United Illuminating Co. v. GroppoUnited Illuminating Co. v. Groppo
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- Glass
The dispositive issue in this tax appeal is whether the trial court properly held that certain machinery and equipment at three electricity generating plants owned and operated by the plaintiff, United Illuminating Company (taxpayer), constitute “machinery and production equipment” at an “industrial plant” within the meaning of § 12-426-26 (d) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, and thereby qualify for an exemption from the sales tax imposed on services to “industrial, commercial or income-
The trial court found the following facts, which are undisputed. The taxpayer is a public utility company that generates electricity for distribution to consumers in south central Connecticut. The taxpayer has three plants in Bridgeport and New Haven, each of which
In reviewing a decision of the trial court sustaining a taxpayer’s appeal from a deficiency assessment, this court must determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, or whether the decision is otherwise legally erroneous. See
We note at the outset the principles of statutory construction that govern the applicability of a tax exemption. “First, statutes that provide exemptions from taxation are a matter of legislative grace that must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Second, any ambiguity in the statutory formulation of an exemption must be resolved against the taxpayer. Third, the taxpayer must bear the burden of proving the error in
The purchase by a taxpayer of services for the maintenance of industrial, commercial or income-producing real property is subject to the sales tax under
Whether the generation of electricity constitutes manufacturing for the purposes of a sales tax exemption is a question of first impression in this state. In determining this question, we need not undertake a scientific discussion of the nature of electricity or its generation by mechanical means. See, e.g., Frederick Electric Light & Power Co. v. Frederick, 84 Md. 599, 600-602, 36 A. 362 (1897). Rather, we rely on the legislative history and construction of the Sales and Use Tax Act as a whole for our conclusion that electricity generation is not manufacturing.7 While the generation of electricity may in some sense be a “manufacturing” process, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to exempt businesses engaged in the generation of electricity for public consumption from the tax on services rendered to machinery and production equipment under
In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Tex
Starting with the language of the statute itself, as we must; see, e.g., Lundy Electronics & Systems, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner, 189 Conn. 690, 695, 458 A.2d 387 (1983); we note that
Where particular words or sections of a statute, considered separately, are imprecise, we may look to the expressed intent of the statute as a whole. State v. Burney, 189 Conn. 321, 326, 455 A.2d 1335 (1983); see also Ruskewich v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 19, 25, 566 A.2d 658 (1989). Thus, in construing the terms “industrial real property,” as used in
Senator Audrey P. Beck, the sponsor of the bill to eliminate the sales tax on machinery and equipment, gave the following two reasons in support of the legislation: “The first is that in the judgment of the Committee, the sector of the business community having the greatest difficulties is the manufacturing sector and, therefore, by eliminating the sales tax on machinery and equipment, we feel that we will be stimulating the
The legislative intent is further illuminated by comments made by Representative Wright at public hearings of the Joint Standing Committee on Finance.16 In response to a question about the meaning of “manufacturing” under the act,17 Representative Wright stated: “Let me try to explain a little bit of the rationale about what we did. We had limited number of dollars to work with and we felt that it was our purpose and our intention to put those tax incentives where we thought they
The legislative history of § 12-412 (34) demonstrates that the elimination of the sales tax on machinery and equipment was intended to encourage the growth and development of “true” manufacturing industries in Connecticut. See Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co. v. Groppo, 204 Conn. 122, 135, 527 A.2d 672 (1987). We conclude that the exemption claimed by the taxpayer pursuant to § 12-426-26 (d) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, for services rendered to machinery and equipment at an industrial plant, was motivated by the same concerns.18 “[Wjould the term
The case law in other jurisdictions supports our conclusion that machinery and equipment used for the generation of electricity is not “machinery and production equipment” at an “industrial plant” pursuant to § 12-426-26 (d) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies because the generation of electricity is not “manufacturing” within the meaning of the Sales and Use Tax Act.19 The commissioner properly calls our
The taxpayer refers us, however, to a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota which held that electricity is a “manufactured, marketable product” for the purposes of a property tax exemption. In re Answer of Minnesota Power & Light Co., 289 Minn. 64, 75, 182 N.W.2d 685 (1970). The Minnesota law at issue exempted “[tjools and machinery which by law is considered as personal property used or useable in . . . the manufacture, processing, production, sale or distribution of marketable products . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 67. In dicta, the court reviewed with approval earlier Minnesota decisions and decisions from other jurisdictions which held that electricity generation is manufacturing. Id., 72-73. The holding in In re Answer of Minnesota Power & Light Co., however, turned on the question of whether electricity is a “marketable product” within the meaning of the statutory exemption. Id., 73-75.
