United States v. Theodore Carrington, Jr.United States v. Theodore Carrington, Jr.
Argued: September 20, 2023
Decided: January 23, 2024
Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Heytens and Senior Judge Floyd joined.
ARGUED: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, PA, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:
Theodore Carrington appeals the district court‘s order finding him “subject to the [civil-commitment] provisions of
I. Legal Framework
Carrington‘s appeal deals with the unfortunate reality that some criminal defendants are mentally incompetent to stand trial and are thus committed to specialized government institutions pretrial. And some of those defendants have persistent mental illnesses that make them dangerous enough to warrant their long-term commitment, even if they are not convicted of a crime. But the Constitution rightly prohibits a person from being detained indefinitely just because he falls into the former category. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). So, to commit a criminal defendant beyond the time needed to determine whether his competency to stand trial may be restored, the government must institute civil-commitment proceedings to establish that he falls into the latter category. Id.
Two federal statutes implement these principles:
A. Section 4241
During a criminal prosecution, either the defendant or the government may request a hearing to determine the defendant‘s mental competency.
After the hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, it “shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.”
The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility—
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and
(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until—
(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or
(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;
whichever is earlier.
B. Section 4246
Section 4246 picks up where
hold a hearing to verify the director‘s finding.
As the statute makes clear, not every hospitalized person may face civil-commitment proceedings. Rather,
C. Moving from § 4241 to § 4246
Often litigated is the question of whether someone fits into the second category of hospitalized people in
We‘ve interpreted it to mean that, at the time the
When the criminal court issued only one
person challenge the duration of any custody period, or only the most recent one (at least in the civil-commitment court)?
We have opted for the latter approach. See Curbow, 16 F.4th at 114–17. When a person challenges a
To illustrate how this works, consider our two recent cases: United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 394, and United States v. Curbow, 16 F.4th 92.
After Wayda was charged with federal sex offenses, the criminal court held a
and entered its third order committing him to the Attorney General‘s custody to determine whether he qualified for civil commitment under
Six months later, the government filed a
In Curbow, we explained further why Wayda focused on the custody period between the criminal court‘s last commitment order and the certificate‘s filing. Like Wayda, Curbow‘s federal prosecution was also interrupted for competency proceedings. Curbow, 16 F.4th at 100. After an initial hearing, the criminal court determined that Curbow was incompetent and committed him to the Attorney General‘s custody “for a period not to
exceed four months” to determine the likelihood of restoring his competency and to assess his dangerousness under
Thirty days later, the government found that Curbow remained incompetent, that there was not a substantial likelihood of restoring him, and that he satisfied
Thus Curbow had endured three commitment orders, each with its own argument of impermissible delay. So he filed a motion to dismiss in the civil-commitment court, arguing that he was not “committed to the custody of the Attorney General” under
The civil-commitment court denied Curbow‘s motion, and we affirmed. Id. at 118. To start, we held that the period of custody
We then declined to consider whether potential delays in the earlier periods of custody meant that the Attorney General‘s custody over Curbow expired before the
criminal court issued its third custody order. Id. at 114–17.4 Doing so would have required us to hold that, upon review of the civil-commitment court‘s denial of a motion to dismiss, the criminal court lacked authority to issue more commitment orders based on past delays. Id. at 115, 116 n.11 (declining “to entertain Curbow‘s theory, as it would require review of orders issued in criminal proceedings . . . by a different district court“). After all, appellate courts typically do not pass on the validity of one court‘s orders while on appeal from an entirely different court.
But that did not leave Curbow without recourse for delays following the first two commitment orders. It simply meant he had to challenge the alleged delays in the criminal court. Id. at 115. In fact, we gave an example of how Curbow could have done so: He could have requested the criminal court release him on account of the delays; and if the
court denied that request, then he could have invoked the collateral order doctrine to get our review of the denial. Id. Unfortunately for Curbow, though, he never raised these delays after the first two commitment orders in the criminal court. Id. at 115–16. So he forfeited these arguments in that court.5 Id. And he couldn‘t revive them in a challenge to the civil-commitment certificate‘s validity. Id.
* * *
Yet
II. Background
Now we can turn to the facts of Carrington‘s case. On November 6, 2020, Theodore Carrington sent a threatening email to Senator Ron Johnson‘s whistleblower email address. Carrington later admitted doing so. So on January 4, 2021, a federal grand jury for the Middle District of North Carolina indicted Carrington for transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce, in violation of
At his detention and arraignment hearing in January 2021, Carrington made several bizarre claims, including that he had been “poisoned” and hit with a “microwave weapon,” and that the government was “persecuting [him] and making [him] . . . agitated and trying to defend [him]self for something that isn‘t real.” J.A. 42–56, 59. At the close of the hearing, the district court ordered Carrington detained, noting that his release would “pose a risk of danger to the community.” J.A. 72.
