UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Shawon McBRIDE, Appellant.
No. 10-2689.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
June 8, 2011.
Submitted: Feb. 14, 2011.
641 F.3d 471
Shawon McBride, Oklahoma City, OK, pro se.
John Vanderslice, Assistant Attorney, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender‘s Office, Lincoln, NE, for Appellant.
Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Shawon McBride pleadеd guilty to possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine, in violation of
I. Background
McBride entered into an agreement with the government to plead guilty to possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cоcaine, in violation of
The PSR hеld McBride responsible for 24 grams of crack cocaine and calculated a base offense level of 26 under the drug-quantity table of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7) (2009). After applying a three-level credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
McBride moved to continue the original sentencing date of May 10, 2010, citing recent legislation passed by the United States Senаte that would increase the threshold quantity of crack cocaine triggering a five-year statutory minimum sentence from five grams to 28 grams. McBride asserted that “if the law changes regarding the triggering drug quantity for such offenses, [he] would likely be at 0 to 20 year offense as opposed to the present 5 to 40 year offense apрlicable in this case.” The district court granted McBride‘s motion, setting the new sentencing date for June 28, 2010.
On June 23, 2010, McBride moved to continue the rescheduled sentencing date for 60 days, again citing the impending change to the statutory sentencing scheme applicable to his offense. The district court denied the motion.
At sentenсing, the district court accepted the plea agreement and adopted the facts and Guidelines calculations set forth in the PSR. The court stated that MсBride‘s Guidelines range was 60 to 71 months’ imprisonment. McBride‘s counsel agreed with the probation department and the government, per the plea agreement, thаt a 60-month sentence was “an appropriate sentence under the circumstances of this case.” But counsel expressed his “hop[e] that ultimately Cоngress changes the crack cocaine guidelines and statutory mandatory minimums.” Counsel informed the court that McBride would “probably take an appeal just in the hopes of keeping this case alive and hopefully getting the benefit of a law change at some point down the road.” According to counsel, if Congress changed the law, such change would pose “some interesting questions” as to “whether it would be retroactive or not.” Counsel asked the district court to impose a “low end sentence” of 60 months’ imprisonment, and the district court did so. After McBride‘s sentencing, the FSA became law.
II. Discussion
McBride makes three arguments on appeаl. First, he argues that the FSA, which eliminated the five-year minimum sentence for offenses involving five or more, but less than 28, grams of crack, should be applied retroactively to him. McBride contends that the pre-FSA sentencing scheme to which he is subject no longer “furthers any legislative purpose” and “is at odds with a changed constitutionаl landscape.” Second, he asserts that the general savings statute,
Our precedent forecloses McBride‘s argument that the Fair Sеntencing Act applies retroactively. See, e.g., Orr, 636 F.3d at 958 (“Thus, as we have previously recognized, Congress expressed no desire in the FSA that the law be appliеd retroactively, and consequently the federal Savings Statute clearly forecloses Orr‘s argument for retroactive application.“) (citing
And, as to McBride‘s argument that the Equal Protection Clause requires retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, the Seventh Circuit recently explained:
[I]n the absence of a clear congressional mandate—and the Act says nothing about retroactivity—the savings statute applies to penalty amendments. United States v. Stillwell, 854 F.2d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir.1988). Moreover, courts have long and uniformly rejected equal-protection challenges to the 100:1 crack-powder sentencing disparity. See, e.g., United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc); United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1168-71 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1506, 1508-09 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 753-56 (7th Cir.1991).
United States v. Robinson, 405 Fed.Appx. 72, 73 (7th Cir.2010) (unpublished order).
In Robinson, the Seventh Circuit also rejected the defendant‘s “second, related equal-protection argument . . . that he merits retroactive relief because he is constitutionally indistinguishable from defendants sentenced after the Act‘s enactment.” Id. In that case, the defendant, like McBride, based his argument primarily on Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). Id. The Seventh Circuit found Griffith inapposite, explaining that Griffith involves the retroactive application to a pending appeal of a Supreme Court decision (in that case, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)) that established new criminal procedural rights. [The defendant] has offered nothing to suggest that Griffith applies equally to amendments to legislation that alter penalties but create no new rights, procedural or otherwise. Id.
Like the Seventh Circuit in Robinson, we reject McBride‘s equal-protection arguments.
Finally, we hold that the district court did not err in denying McBride‘s second “motion to continue sentencing until Congress acted on pending legislation that would reduce the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses.” United States v. Spires, 628 F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th Cir.2011).
Even assuming the district court erred when it denied [McBride‘s] motion for a continuance, [McBride] cannot show prejudice. Although Congress did in fact pass the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010) after [McBride‘s] sentеncing, the Act is not retroactive and [McBride] is thus subject to the penalties in place at the time he committed the crimes at issue in this case. Id.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.