The definition of manufacturing in Potomac Edison Co. v. Commonwealth, supra, is substantially similar to the definition set forth in § 12-426-llb (10) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. See footnote 5, supra. Nevertheless, we reject as unnecessarily technical the reasoning of the Pennsylvania court in that case. The holding of In re Answer of Minnesota Power & Light Co., supra, is inapplicable because it did not depend, as does the exemption claimed by the tax
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving the error in an adverse assessment concerning an exemption. Plastic Tooling Aids Laboratory, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 369. Where there is any ambiguity in the applicability of an exemption, we must uphold the assessment of the commissioner. Id. The taxpayer in the present appeal has not sustained its burden. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court in favor of the taxpayer. We agree with the taxpayer, however, that a remand to the trial court is necessary for a factual determination of the nature of the subject property. See footnote 4, supra.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
The trial court found that smokestacks at the taxpayer’s plants did not qualify as machinery and production equipment within the meaning of the regulation and, thus, were taxable under
Because the trial court found that the subject property qualified as machinery and production equipment at an industrial plant, the court did not determine whether it was real or personal property. The trial court stated: “If the issue was whether or not the equipment maintained were fixtures according to Connecticut law, an inquiry would have to be made whether or not each component was attached to the realty and intended to be permanently so attached. Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 215-16 [477 A.2d 988] (1984). However, § 12-426-26 (d) of Conn. Agencies Regulations, adopted by the Department of Revenue Services obviates such an inquiry.” We agree with the taxpayer, therefore, that our reversal necessitates a remand to the trial court to determine whether the component parts of the taxpayer’s facilities are real or personal property.
Section 12-426-llb (10) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies defines “manufacturing” as follows: “ ‘Manufacturing’ shall mean the performance as a business of an integrated series of operations which places personal property in a form, composition or character different from that in which it was acquired for sale in the regular course of business by the manufacturer. The change in form, composition, or character must be a substantial change, and it must result in a transformation of property into a different product having a distinctive name, nature and use. Operations such as compounding or fabricating are illustrative of the types of operation which may result in such a change. ‘Manufacturing’ is an activity which shall occur solely at an industrial plant.”
Section 12-426-llb (11) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “ ‘Manufacturing production process’ shall mean any one of a series of production activities, beginning with the movement of the raw materials after their receipt, inspection and storage, to the first production machine and ending with the completion of the finished product, including any packaging operations, for its sale to the ultimate consumer. ‘Manufacturing production process’ shall not include any activities prior to the first production stage (such as collecting, weighing and storing raw materials) or any activities following the last production stage (such as casing, loading or delivering to the consumer). ‘Manufacturing production process’ shall occur solely at an industrial plant.”
Other jurisdictions have relied on legislative intent to hold that the generation of electricity is not manufacturing for the purpose of a tax exemption. See State v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 116 La. 144, 150, 40 So. 597 (1906); Frederick Electric Light & Power Co. v. Frederick, 84 Md. 599, 600-603, 36 A. 362 (1897); Commonwealth v. Northern Electric Light & Power Co., 145 Pa. 105, 118-21, 22 A. 839 (1891). As the court stated in Frederick Electric Light & Power Co. v. Frederick, supra, 600-602: “In determining [the question of whether an electric light company is a manufacturing industry], we do not deem it necessary to attempt a scientific discussion of what electricity is. . . . Whether an electric light company can properly be said to ‘manufacture’ electricity or whether it simply brings into action that which is already made, we need not determine. The Mayor and Aldermen of Frederick have . . . undertaken to exempt certain property from municipal taxation and we are simply to determine whether the appellant can reasonably be said to be within the meaning and intention of this legislation.”
Public Acts 1947, No. 228; Public Acts, Spec. Sess., February, 1948, No. 1, §§ 5, 6, 7. The original enactment contained no provision for the tax on services at issue in this appeal.
Public Acts 1947, No. 228, § 7. In 1989, this section was amended to exempt, among other things, electricity used directly in an “industrial manufacturing plant.” Public Acts 1989, No. 89-251, § 12. During the House debate, Representative David Lavine, who introduced a successful amendment to revise the method of determining eligibility for the exemption, stated that the commissioner would use “SIC codes” to determine whether a given taxpayer qualified as an “industrial manufacturing plant.” 32 H.R. Proc., Pt. 29, 1989 Sess., pp. 10,159-60. “SIC codes” refers to the categories set forth in the Standard Industrial Classification Manual periodically published by the United States Office of Management and Budget. Reliance on the SIC codes would exclude public utilities engaged in the generation of electricity from the term, “industrial manufacturing plant,” as the SIC Manual (1972 and 1987 Eds.) separates manufacturing industries (Codes 2011 to 3999) from public utilities, including “[e]stabllshments engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy for sale” (Code 4911).
See also
General Statutes (1949 Rev.) § 2096 (r), enacted by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., February, 1948, No. 1, § 7, provided in relevant part: “production materials. Sales of and the storage, use or other consumption of materials, tools and fuel or any substitute therefor, but excluding machinery or replacement parts thereof used in production . . . which are consumed and used directly in . . . an industrial plant in the process of the manufacture of tangible personal property to be sold. Sales of and the storage, use or other consumption of materials, tools and fuel or any substitute therefor, but excluding machinery or replacement parts thereof used in production, when such products are used and consumed directly in the furnishing of power to an industrial manufacturing plant or in the furnishing of . . . electricity when delivered to consumers through mains, lines or pipes.” (Emphasis added.) This provision of the act is now codified as
This court construed the original provision exempting the sale of public utilities to consumers as follows: “The exemption is of ‘the sales, furnishing, or service of, gas, water, electricity, telephone and telegraph,’ and it is, therefore, an exemption only from the sales tax. It does not, however, exempt such companies generally from that tax but only as regards service delivered to customers ‘through mains, lines or pipes.’ The careful delineation of the bounds of this exemption gives unusual force to the principle that the express mention in a statute of one exemption precludes reading others into it. . . . The provision unmistakably shows a legislative intent that, as to sales other than those specified, public utility companies should be subject to the sales tax, and shows that there was no intent to exempt them generally from that tax.” (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128 (1948).