Shortly after the hearing, the defense moved for, and the court ordered, a competency evaluation of Carrington under
The court agreed and convened a hearing on August 20, 2021. At the hearing, the government presented expert testimony that Carrington suffered from delusional disorder and recommended that he be hospitalized under
waiting period to enter federal medical centers and estimated that the restoration period would take four months. Carrington‘s counsel responded by expressing concern that the government would not complete its competency evaluation within the required four-month statutory window. Nevertheless, the district court found that Carrington was incompetent to stand trial, so it ordered him committed to the Attorney General‘s custody for hospitalization and treatment “for a reasonable period of time not to exceed four months.” J.A. 150. The district court also noted that if the government could not meet the four-month deadline, it could contact the court and provide more information. The court later entered an order on August 23, 2021, summarizing its conclusions and formally committing Carrington to the Attorney General‘s custody.
government‘s request, the Eastern District issued a stay of the civil action, pending completion of the Middle District‘s criminal competency proceedings.
The Middle District eventually conducted a competency and restorability hearing on August 26, 2022. The government‘s expert, who had prepared the restorability report, testified to her conclusions about Carrington‘s condition and the unlikelihood of restoring him. But at the close of evidence, Carrington‘s counsel asked to “put on the record” Carrington‘s objections to a delay in his evaluation process. J.A. 268. She noted Curbow and stated:
Essentially the objection for the record is this, Your Honor: The Defendant does not waive and objects to the period between August 23, 2021, which would be the Court‘s order at D-35 transporting him for evaluation, and the end period of that report of May 15, 2022, for the purpose of review of the [A]ttorney [G]eneral‘s subject matter jurisdiction over the Defendant and on the issue of unreasonable delay.
J.A. 269. She pointed out that Curbow found a defendant had waived his objections to custody delays by not raising them in the criminal court and then again stated that she wanted to present the issues to the Middle District in case Carrington‘s lawyer in the civil proceedings wanted to make timeliness objections in the Eastern District. J.A. 269–70.
The Middle District, confused by this assertion, asked what Carrington‘s attorney was arguing and how it related to the criminal case. She rephrased her Curbow-related statements several times, but the district court still didn‘t understand. So it instructed
Carrington to file a motion explaining the position and deferred ruling on Carrington‘s competency.7
Carrington‘s counsel filed a “notice” with the Middle District soon after, clarifying the objections raised at the hearing. She explained the case‘s procedural posture and the alleged delay in her client‘s
On September 15, 2022, the Middle District entered an order concluding that Carrington was incompetent to stand trial and that there was not a substantial probability of restoring his competency. It therefore found him “subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
One day later, the government moved to dismiss the indictment against Carrington without prejudice. The Middle District granted the motion, and Carrington filed the instant appeal.
The government later asked the Eastern District to lift the stay on the civil-commitment proceedings. After conducting a
III. Discussion
In this appeal from the criminal court (i.e., the Middle District), Carrington argues that the Middle District erred in finding him “subject to the provisions of
or, in the alternative, under the collateral order doctrine. But neither avenue opens the door for our review. Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
A. Final Judgment Rule
Section 1291 gives federal courts jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts.”
These principles preclude our review of Carrington‘s case as a final judgment. Carrington appeals from the Middle District‘s dismissal of his indictment without prejudice. That‘s not a conviction and sentence; so it‘s not a final judgment.
Carrington seems to acknowledge he is fighting an uphill battle; yet he still contends that the dismissal of a criminal indictment without prejudice is an appealable final judgment because of our recent decisions in Bing v. Brivo Systems, LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020), and Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc). In Bing, we held that the dismissal of a civil complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim qualifies as a final judgment if “the grounds for dismissal clearly indicate that no amendment in the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiff‘s case.” 959 F.3d at 610 (quoting Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Loc. Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1993)). And in Britt, our en banc court went a step further and established a bright-line rule that “[w]hen a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without granting leave to amend, its order is final and appealable.” 45 F.4th at 791. Carrington believes these decisions indicate that the dismissal of a criminal indictment without prejudice is an appealable final judgment, at least when the district court fails to specify whether further amendment of the indictment is possible.
But Carrington‘s argument misses the key distinction between those cases and his own: Bing and Britt involved dismissals of civil complaints in civil cases. Neither decision purported to alter the fundamental jurisdictional principles that govern criminal cases. Nor could they have—the criminal final judgment rule comes from binding Supreme Court precedent. See Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 798 (“In criminal cases, [§ 1291] prohibits appellate review until after conviction and imposition of sentence.“); see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003). Altering it is above our pay grade. Besides, principles of finality in criminal cases have never been treated as coextensive with principles of
finality in civil cases. Criminal administration demands stricter adherence to rules of finality. See, e.g., Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853–56 (1978); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (noting that the policies behind finality “are especially compelling in the administration of criminal justice“). So there‘s no indication that Bing and Britt have any bearing on whether the district court‘s dismissal of Carrington‘s criminal indictment is a final judgment. Accordingly, we‘re left with the conclusion that it is not one.
