UTILICORP UNITED, INC., d/b/а Missouri Public Service Company, Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative, Inc., and NW Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., Appellants, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Respondent.
No. SC 83599.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Dec. 18, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 2002.
75 S.W.3d 725
MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Todd Iveson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., James R. Layton, State Sol., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
Missouri‘s sales and use tax law offers an exemption from sales or use tax for purchases of equipment directly used in manufacturing. The parties agree that the production of electricity is within the definition of manufacturing under Missouri‘s sales and use tax law. The question presented here is whether transformers, voltage regulators, and other equipment used between the electric genеrators and the place where the electricity is delivered to the customer are used directly in manufacturing within the meaning of section 144.030.2(4) and (5).1
The utilities seeking the sales tax exemption bear the burden of proving their entitlement to the exemption. While a plausible, if somewhat strained, argument might be made that the manufacturing process for electricity сontinues up to the point of delivery to the customer, the
The administrative hearing commission held that the utilities do not qualify for the exemption. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal.
Facts
The facts are stipulated. Utilicorp United, Inc., NW Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., and Sho-Me Electric Cooperative, Inc., are Missouri electric utilities that sell electricity to their customers.2 Utilicorp, a for-profit corporation, and Sho-Me, an electric cooperative formed under
During the tax period in question, Utilicorp had approximately 246,000 customers in western Missouri in four different groups: commercial, residential, retail and wholesale. Sho-Me had 27 customers in south-central Missouri and elsewhere, and its customers were electric cooрeratives, municipalities and one industrial customer. NW had seven electric-cooperative customers in northwest Missouri and elsewhere.
All three utilities have substations and other equipment sites throughout their service areas for delivering electricity to their customers. Electric utilities recognize three stages in providing electricity to customers: production, transmission, and distribution.
Production refers to the generation of electricity by converting the potential of coal, nuclear fuel, or dammed water into electricity. Production also refers to the purchase of electricity, generated by someone else, for resale to a utility‘s own customers.
Transmission involves the transfer of electriсity from generating sources to local distribution systems. Transformers, regulators, and other equipment are used to change the voltage, amperage, or power factor of electricity to facilitate its transmission across various distances within the utility‘s system.
Distribution involves transfer of electricity to the customers. Distribution also utilizes various devices and equipmеnt, some of which change the voltage, amperage, or power factor of electricity to meet the customers’ demands or regulatory standards.
The equipment purchases for which the utilities claim a tax exemption include:
(1) Step-down transformers: transformers used to reduce the voltage and increase amperage, predominately at substations or on poles or transformer pads near the customers’ meters. These pur
(2) A current transformer: a small transformer connected to the power system and in this case located in a power substation to take measurements оf currents and voltages. Utilicorp claimed a $32.70 refund for the use tax paid on one current transformer.
(3) Capacitors: instruments located in the vicinity of the customers and useful for controlling voltage to meet regulatory standards for delivery of power to the customers. Sho-Me claimed a refund of $243.36 and NW claimed a refund of $440.26 in use taxes on purchases оf capacitors.
(4) Supervisory control and data acquisition hardware: equipment used to provide information back from the distribution system to the control equipment for the generator in order to adjust the generators’ outputs to the needs of the customers. Sho-Me claimed $3,078.66 and NW claimed refunds of $13,117.15 of use tax on such hardware.
Discussion
None of the equipment on which use tax refunds are claimed is used in generating electricity. The parties agree that generating electricity is manufacturing within the meaning of the statute, section 144.030.2(4)3 and (5).4
The question is whether the transmission and distribution of electricity are also “manufacturing.” Because this case involves an exemption from sales and use tax, it is the taxpayers’ burden to show that they qualify for the exemption. Sections 136.300.1 and 2 and 621.050.2, RSMo 2000.5 See, e.g., Westwood Country Club
This Court‘s decision in Galamet, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 915 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. banc 1996), traces the various factual settings of manufacturing, which includes the changing of an item or product so as to make it suitable for a new use. Production of intangibles, such as computer data, may be included as manufacturing. International Business Machines Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 958 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Mo. banc 1997).
Once coal, nuclear fuel or dammed water has been converted into electricity by the generating process, it is rational to conclude that a “product” has been “manufactured.” But since electricity is invisible, if not exactly intangible,6 discussions of electricity tend to involve the use of analogies and figures of speech. We speak of “currents” and “flows” in the same way we describe water.7
The utilities invite us to think of the production and distribution of their product the way we think of cement, a product whose manufacturing is completed in cement mixers as it is being delivered.8
On the other hand, the director of revenue invites us to think of the product as analogous to the process in House of Lloyd v. Director of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d 914 (Mo. banc 1992), which involved the repackaging and shipping of items already manufactured.