The minimal legislative history available on the exemption for materials, tools and fuel supports such an interpretation. At a hearing on the sales tax bill, state tax commissioner Walter W. Walsh explained the exemption for materials, tools and fuel as follows: “If the article purchased is for tangible property to be produced for sale, assembling or processing or whatever is consumed in such cases and no tax should be on the material. A purchase of oil which is going into a machine making up things is not taxed. Parts making up things eventually used for resale, no tax. Many parts incorporated into the same for parts to be sold, no tax.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Finance, 1947 Sess., p. 46. The statute as revised exempts materials used “in the actual fabrication of the finished product to be sold” rather than “in the manufacture of tangible personal property to be sold.”
No. 78-71, § 4, of the 1978 Public Acts added the following subsection to the Sales and Use Tax Act: “(gg) Sales of and the storage, use or other consumption of machinery used directly in a manufacturing or agricultural production process. The word ‘machinery’ as used in this subsection means the basic machine itself, including all of its component parts and contrivances, such as belts, pulleys, shafts, moving parts, operating structures and all equipment or devices used or required to control, regulate or operate the machinery, but excluding office equipment or data processing equipment other than numerically controlled machinery used directly in the manufacturing process.”
21 S. Proc., Pt. 3,1978 Sess., p. 1151. This court has recognized that the statement of the legislator who reported the bill out of committee is entitled to particular weight and careful consideration in discerning legislative intent. Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 15 n.4, 434 A.2d 293 (1980).
21 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5,1978 Sess., pp. 1948-49. Representative Arthur Della Vecchia also expressed support for the bill, noting that “presently the tax discourages the expansion of industry in our State.” He commended the Joint Committee on Finance for being “aware of the problems facing the manufacturers in our State” and “acting constructively to create a better climate for business and industry.” Id., pp. 1963-64.
While we generally review a statute’s legislative history based on the Senate and House debates, we may also consider discussions before a joint standing committee when discerning legislative intent. North Haven v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 556, 564 n.11, 600 A.2d 1004 (1991).
Statement of Warren Seder, president of the Connecticut Dispensing Company and member of the board of directors of the Connecticut Automatic Merchandising Council. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Finance, Pt. 2, 1978 Sess., pp. 547-49.
We reach this conclusion in part because § 12-426-26 (d) of the regulations, as well as the other regulations relevant to this appeal, took effect on April 7,1980, only two years after
See State v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 116 La. 144, 40 So. 597 (1906) (electric company not a “manufacturer” within meaning of clause in state constitution exempting manufacturers from license taxes); Frederick Electric Light & Power Co. v. Frederick, 84 Md. 599, 36 A. 362 (1897) (electric light company is not “manufacturing industry” within meaning of exemption from municipal taxation); Commonwealth v. Northern Electric Light & Power Co., 145 Pa. 105, 22 A. 839 (1891) (company that generates electricity is not “manufacturing company” within meaning of statutory exemption for capital stock of manufacturing companies); Potomac Edison Co. v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. Commw. 1, 411 A.2d 1287, aff‘d, 491 Pa. 432, 421 A.2d 214 (1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901, 101 S. Ct. 1965, 68 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1981) (electric company is not entitled to manufacturing exemption from franchise tax); but see Curry v. Alabama Power Co., 243 Ala. 53, 8 So. 2d 521 (1942) (corporation engaged in generation and distribution of electricity is a “manufacturing corporation” within meaning of use tax act provision exempting machines used in manufacturing tangible personal property); Morley v. Brown & Root, Inc., 219 Ark. 82, 239 S.W.2d 1012 (1951) (dam to be used for generation of electricity is “manufacturing facility” within meaning of use tax act exemption); Kentucky Electric Co. v. Buechel, 146 Ky. 660, 143 S.W. 58 (1912) (electric company was “manufacturing establishment” within meaning of city ordinance exempting such establishments from taxation); In re Answer of Minnesota Power & Light Co., 289 Minn. 64, 182 N.W.2d 685 (1970) (electricity is “manufactured, marketable product” within meaning of property tax exemption for tools and machinery used in the manufacture of “marketable products”); Department of Revenue v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 179 Mont. 255, 587 P.2d 1282 (1978) (electricity generation is “manufacturing process” and, therefore, generating complex is “new industrial property” within meaning of statute providing special property tax treatment); People ex rel. Brush Electric Mfg. Co. v. Wemple, 129 N.Y. 543, 29 N.E. 808 (1892) (electric company was “manufacturing company” within statutory exemption from corporation taxes).