B. Collateral Order Doctrine
That said, the Supreme Court has long recognized a narrow exception to the final judgment rule, known as the collateral order doctrine, which regards certain non-final judgments as “final decisions”
Few orders qualify for this exception. And even fewer do so in criminal cases, because the compelling interest in speedy criminal trials requires us to interpret the
collateral order exception “with the utmost strictness.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984)). Hence, the Supreme Court has applied the exception to only four types of orders in criminal cases: orders denying motions to reduce bail, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); orders denying motions to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977); orders denying motions to dismiss under the Speech and Debate Clause, see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1979); and orders authorizing forced medication of criminal defendants, see Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.
But this Court has identified other such orders. Most relevant here, we have held that
Carrington argues that, because
Recall that the order followed a hearing convened to determine whether Carrington remained incompetent and unrestorable for trial. So the order stated the Middle District‘s findings that Carrington was incompetent to stand trial and that there was no substantial probability that his competency could be restored such that
But the mention of
remain there until the Eastern District disposed of the civil-commitment proceedings. So the September 15 order is not an appealable custody order.
To his credit, Carrington never explicitly argues that the September 15 order is a custody order. But he does assert that it is a collateral order because it “conclusively resolved the question of the applicability of
Yet we conclude that the Middle District‘s order lacked binding legal effect. This is for three reasons: First, the criminal court need not find that
Starting with the first, nothing in either
And once we hop over to
Nor were the Middle District‘s factual or legal conclusions about Carrington‘s competency to stand trial binding on the Eastern District‘s civil-commitment determinations. They couldn‘t have been—the Middle District‘s competency determination was under
Finally, the Middle District‘s order did not resolve the timeliness of any alleged delay in Carrington‘s
violations twice: at the August 26 hearing and in his post-hearing filing. But neither time did he request any relief from the court. At the hearing, he simply asked to “put on the record” that he “did not waive and object[ed]” to alleged delay in his custody. J.A. 268–69. And in his filing, he clearly stated that he was flagging the issues solely to preserve objections to be raised in the Eastern District. See J.A. 292 (“Mr. Carrington respectfully herein Notices in the criminal trial court his objection to the delays represented
The Middle District‘s notation about Carrington‘s objections is not relevant to whether we have jurisdiction to review this appeal. The Middle District decided nothing relating to the timeliness of Carrington‘s
estoppel only applies to those “issues which have been actually determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This all leads to the conclusion that the evidence Carrington points to—namely, that the Middle District and Eastern District mentioned each other in their respective proceedings—doesn‘t show that the order at issue affected the Eastern District‘s legal determination. That evidence merely shows the two courts recognized that their proceedings were related. When the Middle District acknowledged that, “depending on” whether Carrington was incompetent and unrestorable, “[t]he Eastern District would take care of” his civil commitment, J.A. 283, it was not saying that the Eastern District was legally dependent on the Middle District‘s factual or legal findings. Rather, it was recognizing that civil commitment might not be necessary depending on how Carrington‘s criminal case was resolved. If the Middle District determined that Carrington was competent to stand trial, or that he was likely to be restored, then there would be no need for civil commitment since his trial might eventually proceed. But if the court found him incompetent and unrestorable—as it did—then the government would need to go forward with civil commitment. So the Eastern District was only dependent on the Middle District in the sense that the latter‘s findings might render the former‘s proceedings unnecessary.
And the fact that the Eastern District issued a stay supports this conclusion, Carrington‘s contentions notwithstanding. Indeed, the government requested that stay because it recognized that “a finding of competency by the [Middle District] would allow the criminal proceedings to move forward and negate the need for the [] commitment proceedings.” United States v. Carrington, No. 5:22-hc-01093-BO (E.D.N.C. June 29,
2022), ECF No. 5. Put differently, the government wanted a stay in the civil proceedings because the Middle District‘s competency and restorability determination might obviate the need for civil commitment—not because the Eastern District needed to wait for the Middle District‘s factual or legal conclusions before forging ahead.
What, then, was the effect of the Middle District‘s statement that Carrington was “subject to the provisions of
* * *
On appeal from the dismissal of Carrington‘s criminal indictment, he asks us to review the timeliness of his
order nor an otherwise-reviewable collateral order. So we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of Carrington‘s claims. The appeal is therefore
DISMISSED.