it did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop.
A. Law
¶11 Both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions protect against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
¶12 An investigatory stop complies with the Fourth Amendment if it satisfies three criteria:
(1) [T]he [investigating] officer [has] “an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting (i.e., a reasonable suspicion) that criminal activity has taken place, is in progress, or is about tо occur“; (2) the intrusion‘s purpose [is] reasonable; and (3) the character and scope of the intrusion [are] “reasonably related to its purpose.”
People v. Reyes-Valenzuela, 2017 CO 31, ¶ 11, 392 P.3d 520, 522-23 (quoting People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998)).
¶13 Under the third criterion, “a shift in investigatory purpose is not improper when the underlying detention remains lawful.” People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶ 26, 379 P.3d 330, 336 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005), and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). Moreover, “off-topic questioning is permissible as long as it does not ‘measurably extend’ the stop.” Id., 379 P.3d at 337 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333). In other words, “the
¶14 We applied this law in Ball. In that case, an officer approached a car based on reasonable suspicion that an argument between the car‘s occupants would escalate to domestic violence. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7, 407 P.3d at 583. Because the officer recognized symptoms of drug use, he asked one of the car‘s occupants if he could speak to her; she consented, and when she left the car, thе officer asked her “whether there was anything illegal in the car and . . . when she had last used methamphetamine.” Id. at ¶ 6, 407 P.3d at 583. At that point, the woman offered to show the officer the methamphetamine, pipe, аnd scale that were in the car. Id.
The district court concluded that the initial stop was permissible because it “was justified by reasonable suspicion to investigate for domestic violence.” Id. at ¶ 7, 407 P.3d at 583. However, it ruled that the officer “exceeded the parameters of the investigatory stop” once he realized that no acts of domestic violence were occurring but nevertheless continuеd to ask about drugs. Id. We reversed because, as relevant here, the officer used “minimally intrusive investigative methods” that “fell well within the range of techniques associated with diligently pursuing a limited investigatory stop.” Id. at ¶ 14, 407 P.3d at 585. Thus, thе officer‘s question about what was in the car and when the defendant had last used methamphetamine did not measurably extend the stop. See id. at ¶¶ 10-14, 407 P.3d at 584-85.
¶15 With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts of Ashford‘s casе.
B. Application
¶16 The district court here effectively concluded that the officer‘s stop of Ashford satisfied the first two requisite criteria for a valid investigatory stop because (1) the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Ashford might be a threat to his girlfriend‘s safety;2 and (2) the officer had legitimate safety concerns justifying the search for weapons, rendering the initial pat-down reasonable. Thus, the issue is whether the third criterion—that the character and scope of the intrusion were reasonably related to the stop‘s purpose—was satisfied. We conclude that it was.
¶17 The facts of this case are comparable to those in Ball. As in that case, the district cоurt found that the officer here had reasonable suspicion to investigate Ashford for domestic violence. During his brief search of Ashford for weapons, the officer felt what he thought was a pill bottle аnd asked Ashford one short question about it. This led to Ashford producing the pill bottle without any request to do so by the officer. While the question was off-topic, we have explicitly stated that off-topic questioning is permissible so long as it does not measurably extend the investigatory stop. See Chavez-Barragan, ¶ 26, 379 P.3d at 337. The officer asked a single question, which took mere seconds. Hence, like in Ball, the question asked here was minimally intrusive and did not measurably extend the investigatory stop.
¶18 Thus, we hold that the question about the pill bottle did not exceed the scope of the investigatory stop.
IV. Conclusion
¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court‘s suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT
delivered the Opinion of the Court.