These analogies to the world of visible objects are helpful in supplying the mental imagery needed to discern how far the concept of manufacturing can be stretched to fit the various stages of electric production, transmission, and distribution. Employing these analogies, the cement mixer example falls short because the raw materials, including water, sand, and gravel, are put in the mixer, which makes a new product while it is being delivered. The essential question is: Does the transforming and regulating of electricity by these devices result in a “new” product or simply the “repackaging” of an existing product? The repackaging example seems closer to the point.
The product—electricity—may have its voltage increased, and thereby its amperage reduced, for transmission across distances.9 And its voltage may be reduced and its amperage thereby increased near the customer‘s meter to deliver electricity at a voltage suitable for the customer‘s needs. But the essential product, and the total electric powеr expressed in watts, remains fundamentally unchanged from
It is, thus, rational as well to conclude that the equipment whose purchase is at issue here is used in the transmission and distribution of the product and is not, in the words of section 144.030.2(4) and (5), “used directly” in manufacturing.
To carry their burden of showing that they qualify for the exemption, the utilities contend that the equipment in each case is рart of an “integrated plant.” See Concord Publishing House, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 916 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Mo. banc 1996), and DST Systems, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 43 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Mo. banc 2001). DST Systems is pertinent, the utilities contend, because the Court held that DST‘s computer system was part of an integrated plant that produced printed statements through a different, but related, corporation and at a site apart from the DST computers. The equipment at issue here is not at the generator sites, but rather is dispersed throughout the utilities’ service areas.
DST Systems is of no help to the utilities. Much of the electricity transmitted and distributed by them is not generated by them. In particular, NW has no generating facilities and, thus, clearly cannot show that its facilities are part of anyone‘s integrated plant.
More fundamentally, none of the utilities can show that, through the use of this equipment, the utility makes something new and different, whether it generates the electricity or buys the electricity from others. Though volts and amperes may change during the transmission and distribution, not every change is “manufacturing.” L & R Egg Co. v. Director of Revenue, 796 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. banc 1990). See also House of Lloyd v. Director of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d at 914. The total amount of electric energy does not change very much from the point of generation to the points of use.10 Electric energy is sold by its producers and distributors in quantitiеs of power over a time period, commonly expressed as “kilowatt-hours” or “megawatt-hours.” A kilowatt of power can be 100 volts at 10 amperes, or it can be 1,000 volts at one ampere. The product is the same; only its measurements change. By either measure it is the same product, and nearly the same total amount of product.10
The essentiаl character of electricity—the aggregation of subatomic particles that utilities can generate, transmit, distribute, measure and sell—is not changed by the equipment at issue here. Nothing is added and nothing is subtracted in the transmission and distribution process.11
Most items of the equipment at issue here are step-down transformers used to reduce the voltage to a lеvel that custom
Conclusion
This Court concludes that the utilities have not carried their burden of showing that the equiрment at issue here, which clearly is used in the transmission and distribution of their product, was used directly in manufacturing and thereby entitled to be exempt from sales or use taxes. Accordingly, the Commission‘s decision is affirmed.
WHITE, HOLSTEIN, BENTON and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ., concur.
PRICE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; LIMBAUGH, C.J., concurs in opinion of PRICE, J.
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion. The basis of my dissent is simple. Missouri law provides an exemption from sales and use tax for equipment “used directly in manufacturing ... or producing a product“.
The distinctiоn made by the majority is not one expressly stated in the statute. The sales and use tax law makes no specific reference to any generation, transmission, or distribution distinctions.
The majority mistakenly designates the “product“, electricity, as if it were sold raw at the generating plant. Instead, the “prоduct” is the electricity that is sold at the point of use, after it has been transmitted and transformed to a voltage consistent with its use. All of the equipment at issue is necessary to provide the electricity where it is needed and in a voltage that can be used. Electricity simply is not a product that is commonly sold to consumers, either industrial or residential, on a “cash and carry” basis.
Even though some of the utility taxpayers buy electricity generated by others and merely transmit and distribute it to Missouri customers, the integrated plant doctrine is applicable. DST Systems, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 43 S.W.3d 799 (Mo. banc 2001), is precisely on point.
As stated above, the “product” is not a theoretical analogy or image. The electricity that a consumer buys is delivered to the consumer in usable form. The activities оf transforming, transmitting, and distributing the electricity from the plant to the ultimate customer is just as necessary to the “manufacturing” and “producing” of the product as is the generation of the electricity itself. The majority of other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have ruled accordingly. City of Louisville v. Howard, 306 Ky. 687, 208 S.W.2d 522 (1947); Northern States Power Company v. Comm. of Rev., 571 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1997); Maine Yankee Atomic Power v. State Tax Assessor, 690 A.2d 497 (Me. 1997); Curry v. Alabama Power Company, 243 Ala. 53, 8 So.2d 521 (1942). Only New York, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Wanamaker, 286 A.D. 446, 144 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955), aff‘d, 2 N.Y.2d 764, 157 N.Y.S.2d 972, 139 N.E.2d 150 (1956), and Georgia, Forrester v. North Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 66 Ga. App. 779, 19 S.E.2d 158, 163-64 (1942), stand apart.1
