UTAH REPUBLICAN PARTY, and UTAH DEMOCRATIC PARTY, Plaintiffs, υ. LT. GOVERNOR SPENCER J. COX, Defendant.
No. 20160077
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
April 8, 2016
2016 UT 17
This opinion is subject to revision before final Publication in the Pacific Reporter
On Certification from the United States District Court for the District of Utah
The Honorable David Nuffer
Case No. 2:16-cv-00038
Attorneys:
Marcus R. Mumford, Salt Lake City, Christ Troupis, Eagle, Idaho, for plaintiff Utah Republican Party,
Troy L. Booher, Charles A. Stormont, David Billings, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Utah Democratic Party,
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Pursuant to
- In interpreting
Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(d) ,§ 20A-9-406(3) and§ 20A-9-406(4) , does Utah law require that a Qualified Political Party (QPP) permit its members to seek its nomination by “either” or “both” of the methods set forth in§ 20A-9-407 and§ 20A-9-408 , or may a QPP preclude a member from seeking the party‘s nomination by gathering signatures under§ 20A-9-408 ? - If a registered political party (RPP) that has selected to be designated as a Qualified Political Party (QPP) fails to satisfy the requirements of a QPP, must the Lieutenant Governor treat that political party as a RPP under Utah law?
We address the first question, but have determined that the second is not ripe and therefore decline to respond, as explained below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶2 “‘When a federal court certifies a question of law to this court, we are not presented with a decision to affirm or reverse . . . [and thus] traditional standards of review do not apply.’ Rather, ‘we answer the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying dispute.‘” Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2015 UT 83, ¶ 8, 359 P.3d 614 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 20A-9-101 REQUIRES THAT QPP PARTY MEMBERS MAY CHOOSE THE METHOD OF CANDIDACY QUALIFICATION
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(12) “Qualified political party” means a registered political party that:
. . .
(d) permits a member of the registered political party to seek the registered political party‘s nomination for any elective office by the member choosing to seek the nomination by either or both of the following methods:
(i) seeking the nomination through the registered political party‘s convention process, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 20A-9-407 ; or(ii) seeking the nomination by collecting signatures, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 20A-9-408 . . . .
¶4 We begin our construction of this portion of the statute by examining its plain language. We conclude that its contents, including its grammatical structure, clearly evince the legislature‘s meaning: to meet the definitional requirements of a QPP, a political party must permit its members to seek its nomination by “choosing to seek the nomination by either or both” the convention and the signature process. The Utah Republican Party has offered two basic arguments in opposition to this interpretation of the statute‘s plain language: (1) the language actually permits the party, not the member, to choose either or both of the methods; and (2) a contrary interpretation is inconsistent with
¶5 We cannot accept the Republican Party‘s first assertion—it simply ignores the structure of the statutory language “permits a member” and “by the member choosing to seek the nomination by . . . .” Our reading is also consistent with the language of
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(1) This part shall be construed liberally so as to ensure full opportunity for persons to become candidates and for voters to express their choice.
(2) This part may not be construed to govern or regulate the internal procedures of a registered political party.
The Republican Party argues that our plain language construction of
¶7 Finally, we reject the Republican Party‘s argument that we should avoid an unconstitutional interpretation of
II. THE CERTIFIED QUESTION REGARDING THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR‘S OBLIGATIONS IS HYPOTHETICAL AND NOT RIPE FOR DECISION
¶8 Notwithstanding our acceptance of the second certified question, our review of the record and the parties’ arguments in this matter persuades us that it is purely hypothetical and not ripe for review. Two of the parties—the Lieutenant Governor and the Republican Party—conceded this lack of ripeness at oral argument.
¶9 At present there are multiple options available to the Republican Party once this court‘s interpretation of the QPP statute is published, and it is not clearly established in the record which of those the party will choose. According to the February 11, 2016 order of the federal district court, the Chairman of the Utah Republican Party sent a letter to the Lieutenant Governor in December 2015 declaring that “it would restrict its candidate-selection procedures to the convention method, thereby prohibiting any URP candidate from gathering signatures.” The letter cited by the federal court does not refer to any process by which the Utah Republican Party could or would revoke the membership of a non-compliant candidate.
¶10 More recently, however, counsel for the Republican Party in this case made the following statement to the federal district court on February 24, 2016: “[I]f the state
¶11 We note further that in essence the Utah Democratic Party has asked us, on a certified question of law, for relief in the nature of an extraordinary writ—to order the Lieutenant Governor to take action based on ambiguous statements of intent by different representatives of the Republican Party. Such relief, premised on hypothetical future facts, is inappropriate in this procedural setting. If the Republican Party chooses to comply with the requirements of the QPP statute as confirmed in this opinion, the relief sought by the Democratic Party (i.e., to require the Lieutenant Governor to declare the Republican Party a “registered political party” ineligible for QPP status) will be moot. If the Republican Party chooses otherwise, perhaps by actually ejecting a member from the party, there may emerge an actual injury, conveying standing to seek relief in an appropriate forum. In the meantime there is no controversy ripe for resolution, and no basis for mandating future actions by the Lieutenant Governor.
CONCLUSION
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