United States v. WilliamsUnited States v. Williams
Wu appealed to the BIA. It adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ. After noting the various grounds cited by the IJ for denying the motion to reopen, the BIA rejected Wu‘s contention that his untimely motion warranted sua sponte reopening. It found no merit in Wu‘s arguments.
Wu filed a timely petition for review.2 He continues to rely on the Matter of X-G-W as authority for the relief he seeks and contends that the BIA erred by not recognizing that his multiple children make him prima facie eligible.3
We find no basis for granting the petition for review. Wu‘s reliance on Matter of X-G-W is misplaced. It was superceded by In re G-C-L. As a result, the policy announced in Matter of X-G-W of liberally reopening an alien‘s asylum proceeding based on a coercive population control policy does not apply to Wu‘s motion to reopen, which was filed in 2005 after the BIA rescinded the policy in In re G-C-L. Wu asserts that his multiple children make him prima facie eligible for asylum. The BIA, however, acknowledged the IJ‘s finding that there was no evidence that Wu had multiple children, and therefore concluded that there was no merit to Wu‘s claim. This determination was not an abuse of discretion. The record contains no more support for this claim than Wu‘s asylum application listing three names as children. The age and gender of these alleged children, as the IJ noted, were never mentioned or provided.
Because the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ‘s denial of Wu‘s motion to reopen, we will deny the petition for review.
Elizabeth T. Hey, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Court Division, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Darryl Williams was convicted by a jury of two counts of bank robbery in violation of
I.
Williams was charged with robbing two banks in June 2003. In the first robbery on June 6, a man entered Sovereign Bank in Folsom, Pennsylvania, demanded money from a teller and ran out after receiving $640. This robbery was captured on the bank‘s surveillance camera. In the second robbery on June 18, a man who, witnesses say, bore a resemblance to the Sovereign robber, entered a Citizens Bank in Glenolden, Pennsylvania. This man demanded money from the teller station but grabbed $422 from the teller before she could comply.
The primary issue at trial was the height of the bank robber in each of these robberies. Witnesses to the robberies testified that the robber was anywhere from 5‘2” to 5‘7” tall. Williams is 6’ tall. The
Williams challenges the District Court‘s admission of Smith‘s testimony concerning reverse projection photogrammetry on the grounds that the technique fails to satisfy any of the five Daubert criteria for admission of expert testimony. The District Court found under the preponderance standard that Smith‘s testimony met the requirements of
II.
We review the District Court‘s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 847 (3d Cir.1995). Although the Supreme Court has made clear that federal trial judges, pursuant to
The parties do not dispute that Smith‘s testimony satisfies the first and third requirements of
The second requirement, that the expert testify to scientific, technical or specialized knowledge, is at issue here. The Supreme Court clarified in Daubert that this requirement is intended to ensure the reliability or trustworthiness of the expert‘s testimony. See Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Daubert enumerates a number of factors to be considered by a district court in its assessment of whether the testimony‘s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786. These factors
Williams argues that the District Court erred in admitting Smith‘s testimony because the government failed to proffer evidence demonstrating the reliability of Smith‘s reverse projection photogrammetry technique as it was used in this case, including evidence that the technique has been published or subjected to peer review, evidence as to the technique‘s error rate, evidence as to the standards controlling the technique‘s operation, or evidence that the technique, as used in this case, is accepted by anyone outside of the FBI. We disagree.
The trial judge is granted a certain degree of latitude to determine whether the Daubert factors or any other set of reasonable reliability criteria are appropriate measures of reliability in a particular case. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. All of the Daubert factors do not necessarily apply to each case nor are these factors a comprehensive list of all possible measures of reliability. ”Daubert‘s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Moreover, depending on the facts of each particular case, the factors do not have to be weighed equally. The factors merely guide the judge‘s determination of the admissibility of evidence, a determination to which we afford great deference.
Under the liberal Daubert standard, the plaintiffs do not have to prove to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that their expert‘s testimony is correct, they must only show that it is reliable. The requirement of reliability is lower than the standard of correctness. A judge can find an expert opinion reliable if it is based on “good grounds” or methods and procedures of science rather than on subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The judge does not have to determine that these methods are necessarily the best grounds to ascertain certain facts, but only that the evidence presented will help the trier of fact.
Additionally, the reliability factor is not a strict requirement that should be used to exclude all questionably reliable evidence. “The reliability of evidence goes ‘more to the weight than to the admissibility of the evidence.‘” Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849 (citing United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir.1992)). In order to be admissible, evidence need only be sufficiently reliable to help the trier of fact. In re Paoli R.R., 35 F.3d at 744.
Here, the government proffered a detailed explanation of the technique of reverse projection photogrammetry. Smith testified about the methodology used in the technique and detailed how the methods were applied in this case. He also testified that he has published articles about the technique and that it is employed by the FBI and by a few other law enforcement agencies.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining, based on this evidence, that the reverse projection photogrammetry technique is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the admis
Once the foundation for admissibility required by Daubert has been established, concerns about the validity of an expert‘s conclusions should not result in the exclusion of the expert‘s testimony. Rather, such concerns should be presented to the jury through cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence and careful instruction on the burden of proof. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987).
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm Williams’ conviction.
RENDELL
Circuit Judge